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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Mechanism design uses game theory to analyze how to construct mechanisms
that give agents incentives to produce an outcome as optimal as possible for the
mechanism designer. My dissertation is on robust mechanism design, where the
mechanism designer has a great deal of uncertainty about what agents believe about
other agents’ preferences and beliefs. Much research on robust mechanism design
has focused on finding “dominant strategy mechanisms,” mechanisms where agents’
equilibrium actions depend only on their preferences and not their beliefs about the
other agents. Focusing on such mechanisms avoids the problem of uncertainty about
agents’ beliefs because it makes any assumptions about agents’ beliefs irrelevant.
Chapters 2 through 5 of my dissertation explore how effective dominant strategy
mechanisms are at achieving mechanism designers’ goals. Mechanisms are compared
by considering performance of the mechanisms for a wide range of possible agent pref-
erences and beliefs, and then defining one mechanism as an improvement on another
mechanism if it performs as well (and sometimes better) for every possible realiza-
tion of agents preferences and beliefs. The first two chapters explore this question
in the context of a public good problem. Chapter 2 demonstrates that there are
mechanisms that improve on the dominant strategy mechanisms in the sense just
described; Chapter 3 examines the usefulness of this particular efficiency concept by
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providing an example of a mechanism that is both very simple and unimprovable.
The fourth and fifth chapters are coauthored with Tilman Bo¨rgers and look at the
same question for the voting problem, where dominant strategy mechanisms are (ran-
dom) dictatorships. Chapter 4 shows that random dictatorship can be improved on
if the mechanism designer wants to maximize agents expectation of their welfare, but
not ex post welfare. Chapter 5 shows the same results when the designer wants to
maximize the sum of two agents welfare.
The last chapter, Chapter 6, is coauthored with Mary Rigdon and reports on an
experiment designed to investigate whether seemingly altruistic behavior is actually
a response to strategic incentives, by using pre-commitment of some agents to test
whether agents act differently when their actions cant influence others future actions.
Our data support the hypothesis that agents are motivated by social concerns.
2
CHAPTER II
A Prior Free Efficiency Comparison for the Public
Good Problem
2.1 Introduction
The public good problem with private information has long been considered an
important problem in economics. The simplest version of this problem is as follows.
A group of agents must decide whether to produce a single unit of an indivisible, non-
excludable public good and how to pay for it. The cost of production is commonly
known, but the value that each agent would gain from the production of the public
good, although privately known to that agent, is not necessarily known by the other
agents. Production of the good is efficient if the sum of the agents’ valuations is larger
than the production cost of the public good. But if the total value gained is less than
the cost, then the public good should not be created. In this paper I focus on the
case in which participation is voluntary: no agent can be forced to contribute to the
production of the public good.
If the agents adopt a decision procedure in which first agents report their values
for the public good, and the decision whether to produce the public good and the
division of the cost among the agents depend on the reported values, then it is possible
that some agents will try to free-ride by reporting lower valuations than they actually
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have. They may expect that others’ reported values may be sufficiently high that the
public good is produced even with their lower report, but that their own contribution
to the cost is lower than it would have been had they reported their values truthfully.
Such strategic misrepresentation of private values may undermine the efficiency of
the given procedure. Indeed, for some settings it can be shown that there is no way
to avoid strategic misrepresentation as long as the decision procedure adopted by
the agents ensures that the sum of agents’ payments equals the production cost of
the public good, and participation is voluntary.1 It is therefore, in these settings,
impossible to find a decision procedure that always arrives at efficient decisions.
This impossibility result inspires the study of a “second best problem:” This prob-
lem is typically conceptualized as that of a welfare-maximizing mechanism designer
who must design a game (a mechanism) which determines a set of available actions
for each agent to choose from. The mechanism then determines, based on the agent’s
choices, whether or not the public good is created, and which agents will pay what
share of the cost. The mechanism designer predicts the agents’ choices in any possible
mechanism using a game-theoretic equilibrium concept, such as Bayesian equilibrium.
If it is assumed that agents’ beliefs are derived from a common prior on some type
space, then the mechanism designer can be assumed to share the same common
prior, and the mechanism designer can seek to maximize expected welfare where the
expected welfare calculation is based on the common prior.
This problem has been studied in the literature where the literature has focused
on relatively special type spaces. In particular, Gu¨th and Hellwig (1986), Mailath
and Postlewaite (1990), and Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) have solved this problem
for the case that agents’ types are independently distributed. The mechanisms that
arise in these settings as second best do not have simple and intuitive interpretations.
1The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973)) pro-
duces the efficient outcome, but is not budget balanced. d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) show
that efficient mechanisms that are budget balanced exist, but these violate voluntary participation
as some agents may expect to be made worse off by participating.
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However, they typically imply underproduction of the public good in comparison to
the first best.
Starting with Wilson (1987), some economists have criticized the classic Bayesian
approach to mechanism design on the grounds that it makes too strong assumptions
regarding agents’ beliefs about other agents’ valuations, and about other agents’ be-
liefs. These assumptions reflect the mechanism designer’s perception of the environ-
ment for which he designs a mechanism. Critics of the classic approach argue that
we should instead study second-best mechanisms for a mechanism designer who has a
wider range of uncertainty about the agents’ beliefs. The common prior assumption
of classic Bayesian mechanism design may also be criticized as too strong. First,
common priors rule out certain hierarchies of beliefs, such as the “agreeing to dis-
agree” hierarchy. Second, even if agents’ hierarchies of beliefs are such that they can
be derived from a common prior, it is not clear why the mechanism designer should
share this common prior, as classic Bayesian mechanism design implicitly assumes.
There are two responses to this concern with the Bayesian approach. One solution
could be to study second best mechanisms with more complex type spaces, and allow
the subjective belief of the mechanism designer to not necessarily be identical to the
common prior that underlies agents’ beliefs (if such a common prior exists). But with
more complex priors the problem can become intractable. The more frequently cho-
sen approach is to impose stronger solution concepts that make assumptions about
agents’ beliefs irrelevant. This approach means focusing on mechanisms where equi-
librium strategies are (weakly) dominant or ex-post incentive compatible. When
only such mechanisms are considered, assumptions about agents’ beliefs are rendered
innocuous. The question then becomes whether imposing these stronger solution
concepts excludes too many mechanisms from consideration. If so, the approach will
constrain the mechanism designer to a lower level of efficiency than might be achieved
by directly analyzing the problem for a larger class of type spaces. Recent papers
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(Bergemann and Morris, 2005; Chung and Ely, 2007) have explored this question for
different mechanism design settings.
This paper proposes an alternative approach to the study of second best mecha-
nisms for the public good problem. I assume there is some, possibly large, set of type
spaces that the mechanism designer recognizes as possible descriptions of the agents’
type space. Then one mechanism is said to improve on another mechanism if the
former is at least as efficient as the latter for every realization of types on every type
space, and strictly more efficient for at least one type space that the mechanism de-
signer considers. When a mechanism designer considers a sufficiently rich set of type
spaces, this is equivalent to making no assumption about the mechanism designer’s
perception of the agents’ beliefs and private values. Furthermore, the induced partial
ranking of mechanisms is independent of any beliefs the mechanism designer might
have about the relative likelihood of different type spaces and realizations of types
within each type space. In that sense the ranking is robust. Furthermore, I prove a
result regarding the soundness of the improvability ranking by showing that, if the
typespaces the mechanism designer considers are finite, any feasible mechanism is
either unimprovable or there is an unimprovable mechanism that improves upon it.
I use the improvability ranking to examine the effect of restricting attention to
mechanisms where agents’ equilibrium actions depend only on their private values
and not on their beliefs. In private value settings those mechanisms are dominant
strategy mechanisms. I first characterize the set of dominant strategy mechanisms in
this setting (I restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms). I then show that in
this setting every dominant strategy mechanism is improved on by some mechanism,
i.e., there is some mechanism that is at least as efficient as the dominant strategy
mechanism on any type space, and strictly more efficient on some type space. While
this mechanism improves on the dominant strategy mechanism from an efficiency
perspective, it is just as “detail free.” Furthermore, any sufficiently rich set of possible
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type spaces would lead a welfare maximizer to prefer these non-dominant strategy
mechanisms to the class of dominant strategy mechanisms. This analysis implies that
in the public good setting, restricting attention to dominant strategy mechanisms is
not a satisfactory solution to finding optimal mechanisms on richer type spaces.
A further goal of this research is to characterize the unimprovable mechanisms
in the public good problem. I explore this question in a companion paper, “An
Unimprovability Result for the Public Good Problem.” In that paper, I show a simple
mechanism that is unimprovable among finite-action mechanisms on the universal
type space.
There is a natural connection between the literature on public good mechanisms
without hidden information and the mechanisms I find that improve on the dominant
strategy mechanisms. The improving mechanisms allow for agents to reduce the cost
of the public good to other agents (and pay the difference in cost themselves). In
this way they are similar in spirit to the public good “compensation mechanisms”
studied by Varian (1994a and 1994b), where agents contributing to a public good (in
a complete information setting) can subsidize other agents’ purchases of the public
good, and in so doing make those agents internalize the social benefit of their purchase
of the public good. In a similar fashion, the mechanism that improves on a dominant
strategy mechanism allows an agent to express a stronger preference for a public good
by reducing what another agent has to pay for the good to be produced.
This paper contributes to the literature examining when a mechanism designer
might choose to use a mechanism with belief-invariant strategies. One important
difference between this paper and the previous literature is the improvability com-
parison. Bergemann and Morris (2005) look at a general mechanism design setting
and a mechanism designer who wants to implement a social choice rule. They prove
results describing environments in which a mechanism designer can restrict attention
to mechanisms with belief-invariant equilibria and not reduce the set of social choice
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rules that can be implemented. In their analysis, social choice rules only depend on
payoff-relevant information. In contrast, the improvability concept of this paper takes
a description of the mechanism designer’s preference over outcomes that depends only
on agents’ valuations and then creates a ranking of mechanisms that reflects the goal
of finding, given that objective, a second best mechanism. This ranking can make a
distinction between mechanisms when for a given profile of pay-off relevant types, one
mechanism implements the optimal outcome for more possible beliefs of the agents
than another mechanism.
Chung and Ely (2007) examine an auction setting where the mechanism designer
is trying to maximize revenue, has a prior over the distribution of agents’ valuations,
and evaluates mechanisms on the basis of their worst-case revenue outcome over all
possible beliefs of the agents (a maxmin approach). They show that it in this setting
the mechanism designer can rationally choose a dominant strategy mechanism. A
difference between Chung and Ely’s setting and the setting in this paper is that
they assume that the mechanism designer only cares about the worst-case outcome,
whereas in this paper the mechanism designer compares outcomes across all possible
agent realizations. Given two mechanisms that have the same worse-case outcome,
one mechanism can still improve on the other mechanism if the former does strictly
better than the latter on other type spaces. However, maxmin preferences would not
make a distinction between the performance of the two mechanisms.
Chung and Ely also show that for a dominant strategy mechanism that is optimal
among dominant strategy mechanisms for a given distribution over agents’ valua-
tions, they can find a type space that describes agents’ beliefs such that a dominant
strategy mechanism is a rationalizable choice on that type space. In contrast, this
paper’s results suggest in the public goods setting, if the mechanism designer takes
into consideration a sufficiently broad range of types spaces, any dominant strat-
egy mechanism will be strictly inferior from an expected welfare standpoint to some
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mechanism where equilibrium actions depend on beliefs as well as payoff types.
An interesting recent paper by Yamashita (2011), written independently from
and at the same time as this paper, looks at a related question in the bilateral trade
setting. The approach of the paper differs from this paper in that in that it constructs
a robust mechanism design approach by analyzing outcomes that can arise from a
given mechanism when agents play non-weakly dominated strategies, and evaluates
mechanisms based on the minimal welfare the mechanism can guarantee when agents
can potentially play any non-weakly dominated strategy. He shows that for some
assumptions on the distribution of agents’ valuations, dominant strategy mechanisms
(specifically, fixed price mechanisms) can be optimal. He also shows that under
certain assumptions on the agent’s type spaces, a two-price mechanism that is not a
dominant strategy mechanism not only performs better than any dominant strategy
mechanism, but is in fact optimal among the class of finite mechanisms in terms of
its minimal welfare guarantee.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, I introduce the public good
problem and define the set of type spaces that a mechanism designer may consider. In
section 2.3, I describe the set of feasible mechanisms and equilibria. Section 2.4 defines
the concept of improvability as a (partial) ranking of mechanisms. Section 2.5 defines
dominant strategy mechanisms, while section 2.6 shows that in thinking about the
efficiency of dominant strategy mechanisms we can focus on a particular set of maxi-
mally efficient dominant strategy mechanisms, the fixed contribution mechanisms. In
section 2.7 I describe another mechanism, the “additional contribution mechanism.”
Section 2.8 compares the efficiency of dominant strategy mechanisms and interim im-
plementable mechanisms by showing that every fixed contribution mechanism, and
hence any dominant strategy mechanism, is improved on by some additional contri-
bution mechanism for any mechanism designer who considers a sufficiently rich set of
type spaces. Section 2.9 concludes.
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2.2 The Public Good Problem
A set of N individuals, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}, have to decide whether an
indivisible and non-excludable public good will be created, and how it will be paid
for. Each individual derives a private benefit from the creation of the public good, and
each individual knows their own benefit (valuation) but not necessarily the valuations
of the other individuals. Preferences are assumed to have a quasi-linear structure, and
monetary transfers between agents are possible. In this paper I focus on the problem
of a welfare maximizing social planner, who faces a budget balance constraint as well
as individual rationality constraints, who wants the public good to be created if and
only if the sum of the private benefits is at least as large as the cost of producing the
public good. The rest of this section develops the formal model and notation.
Let the set of outcomes be Y = {0, 1} ×RN where the first component is inter-
preted as the probability that the public good is created, and the other components
are the transfers from (or if negative, to) each individual. Let y ≡ (q, τ) ∈ Y where
τ = (τ1, τ2, ..., τN). The cost of creating the public good is c.
Individual i’s valuation of the good is vi ∈ [v, v], with the valuation profile v =
(v1, v2, ..., vN). I assume that Nv > c > Nv, so if all agents have the highest valuation
then the value created by the public is greater than its costs, and if all agents have
the lowest valuation then the value created by the public good is less than its cost.
I assume that each agent’s utility only depends on the outcome and their valuation
of the good. Furthermore, utilities are linear in the probability of the public good
being created and the monetary transfer:
ui(y, vi) = vi · q − τi (2.1)
Define a type space T ≡ (Ti, vˆi, pˆii)i∈{1,...,N} as a collection of types, Ti, for each
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player (ti ∈ Ti), a function for each agent i from types to valuations of the good,
vˆi : Ti → [v, v], and a function for each agent i that maps from agent i’s types
to beliefs over other agents’ types, pˆii : Ti → ∆(T−i), where ∆(T−i) is the set of
probability distributions over T−i. I will write pˆiti [E] for the probability that agent i
of type ti puts on the other agents being of a type profile in the set E. Furthermore,
define T = ×Ti, and for any i, T−i = ×j 6=iTj.
A given typespace T can be any set of types (and valuation and beliefs functions)
as long as a suitable measure can be defined for beliefs on T−i for all i. I do not
require T to be a subset of the universal type space (see Mertens and Zamir (1985)
for a description of the universal type space). In particular, I allow T to contain
“redundant” types, that is types with the same beliefs and valuations. I will focus
on two main cases of type spaces. I’ll call T finite if |Ti| is finite for all i. I will also
consider the universal type space.
I model the mechanism designer as having in mind a set Ω of type spaces which
the mechanism designer believes contains the actual type space. The mechanism
designer then considers mechanisms and their equilibria on all the type spaces in Ω.
2.3 Feasible Mechanisms
A mechanism M = (A, yˆ) consists of a set of actions Ai for each agent, with
A = ×Ai, and a mapping from combinations of actions into outcomes, yˆ : A→ Y . In
particular, I define yˆ(a) ≡ (q(a), τ(a)). Sequential games are included in the analysis
through their strategic form representations. A (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of a
mechanism is defined in the following way:
Definition II.1. An equilibrium a∗ of a mechanism M consists of a mapping for each
type space T ∈ Ω, and for each agent, a∗T,i : Ti → Ai, such that for all i and all ti ∈ Ti,
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a∗T,i(ti) is a best response to the other agent’s equilibrium actions a
∗
T,−i = ×j 6=i a∗T,j,
i.e.
Epˆi(ti)
[
vˆi(ti) · q
(
a∗T,i(ti), a
∗
T,−i(t−i)
)− τi (a∗T,i(ti), a∗T,−i(t−i))]
≥ Epˆi(ti)
[
vˆi(ti) · q
(
aˆi, a
∗
T,−i(t−i)
)− τi (aˆi, a∗T,−i(t−i))] (2.2)
for all aˆi ∈ Ai.
Note that an equilibrium defines actions for all agents and for all type spaces T ∈ Ω.
Given an equilibrium a∗, I can define for any T the expected utility of a type
ti ∈ Ti:
Ui(ti) ≡ Epˆi(ti)
[
vˆi(ti) · q(a∗T,i(ti), a∗T,−i(t−i))− τi(a∗T,i(ti), a∗T,−i(t−i))
]
and the expected utility of ti playing action ai in equilibrium,
Ui(ti, ai) ≡ Epˆi(ti)
[
vˆi(ti) · q(ai, a∗T,−i(t−i))− τi(ai, a∗T,−i(t−i))
]
.
Similarly, define the expected likelihood of the public good being produced for ti in
equilibrium,
Qi(ti) ≡ Epˆi(ti)q(a∗T,i(ti), a∗T,−i(t−i))
and the expected likelihood of the public good being produced for ti in equilibrium
if ti plays ai,
Qi(ti, ai) ≡ Epˆi(ti)q(ai, a∗T,−i(t−i)).
Definition II.2. M = (A, yˆ) and an equilibrium a∗ of that mechanism are feasible
if the following two conditions are satisfied:
• Ex-post Budget Balance (BB). For all a ∈ A,
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N∑
i=1
τi(a) = q(a) · c (2.3)
Note that budget balance is a condition on the mechanism, not on the equilib-
rium.
• Interim individual rationality (IIR). For all T ∈ Ω and all ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(ti) ≥ 0 (2.4)
The definition of equilibrium implies a third property:
• Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC). For all T ∈ Ω and all ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(ti) ≥ Epˆi(ti)
[
vˆi(ti) · q(aˆi, a∗T,−i(t−i))− τi(aˆi, a∗T,−i(t−i))
]
(2.5)
∀aˆi ∈ Ai
I now turn to comparisons of feasible mechanisms.
2.4 Improvability
The mechanism designer is assumed to want to maximize the sum of agents’
utilities. I further assume the mechanism designer must choose a feasible mechanism.
Therefore budget balance implies that the mechanism designer’s value function at
any realization of types t and for any outcome y = (q, τ) is equal to,
V (y, t) = q ·
(
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)− c
)
(2.6)
for any T ∈ Ω and t ∈ T .
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I make no assumptions about the mechanism designer’s beliefs. This allows the
analysis to apply to a mechanism designer with any Bayesian beliefs who maximizes
expected welfare, but can accomodate a mechanism designer with different or less well
defined beliefs, or different preferences. Instead I develop a prior-free comparison of
the efficiency of two mechanisms. I say a feasible mechanism M and equilibrium
a∗ improve on another mechanism M˜ and equilibrium a˜∗ if a∗ produces at least as
efficient a result for any realization of types as a˜∗, and for some possible realization
of types produces a strictly more efficient result. Efficiency is judged in terms of
equation (2.6).
Definition II.3. A feasible mechanism M and equilibrium a∗ improve on a feasible
mechanism M˜ and equilibrium a˜∗ if for all type spaces T ∈ Ω and all t ∈ T ,
qM(a∗T(t)) ≥ qM˜(a˜∗T(t)) when
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti) > c
and
qM(a∗T(t)) ≤ qM˜(a˜∗T(t)) when
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti) < c
(2.7)
and there is some T ∈ Ω and t ∈ T such that the applicable inequality in (2.7) is
strict.
This comparison corresponds to a weak dominance approach to comparing mecha-
nisms (and associated equilibria). It defines a partial ranking of mechanisms that
will partially describe a mechanism designer’s preferences under a broad range of as-
sumptions about the mechanism designer. Specifically, the analysis will apply for any
mechanism designer who prefers a mechanism over another if the former is always at
least as efficient and sometimes strictly more efficient than the latter. There are mod-
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els of mechanism designers that would not fit this description (for example, Chung
and Ely (2007)’s maxmin preferences disregard performance in all but the worst-case
situation). Even in these cases, however, the intuitive appeal of the improvability
criterion make it an appealing potential tie-breaker between mechanisms that are
ranked equally according to the specified preferences.
This definition of improvability focuses on ex-post outcomes rather than an interim
measure of efficiency. That choice reflects the description of the mechanism designer’s
preference for maximizing realized aggregate welfare. One reason for using realized
outcomes is that the mechanism designer may have different beliefs about the dis-
tribution of types than any particular agent, and so may disagree with an agent’s
interim evaluation of a mechanism. (The mechanism designer’s beliefs are not for-
mally modeled in this paper.) Furthermore, if agents have inconsistent beliefs, it may
be interim improving to allow agents to make bets between themselves. Focusing on
ex-post outcomes avoids entangling the analysis of the public goods problem with the
welfare analysis of bets reflecting inconsistent beliefs. Although any given mechanism
may allow agents to make such bets, the evaluation of the mechanism depends only
on agents’ realized utilities.
The following straightforward lemma establishes that improvability relates in a nat-
ural way to ex-post welfare maximization.
Lemma II.4. A feasible mechanism M = (AM , yˆM) and equilibrium a∗ improve on
a feasible mechanism M˜ = (AMˆ , yˆMˆ) and equilibrium a˜∗ if for all type spaces T ∈ Ω
and all t ∈ T ,
N∑
i=1
ui
(
yˆM(a∗T(t)), vˆi(ti)
) ≥ N∑
i=1
ui
(
yˆM˜(a˜∗T(t)), vˆi(ti)
)
(2.8)
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and for some T ∈ Ω and t ∈ T the inequality is strict.
Proof. Observe that
N∑
i=1
ui
(
yˆM(a∗T(t)), vˆi(ti)
)
= qM (a∗T(t))
(
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)− c
)
−
(
N∑
i=1
τMi (a
∗
T(t))− c · qM (a∗T(t))
)
,
which, by budget balance,
= qM (a∗T(t))
(
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)− c
)
. (2.9)
Therefore the sum of realized utilities will be
increasing in qM (a∗T(t)) when
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti) > c
and decreasing in qM (a∗T(t)) when
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti) < c.
So M and a∗ improve on another mechanism M˜ and a˜∗ if M and a∗ lead to a
(weakly) greater sum of realized utilities for every t, and a strictly greater sum of
realized utilities for some t.
The relationship between improvability and the sum of realized utilities holds be-
cause of strict budget balance. With a non-negative budget balance the relationship
between the two becomes more complicated, although the comparison of dominant
strategy mechanisms and Bayesian implementable mechanisms still holds. See ap-
pendix B for details.
To confirm the soundness of improvability as a method of (partially) ranking
mechanisms, it would be useful to know that for every improvable mechanism, there
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exists an unimprovable mechanism that improves on it. The following result shows
that this in fact the case in the finite type spaces setting. (I conjecture that a similar
result holds for infinite type spaces.)
Proposition II.5. Suppose Ω is a set of finite type spaces. For any mechanism
M and equilibrium a∗, either M an a∗ are unimprovable on Ω or there exists an
unimprovable mechanism Mˆ and equilibrium aˆ∗ that improve on M and a∗ on Ω.
Proof. Suppose M and a∗ are improvable. For any T, we can define the following
restricted improvability concept:
Definition II.6. A feasible mechanism M and equilibrium a∗ improve on a feasible
mechanism M˜ and equilibrium a˜∗ on T if for all t ∈ T ,
qM(a∗T(t)) ≥ qM˜(a˜∗T(t)) when
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti) > c
and
qM(a∗T(t)) ≤ qM˜(a˜∗T(t)) when
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti) < c
(2.10)
and for some t ∈ T such the applicable inequality in (2.10) is strict.
This is just the improvability definition with Ω = {T}.The following result will be
important in proving the proposition.
Lemma II.7. For any feasible mechanism M and equilibrium a∗ on finite T, either
M and a∗ are unimprovable on T or there exists an unimprovable mechanism Mˆ and
equilibrium aˆ∗ that improve on M and a∗ on T.
Proof. If M and a∗ are improvable then there must be some mechanism M1 and
equilibrium a∗1 that improve on them. M1 and equilibrium a∗1 must be efficient on
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strictly more type profiles than M and a∗. If M1 and equilibrium a∗1 are improvable,
then there exists some M2 and equilibrium a
∗2 that must be efficient on strictly more
type profiles than M1 and equilibrium a
∗1. Repeating this process, we can create a
sequence of mechanisms such that Mk+1 and equilibrium a
∗k+1 must be efficient on
strictly more type profiles than Mk and equilibrium a
∗k for all k ≥ 1. There are
ΠNi=1|Ti| type profiles in T, so the number of type profiles is finite. Therefore there
exists some k′ ≤ ΠNi=1|Ti| such that Mk′ and equilibrium a∗k′ are unimprovable.
Let Ω be a set of finite type spaces (possibly the set of all finite type spaces). For
each T ∈ Ω select a MT and equilibrium a∗T such that MT and a∗T are unimprovable
on T and improve on M and a∗ on T, or are equivalent to M and a∗ if M and a∗ are
unimprovable on T. Define the mechanism MΩ and equilibrium a
∗Ω by the following:
For each T ∈ Ω, ATi = {T} × AMTi for all i.
Then AMΩi = ∪T∈Ω ATi for all i.
Define ai ∈ AMΩi = (Ti, aTi ), and aT =
(
aT1 , ..., a
T
N
)
. Then let
yˆMΩ(a) =

yˆMT(aT) if Ti = Tj ∀i, j
(0,~0) otherwise.
For any T′ and any ti ∈ T ′i , let a∗ΩT′,i(ti) =
(
T′, a∗T
′
T′,i(ti)
)
.
An agent’s action is an indication of a type space T and an action from those actions
available in MT. By inspection a
∗Ω is an equilibrium of MΩ. (An agent has no incen-
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tive to indicate a different type space from the other agents, and given agreement on
the type space the agent has no incentive deviate from the equilibrium a∗T). Further-
more, for any T, MΩ and a
∗Ω are unimprovable on T because MT and equilibrium
a∗T are unimprovable on T and for all t ∈ T we have yˆMΩ(a∗ΩT (t)) = yˆMT(a∗TT (t)).
That MΩ and a
∗Ω are unimprovable on T for all T ∈ Ω implies they are unimprovable,
by the following logic: if any mechanism Mˆ and equilibrium aˆ∗ improved on MΩ and
a∗Ω, that would imply there exists a T′ such that Mˆ and aˆ∗ improved on MΩ and
a∗Ω on T′, which would be a contradiction.
Furthermore, M and a∗ improvable implies that M and a∗ are improvable on some
T′, and by construction MΩ and a∗Ω improve on M and a∗ on T′.
2.5 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
In this section I describe mechanisms that have equilibria that are belief-invariant,
that is agents’ equilibrium actions depend only on their valuations and not on their
beliefs. In the following section I describe the fixed contribution mechanism, and
establish that every belief-invariant equilibrium of an interim individually rational and
budget balanced mechanism is either equivalent to a fixed contribution mechanism
or improved on by a fixed contribution mechanism.
For ease of exposition I assume in this section that Ω includes all finite type
spaces, or the universal type space, or both. This allows me to assume that agents
with any valuation profile (and with certain beliefs) exist in some T in Ω. This is
consistent with the usual motivation for using dominant strategy mechanisms, that
they are robust to the specification of the type space.
Definition II.8. An equilibrium a∗ of a mechanism M = (AM , yˆM) is belief-
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invariant if for each i there exists a function aˆi : [v, v] → AMi such that for all
T ∈ Ω and all ti ∈ T , a∗T,i(ti) = aˆi(vˆi(ti)).
If we restrict attention to equilibria where actions only depend on valuations, then
the following definitions are natural:
Definition II.9. A mechanism M = (AM , yˆM) is a direct mechanism if AMi = [v, v]
for all i.
Definition II.10. A belief-invariant equilibrium a∗ (and the associated aˆi) of a direct
mechanism is a truth-telling equilibrium if for all i and all vi ∈ [v, v], aˆi(vi) = vi.
Given these definitions, I can apply the revelation principle:
Lemma II.11. Given a belief-invariant equilibrium a∗ (and the associated aˆ) of a
mechanism Mˆ = (AMˆ , yˆMˆ), the direct mechanism M = (AM , yˆM) defined by yˆM(v) =
yˆMˆ(aˆ(v)) for all v ∈ [v, v]N has a truth-telling equilibrium a∗, defined by
a∗T,i(ti) = vˆi(ti) (2.11)
for all T ∈ Ω and all ti, where
yˆM(a∗T(t)) = yˆ
Mˆ(a∗T(t)) (2.12)
for all T ∈ Ω and all t.
Proof. By construction, yˆM(a∗T(t)) = yˆ
M(aˆ(vˆ(t)) = yˆMˆ(a∗T(t)). I show a
∗ is an equi-
librium of M by contradiction. If a∗ is not an equilibrium, then there exists a T ∈ Ω
and ti such that an agent with type ti and who takes action vˆi(ti) would want to
deviate to another action v′ in AMi = [v, v]. Because ti deviating to v
′ has the same
effect on outcomes as ti deviating from aˆi(vˆi(ti)) to aˆi(v
′) when agents are in the a∗
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equilibrium of Mˆ , it must be that ti has an incentive to deviate under a
∗ as well,
which contradicts the assumption a∗ is an equilibrium.
Let a˜∗ : [v, v] → [v, v] be the identity function. Then for all T and all ti ∈ Ti,
a∗i (ti) = a˜
∗(vˆi(ti)) which shows a∗ is a truth-telling equilibrium.
Definition II.12. A direct mechanism satisfies dominant strategy incentive
compatibility (DIC) if, for all v,
vi · q(v)− τi(v) ≥ vi · q(vˆ, v−i)− τi(vˆ, v−i) ∀vˆ ∈ [v, v] (2.13)
A direct mechanism is called a dominant strategy mechanism if it satisfies
dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
Lemma II.13. A direct mechanism M has a truth-telling equilibrium a∗ if and only
if it is a dominant strategy mechanism.
Proof. If M has a truth-telling equilibrium a∗, and Ω contains all finite type spaces
or the universal type space, then for any vi ∈ [v, v] and v−i ∈ [v, v]N−1, we can find
a T where there exists a type ti with pˆiti {t−i|vˆ−i(t−i) = v−i} = 1. Then a∗ being a
truth-telling equilibrium implies that for all v′i,
Epˆitiui(ti, vˆi(ti)) = vi · qM(v)− τMi (v)
≥ Epˆitiui(ti, v′i) = vi · qM(v′i, v−i)− τMi (v′i, v−i).
Therefore M satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
If a direct mechanism is a dominant strategy mechanism, then it is immediate
that aˆi(vi) = vi is truth-telling equilibrium.
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Lemma II.14. A dominant strategy mechanism and its truth telling equilibrium are
feasible if and only if they satisfy the following two properties:
• Ex-post Budget Balance (BB). For every v ∈ [v, v]N , it must be that
N∑
i=1
τi(v) =
q(v) · c.
• Ex-post individual rationality (EIR). For all i, all v,
vi · q(v)− τi(v) ≥ 0 (2.14)
Proof. This characterization of ex-post budget balance is immediate from the ex-post
budget balance property of feasible mechanisms. Therefore it is immediate that if a
dominant strategy mechanism and its truth telling equilibrium are feasible they satisfy
ex-post budget balance, and if they don’t satisfy it then they cannot be feasible.
For ex-post individual rationality, just as in the proof of Lemma II.13, for any
vi ∈ [v, v] and v−i ∈ [v, v]N−1, it is possible to construct a T such that there exists
a type ti with pˆiti {t−i|vˆ−i(t−i) = v−i} = 1 (assuming that Ω includes all finite type
spaces or the universal type space). Then
Epˆitiui(yˆ(v), vˆi(ti)) = vi · q(v)− τi(v)
and interim individual rationality therefore implies vi · q(v)− τi(v) ≥ 0.
If a dominant strategy mechanism and its truth telling equilibrium satisfy EIR, then
for all i and all v, q(v) · vi − τi(v) ≥ 0, so
Ui(ti) = Epˆi(ti) [q(v) · vi − τi(v)] ≥ 0 (2.15)
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2.6 Fixed Contribution Mechanisms
Now I turn to a description of a particular class of mechanisms that are dominant
strategy mechanisms, the fixed contribution mechanisms. First I define the indi-
rect mechanism, then describe an equilibrium, which allows me to define the direct
mechanism version of the fixed contribution mechanism.
The fixed contribution mechanism is defined as follows: the mechanism designer
chooses a set of cost shares s = (s1, ..., sN) such that
N∑
i=1
si = c.
Each agent i learns his/her type, and is asked whether he/she wishes to have the
public good created if they have to pay si, and reply “Yes” or “No.” If all agents
indicate “Yes,” the public good is created, with each agent paying si. Otherwise the
public good is not created, and no transfers are made.
Formally, AFi = {“Y es”, “No”}, and yˆF (a) is defined as follows:
qF (a) =
 1 if ai = “Yes” ∀i0 otherwise (2.16)
τF (a) =
 s if ai = “Yes” ∀i0 otherwise (2.17)
To consider strategies of the agents, fix a type space T. A pure strategy for an
agent is a mapping ai : Ti → {“Yes”, “No”} that indicates for each type of the agent
whether they agree to the public good being created or not.
Define the following strategy for each agent i:
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a∗i (ti) =
 “Yes” if vˆi(ti) ≥ si“No” if vˆi(ti) < si (2.18)
The following lemma shows the straightforward result that these strategies form
an equilibrium (and are in fact weakly dominant for all i whenever vˆi(ti) 6= si).
Lemma II.15. The strategies a∗i for all i form a belief-invariant Bayesian Nash
equilibrium on any type space T. Furthermore, agents play weakly dominant strategies
when (for any i) their valuation is such that vˆi(ti) 6= si.
Proof. We show that each agent’s strategy is a weakly dominant strategy.
If the agent’s valuation vˆi(ti) > si,
ui (y(“Yes”, a−i(t−i)), vˆi(ti)) ∈ {0, vˆi(ti)− si}, ∀t−i ∈ T−i
Therefore, regardless of which value it takes on,
ui (y(“Yes”, a−i(t−i)), vˆi(ti)) ≥ 0 = ui (y(“No”, a−i(t−i)), vˆi(ti)) .
and if aj(tj) =“Yes” for all j 6= i, then the inequality is strict. Therefore “Yes” is a
weakly dominant.
If the agent’s valuation vˆi(ti) < si,
ui (y(“Yes”, a−i(t−i)), vˆi(ti)) ∈ {0, vˆi(ti)− si}, ∀t−i ∈ T−i
Therefore, regardless of which value it takes on,
ui (y(“Yes”, a−i(t−i)), vˆi(ti)) ≤ 0 = ui (y(“No”, a−i(t−i)), vˆi(ti)) .
and if aj(tj) = “Yes” for all j 6= i, then the inequality is strict. Therefore “No” is a
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weakly dominant strategy.
Since each agent is playing a weakly dominant strategy, or is indifferent between
either action, the strategies a∗i for all i form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
I call this equilibrium the “standard equilibrium” for the fixed contribution mech-
anism. There are other equilibria of this game, including the equilibrium where every
type says “No.” However, it is immediate that any equilibrium in weakly dominant
strategies will be equivalent to the equilibrium described above for all T and all t ∈ T
where ∀i, vˆi(ti) 6= si. That is, the equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies is unique
up to the behavior of agents whose valuations exactly equal their share costs.
Given the equilibrium above, the direct mechanism version of the fixed contribu-
tion mechanism with shares s is of the form F = (qF (v), τF (v)), where
qF (v) = Iv≥s (2.19)
where IX is the indicator function that equals 1 if X is true and 0 otherwise, and
τFi (v) = si · Iv≥s (2.20)
Lemma II.15 shows that this corresponds to a belief-invariant equilibrium of the
mechanism. Therefore fixed contribution mechanisms are dominant strategy mecha-
nisms.
Our interest in fixed contribution mechanisms derives from the following proposi-
tion. I restrict attention to deterministic dominant strategy mechanisms, i.e. where
qM(t) ∈ {0, 1} although I conjecture that a similar result holds for stochastic domi-
nant strategy mechanisms.
Proposition II.16. For any belief-invariant equilibrium of a feasible mechanism,
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with the corresponding direct mechanism M = (qM(v), τM(v)) with truth-telling equi-
librium a∗, there exists a fixed-contribution direct mechanism F = (qF (v), τF (v)) with
truth-telling equilibrium aˆ∗ such that either:
F and aˆ∗ improve on M and a∗
or
∀v, qM(v) = qF (v) whenever
N∑
i=1
vi 6= c.
Proof. See appendix A.
2.7 Additional Contribution Mechanism
This section describes a mechanism, called the “additional contribution mecha-
nism,” and discusses an equilibrium of this mechanism. Intuitively, this mechanism
starts with fixed cost shares like the fixed contribution mechanism, but one agent can
offer to pay a part of the fixed contribution of another agent (or agents) towards the
production cost of the public good. Offering to pay part of another agent’s payment
will potentially make the other agent willing to support the public good’s creation.
The additional contribution mechanism has the following structure. The mecha-
nism designer sets initial shares s0 = (s01, ..., s
0
N) with
∑N
i=1 s
0
i = c. Without loss of
generality, assume s01 < v.
The mechanism has two stages:
1. Each agent i ≤ N learns her type. Agent 1 selects a vector b ∈ RN+ where for
all i, 0 ≤ bi ≤ s0i − v, and b1 ≡ 0. This choice corresponds to how much agent 1
offers to pay on behalf of each other agent (hence the component corresponding
to agent 1 herself is zero.)
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2. Each agent i is given a final cost share sˆi. For agent 1, that share is her initial
share plus the sum of the components of b. For each agent 1 < i ≤ N , agent
i’s new share is her old share minus bi, the corresponding component of b.
Formally, the final cost shares sˆi are determined by the following formula:
sˆ1 = s
0
1 +
N∑
i=2
bi
and for i > 1,
sˆi = s
0
i − bi
The agents play the fixed contribution mechanism with contribution shares sˆ.
It may seem counterintuitive that agent 1 would raise her own share by making an
additional contribution to one or more other agents. However, if agent 1 believes that
lowering another agent’s required contribution increases the likelihood the public good
is created by enough to make up for the increased private cost if the public good is
created, then raising her own required contribution can be incentive compatible. I
show an example where this occurs in section 2.8. Here I show certain properties
that will hold for any equilibrium of the mechanism that is in non-weakly dominated
strategies.
For the following analysis, fix a type space T. A strategy for agent 1 is then a
pair (βT,mT,1) where βT : T1 → ∆(RN) maps every type t1 ∈ T1 into a distribution
over b vectors, and where mT,1 : T1 ×R → {“Yes”, “No”} maps every type t1 ∈ T1
and observed final share sˆ1 into an acceptance or rejection decision by agent 1. A
strategy for an agent 1 < i ≤ N is mT,i : Ti×R→ {“Yes”, “No”} which maps every
type ti ∈ Ti and observed final share sˆi into an acceptance or rejection decision by the
agent. Technically, each agent’s strategy in the final stage could depend on the sˆ’s or
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β’s, but because the fixed contribution mechanism is a dominant strategy mechanism,
I can ignore the potential role of this information and focus on the dominant strategy
equilibrium in the final stage.
Proposition II.17. There exists an equilibrium a∗ of the additional contribution
mechanism such that
vˆ(t) ≥ s0 ⇒ qM(a∗T(t)) = 1 (2.21)
and
vˆ(t) ≥ sˆ⇒ qM(a∗T(t)) = 1 (2.22)
for all t ∈ T and all T ∈ Ω.
Proof. I construct the equilibrium as follows: for all i, mT,i is specified by every agent
plays the equilibrium of the fixed contribution mechanism described in section 6 in the
second stage. This is enough to prove equation (2.22). To complete the description
of the equilibrium we have to specify agent 1’s choice βT of a b vector.
If vˆ1(t1) ≤ s01: In this case βT(t1) = ~0. Agent 1 has no incentive to deviate because
agent 1 will always get a utility of zero in the second stage regardless of the b agent
1 chooses, as sˆ1 ≥ s01 ≥ vˆ1(t1). In the second stage, agent 1 will either be indifferent
between “Yes” and “No” or will strictly prefer “No”.
If vˆ1(t1) > s
0
1: In this case, βT,−1(t1) maximizes the following expression:
βT,−1(t1) ∈ argmax
0≤b−1≤~v−s0−1
pˆit1
[
s0−1 − b−1 ≤ v−1(t−1)
] ·(vˆ1(t1)− (s01 + N∑
i=2
bi)
)
. (2.23)
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Consider the function
F (b−1) = pˆit1
[
s0−1 − b−1 ≤ v−1(t−1)
] ·(vˆ1(t1)− (s01 + N∑
i=2
bi)
)
(2.24)
which is the expression within the argmax of equation (2.23) and is the payoff agent
1 expects for each possible b−1. It is the product of F1(b−1) and F2(b−1), where
F1(b−1) = pˆit1
[
s0−1 − b−1 ≤ v−1(t−1)
]
= 1− pˆit1
[
v−1(t−1) < s0−1 − b−1
]
(2.25)
which by inspection is everywhere non-negative, monotonically non-decreasing and
right continuous in each dimension of b−1, and F2(b−1) is the continuous function,
F2(b−1) = vˆ1(t1)− (s01 +
N∑
i=2
bi), (2.26)
equal to the difference between agent 1’s valuation and sˆ1 as a function of b−1, that
is positive over some range.
I show F (b−1) has a maximum by contradiction. Assume F (b−1) has no maximum.
Then there exists a sequence of {bm−1} such that F (bm−1) > 0 is strictly increasing with
m and there is no bˆ−1 such that F (bˆ−1) ≥ F (bm−1) for all m. The domain of possible
b−1 is compact, so the sequence bm−1 has a convergent subsequence. Let the limit of
this subsequence be b∗−1. By F1 monotonically non-decreasing and right-continuous in
each dimension, F1(b
∗
−1) ≥ limF1(bm−1). And by F2 continuous, F2(b∗−1) = limF2(bm−1).
F (bm−1) > 0 implies F2(b
m
−1) > 0 for all m. Therefore, using that F1 is everywhere
non-negative and F2 is positive for all b
m
−1,
F (b∗−1) = F1(b
∗
−1) · F2(b∗−1) ≥ limF1(bm−1) · limF2(bm−1) = limF (bm−1) (2.27)
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and by assumption F (bm−1) is strictly increasing in m, so for all m
F (b∗−1) ≥ F (bm−1). (2.28)
However, that contradicts the assumption that F (b−1) has no maximum. Therefore
F (b−1) must have a maximum and so the argmax in equation (2.23) is well defined.
If there is more than one argmax, then an argmax is chosen arbitrarily, constrained
to
s01 +
N∑
i=2
βi < vˆ1(t1) (2.29)
Choosing a β(t1) that satisfies equation (2.29) ensures that the first part of the
Proposition holds. There must be a b that is an argmax of equation (2.23) and
satisfies equation (2.29) for the following reason: either t1’s expected utility at the
argmax b is greater than zero, implying that agent 1 expects the public good will be
produced with some probability and that equation (2.29) holds (that is, t1 pays less
than vˆ1(t1)), or the expected utility at the argmax is 0, in which case b = ~0 is an
argmax. In the latter case let β1(t1) = ~0. By assumption vˆ1(t1) > s
0
1 so equation
(2.29) is satisfied.
Then equation (2.21) follows from equation (2.29) and the fact that for all i > 1
sˆi ≤ s0i by construction, as well as the equilibrium actions in the second stage of the
game.
I will refer to an equilibrium of the additional contribution mechanism that fits the
description of Proposition II.17 as a “standard equilibrium” of the additional contri-
bution mechanism.
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2.8 Comparison of Efficiency
In this section I compare the ex-post welfare of the standard equilibrium of the
fixed contribution mechanism, as described in section 2.6, and a standard equilibrium
of the additional contribution mechanism as described in section 2.7. The central
result (Proposition II.22) is that the additional contribution mechanism performs at
least as well as the fixed contribution mechanism on any type space, and performs
better on some type spaces. In the terminology introduced in section 2.4, this means
that any standard equilibrium of the additional contribution mechanism will improve
on the standard equilibrium of the fixed contribution mechanism.
Our comparison will be between the fixed contribution mechanism with initial
shares s0 and the additional contribution mechanism with the same initial shares s0,
with the corresponding standard equilibria. The criterion will be the improvability
relationship, as defined in section 2.4.
Proposition II.18. For any type space T and type profile t, and given the standard
equilibria, the additional contribution mechanism implements the social welfare max-
imizing outcome if the fixed contribution mechanism implements the social welfare
maximizing outcome.
Proof. There are two cases to consider: when welfare maximization requires that the
public good not be created at t, and when welfare maximization requires the public
good to be created.
When welfare maximization requires the public good not be created, the sum
of valuations is less than c, so there is no possible sˆ such that for all i, sˆi ≤ vˆi(ti).
Therefore in a standard equilibrium of the additional contribution mechanism, at least
one agent must choose “No” and the public good will not be created. Likewise it must
be that s0i > vi for some i, guaranteeing that the public good is not created under
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the standard equilibrium of the fixed contribution mechanism. So neither mechanism
will produce the good.
When welfare maximization requires the public good be created, we need to show
that if the fixed contribution mechanism leads to the public good being created,
then so does the additional contribution mechanism. Recall that I defined a standard
equilibrium of the additional contribution mechanism as having the following property
(equation (2.21)):
vˆ(t) ≥ s0 ⇒ qM(a∗T(t)) = 1
for all t ∈ T and all T ∈ Ω, which ensures that whenever the standard equilibrium
of the fixed contribution mechanism produces the public good, so does the standard
equilibrium of the additional contribution mechanism.
Therefore both when producing the public good is efficient and when it is not effi-
cient, the standard equilibrium of the additional contribution mechanism maximizes
welfare if the standard equilibrium of the fixed contribution mechanism maximizes
welfare.
Proposition II.19. There exist T containing type profiles t where, for the standard
equilibria of the additional contribution mechanism, the additional contribution mech-
anism implements welfare maximization but the fixed contribution mechanism, with
its standard equilibrium, does not.
Proof. To demonstrate the existence of type spaces that satisfy this condition, I use
the following result that only depends on the primitives of T. The logic here is that
if agent 1 has a valuation above her initial share, knows the true valuations of the
other agents with probability one, and those agents all have valuations at or below
their initial shares (with at least one strictly below), then agent 1 can ensure the
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public good is created by choosing appropriate additional contributions to direct to
the other agents.
Lemma II.20. For any type profile t such that
•
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti) > c,
• pˆit1
({tˆ−1 | vˆ−1(tˆ−1) = vˆ−1(t−1)}) = 1,
• for i > 1, vˆi(ti) ≤ s0i , and
• for some j 6= 1, vˆj(tj) < s0j
any standard equilibrium of the additional contribution mechanism implements the
welfare maximizing outcome (creating the public good) at t.
Proof. Given agent 1’s beliefs, agent 1 will only expect the public good to be created
if and only if for all i 6= 1, bi ≥ s0i − vˆi(ti). The minimum amount of additional
contribution that will lead to the public good being created is then
N∑
i 6=1
s0i − vˆi(ti)
If agent 1 makes that additional contribution, she receives a payoff of
vˆ1(t1)− sˆi = vˆ1(t1)− s01 −
N∑
i 6=1
s0i +
N∑
i 6=1
vˆi(ti)
= vˆ1(t1)− s01 −
(
c− s01
)
+
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)− vˆ1(t1)
=
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)− c > 0
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Agent 1 gets a payoff of 0 if the public good is not created, so she is willing to
pay the minimal additional contributions that ensure the public good gets created.
Therefore, for all i > 1
bi = s
0
i − vˆi(ti)
and for all i, sˆi ≤ vˆi(ti) which implies the public good is created.
Let T be any type space. Then the above lemma leads immediately to the follow-
ing sufficient condition:
Lemma II.21. If there exists a t′ ∈ T that satisfies the conditions of Lemma II.20,
then at t′ ∈ T the additional contribution mechanism and its standard equilibria
implement the welfare maximizing outcome (the public good is created), while the
fixed contribution mechanism and its standard equilibrium do not.
Proof. Lemma II.20 implies that the additional contribution mechanism implements
the welfare maximizing outcome. The fixed contribution mechanism, however, will not
lead to the public good being created, because there is some j such that vˆj(tj) < s
0
j ,
so the fixed contribution mechanism does not implement the welfare maximizing
outcome.
Notably, the universal type space satisfies the conditions of lemma II.20, as do
some finite type spaces. So if Ω includes the set of all finite type spaces or the
universal type space then lemma II.21 will hold for some T ∈ Ω.
Propositions II.18 and II.19 together give us our result:
Proposition II.22. If Ω includes at least one T that satisifies the conditions of
lemma II.20, then: for any shares s0, the additional contribution mechanism with
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initial shares s0 and its standard equilibrium improves on the fixed contribution mech-
anism with fixed shares s = s0 and its standard equilibrium.
Proof. Proposition II.18 establishes that for every T and every t ∈ T , the additional
contribution mechanism is at least as efficient. Proposition II.19 establishes that for
some T and t ∈ T , the additional contribution mechanism is strictly more efficient.
These two claims together establish that the additional contribution mechanism im-
proves on the fixed contribution mechanism.
Combined with Proposition II.16, which shows that any feasible dominant strat-
egy mechanism is either improved on or equivalent (from an efficiency standpoint) to
a fixed contribution mechanism, Proposition II.22 implies that every feasible domi-
nant strategy mechanism is improved on by some additional contribution mechanism
on any Ω with a T that satisfies the conditions of lemma II.20. In particular, if Ω
includes the set of all finite type spaces or the universal type space, then every fea-
sible dominant strategy mechanism is improved on by some additional contribution
mechanism.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper has introduced, for the public goods problem, an approach to efficiency
comparisons between mechanisms. One mechanism improves on another mechanism
if it is at least as efficient for any realization of agents’ type on any type space the
mechanism designer considers possible, and strictly more efficient for some realization
of agents’ types on at least one of those type spaces. I demonstrated the soundness
of the unimprovability concept on finite type spaces, and then used the improvability
ranking to show that for any dominant strategy mechanism there exists an mechanism
where agents’ strategies depend upon their beliefs that improves on the dominant
strategy mechanism, if the mechanism designer considers a sufficiently rich set of
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type spaces. The result suggests than any welfare-maximizing mechanism designer
who considers a sufficiently rich set of type spaces would prefer a mechanism other
than a dominant strategy mechanism.
The improvability comparison raises the question of what mechanisms are unim-
provable in the public good setting. Chapter 3 of this dissertation provides a first
step in examining that question: a fairly simple mechanism, the all or nothing mech-
anism, is unimprovable on the universal type space among mechanisms with finite
actions. I hope to characterize the (possibly large) set of undominated mechanisms
on rich type spaces in the public good setting in future research. Another area for
further work is extending the improvability concept and the associated analysis of
mechanisms to other settings and to mechanism designers with objectives other than
welfare maximization. Chapter 4 of this dissertation performs a similar analysis in
the voting mechanism setting.
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2.10 Appendix 2.A
Dominant Strategy Mechanisms Are (Weakly) Improved on by Fixed
Contribution Mechanisms
The following lemma is a standard result. I present its proof for completeness.
Lemma II.23. A mechanism that satisfies ex-post budget balance (or has a non-
negative budget balance everywhere) is dominant strategy incentive compatible and
ex-post individual rational if and only if, for all i there exists a function τi(v−i) such
that, for all v−i,
q(vˆi, v−i) =
 1 vˆi > τi(v−i)0 vˆi < τi(v−i) (2.30)
and
τi(vˆi, v−i) =
 τi(v−i) vˆi > τi(v−i)0 vˆi < τi(v−i) (2.31)
Proof. Consider any v−i.
If ∀vˆi, q(vˆi, v−i) = 0, then let τi(v−i) = v.
For any vˆi and vˆ
′
i such that q(vˆi, v−i) = q(vˆ
′
i, v−i) = 1, then dominant strategy incen-
tive compatible implies that τi(vˆi, v−i) = τi(vˆ′i, v−i). Therefore let τi(v−i) ≡ τi(vˆi, v−i)
for any vˆi such that q(vˆi, v−i) = 1.
If there exist vˆi such that q(vˆi, v−i) = 0, then by ex-post individual rationality and
that the budget cannot be negative, τi(vˆi, v−i) = 0.
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Then by dominant strategy incentive compatibility,
q(vˆi, v−i) = 1 ⇒ vˆi ≥ τi(v−i) and τi(vˆi, v−i) = τi(v−i) (2.32)
and
q(vˆi, v−i) = 0 ⇒ vˆi ≤ τi(v−i) and τi(vˆi, v−i) = 0 (2.33)
which imply equation (2.30) and equation (2.31).
Proposition II.16. For any belief-invariant equilibrium of a feasible mechanism,
with the corresponding direct mechanism M = (qM(v), τM(v)) with truth-telling equi-
librium a∗, there exists a fixed-contribution direct mechanism F = (qF (v), τF (v)) with
truth-telling equilibrium aˆ∗ such that either:
F and aˆ∗ improve on M and a∗
or
∀v, qM(v) = qF (v) whenever
N∑
i=1
vi 6= c.
Proof. In constructing F , there are two possibilities to consider regarding qM(v):
If qM(v) = 0 then the result is trivial. Set si =
c
N
for all i, and then it is immediate
that F and aˆ∗ improve on M and a∗.
Therefore the rest of the proof will deal with the case qM(v) = 1.
Construct F = (qF (v), τF (v)) by, for all i, setting si = τ
M
i (v).
Then qF (v) = Iv≥s and τFi (v) = q
F (v) · si.
F is feasible because the fact that M is budget balanced implies
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N∑
i=1
si =
N∑
i=1
τi(v) = 1.
For any v, we can compare the relative efficiency.
Case 1:
N∑
i=1
vi < c. In this case creation of the public good is inefficient. Furthermore,
N∑
i=1
vi < c =
N∑
i=1
si so there exists an i such that vi < si which implies q
F (v) = 0 ≤
qM(v).
Case 2:
N∑
i=1
vi > c. There are two possible values for q
M(v):
If qM(v) = 1, note that lemma II.23 implies that q(vi, v−i) is non-decreasing in v−i.
That implies that q(vj, v−j) = 1 for all j. Lemma II.23 then implies that vj ≥
τMj (v) = sj for all j. Therefore q
F (v) = 1 = qM(v).
If qM(v) = 0, then qF (v) ≥ 0 = qM(v). Therefore qF (v) ≥ qM(v).
Together these results show that in Case 2, qF (v) ≥ qM(v).
Combining Case 1 and Case 2, we get the statement:
qF (v) ≥ qM(v) when
N∑
i=1
vi > c
and
qF (v) ≤ qM(v) when
N∑
i=1
vi < c
(2.34)
If there exists a v such that the applicable inequality in (2.34) is strict, then F and
aˆ∗ improve on M and a∗; otherwise, (2.34) implies that for all v,
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N∑
i=1
vi 6= c⇒ qF (v) = qM(v)
which completes the result to be proved.
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2.11 Appendix 2.B
Non-Negative Budget Balance
In the main body of this paper I have assumed that feasible mechanisms have a
strict budget balance of zero. A weaker assumption would be to allow mechanisms
to have a non-negative budget balance. Here I discuss the implications of a non-
negative budget balance for the definition of improvability, and for the improvability
of dominant strategy mechanisms by fixed contribution mechanisms. I show that
allowing non-negative budget balance does not alter the result of the paper regarding
the improvability of dominant strategy mechanisms, as fixed contribution mechanisms
still (weakly) improve on all other non-negative budget balance dominant strategy
mechanisms.
Improvability. Allowing non-negative budget balance means that the definition of
improvability has to be modified. Now it must account for the fact that the sum of
transfers affects the sum of the individual agents’ utilities as well as whether the public
good is produced. How to define improvability will now depend on what happens to
the non-balanced portion of transfers.
If we assume the budget is balanced by an agent outside of theN agents we’ve modeled
as participating in the mechanism, and the mechanism designer cares equally about
this external agent’s welfare as the welfare of the participants, then the definition of
improvability used above still applies; any transfer paid by an agent is received by
another agent, except for transfers used to pay for the public good, so a mechanism
maximizes welfare by creating the public good if its aggregate value exceeds its cost
and not creating the public good if its aggregate value is less than the cost.
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Alternatively we might imagine that a mechanism constrained to have a non-negative
budget might generate a surplus that is either physically destroyed or transferred to
agents whose welfare does not enter into the mechanism designer’s consideration. I
call such a mechanism a non-negative budget mechanism.
Definition II.24. A mechanismM = (A, yˆ) is a non-negative budget mechanism
if for all a ∈ A,
N∑
i=1
τi(a) ≥ c · q(a) (2.35)
Then the definition of improvability can be generalized to become the following defi-
nition of improvability-including-transfers:
Definition II.25. A non-negative budget mechanism M = (qM , τM) and equilibrium
a∗ improve-including-transfers on another non-negative budget mechanism Mˆ =
(qMˆ , τ Mˆ) and equilibrium aˆ∗ if for all type spaces T ∈ Ω and all t ∈ T ,
qM(a∗T(t))
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)−
N∑
i=1
τMi (a
∗
T(t)) ≥ qMˆ(aˆ∗T(t))
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)−
N∑
i=1
τ Mˆi (aˆ
∗
T(t)) (2.36)
and there is some T ∈ Ω and t ∈ T such that the inequality is strict.
By inspection this definition corresponds to (weakly) increasing the sum of the realized
utilities of the agents at each possible type profile. If both mechanisms are ex-post
budget balanced in the strict sense of equation (3), then improvability-with-transfers
is equivalent to improvabilty.
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Dominant strategy mechanisms. In this part of the appendix I analyze domi-
nant strategy mechanisms that satisfy non-negative budget balance and individual
rationality but not necessarily ex-post budget balance.
I show that proposition 1 generalizes to non-negative budget, individually rational
dominant strategy mechanisms with non-negative budget balance (Proposition II.26).
I further show that proposition 1 generalizes to non-negative budget, individually ra-
tional dominant strategy mechanisms when the criteria is changed from improvability
to improvability-with-transfers (Proposition II.28).
Proposition II.26. For any belief-invariant equilibrium of a non-negative budget, in-
dividually rational mechanism, with the corresponding direct mechanism M = (qM(v), τM(v))
with truth-telling equilibrium a∗, there exists a fixed-contribution direct mechanism
F = (qF (v), τF (v)) with truth-telling equilibrium aˆ∗ such that either:
F and aˆ∗ improve on M and a∗
or
∀v, qM(v) = qF (v) whenever
N∑
i=1
vi 6= c.
Proof. This section draws upon the proof for Proposition 1, in Appendix A. Note
that for the proof of Proposition 1 the only detail of a particular dominant strategy
mechanism M that matters is τ(v). Lemma II.23 only requires that the budget cannot
be negative.
Fix a non-negative budget, individually rational dominant strategy mechanism M =
(qM(v), τM(v)). If
N∑
i=1
τi(v) = c, then the proof of Proposition 1 applies without any
modification.
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If
N∑
i=1
τMi (v) > c, then proposition 1 only needs to be modified in a very small way:
in the construction of F , let
s1 = τ
M
i (v)−
(
N∑
i=1
τMi (v)− c
)
That is, in the fixed contribution mechanism that is constructed, I lower agent 1’s
fixed share by just enough to balance the budget (at v). Then the proof of proposition
1 applies.
Note that in the case that
N∑
i=1
τMi (v) > c the fixed contribution mechanism must
improve on (not just be equivalent to) the original mechanism, because the fixed
contribution mechanism creates the public good for any v of the form (v1, v−1), where
v1 ∈
[
τMi (v)−
(
N∑
i=1
τMi (v)− c
)
, τMi (v)
)
but the original mechanism does not.
Therefore the result of Proposition 1 extends to the entire class of non-negative bud-
get, individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms (of which feasible dominant
strategy mechanisms are a subset).
As the following lemma demonstrates, it is straighforward to show that a strictly
budget balanced mechanism that improves on a non-negative budget mechanism also
improves-including-transfers on the non-negative budget mechanism.
Lemma II.27. If an ex-post budget balanced mechanism M = (qM , τM) and equilib-
rium a∗ improve on a non-negative budget mechanism Mˆ = (qMˆ , τ Mˆ) and equilibrium
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aˆ∗, then
M and a∗ improve-including-transfers on Mˆ and aˆ∗.
Proof. For any type space T ∈ Ω and t ∈ T ,
M ex-post budget balanced and Mˆ non-negative budget implies:
N∑
i=1
τMi (a
∗
T(t)) = c · qM(a∗T(t)) and
N∑
i=1
τ Mˆi (aˆ
∗
T(t)) ≥ c · qMˆ(aˆ∗T(t)) (2.37)
Improvability implies:
qM(a∗T(t))
(
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)− c
)
≥ qMˆ(aˆ∗T(t))
(
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)− c
)
Substituting from (2.37) yields
qM(a∗T(t))
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)−
N∑
i=1
τMi (a
∗
T(t)) ≥ qMˆ(aˆ∗T(t))
N∑
i=1
vˆi(ti)−
N∑
i=1
τ Mˆi (aˆ
∗
T(t))
which is identical to equation (2.36). Therefore M and a∗ improve-including-transfers
on Mˆ and aˆ∗.
Proposition II.26 and lemma II.27 imply a generalization of Proposition II.16.
Proposition II.28. For any belief-invariant equilibrium of a non-negative budget, in-
dividually rational mechanism, with the corresponding direct mechanism M = (qM(v), τM(v))
with truth-telling equilibrium a∗, there exists a fixed-contribution direct mechanism
F = (qF (v), τF (v)) with truth-telling equilibrium aˆ∗ such that either:
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F and aˆ∗ improve-with-transfers on M and a∗
or
∀v, qM(v) = qF (v) whenever
N∑
i=1
vi 6= c.
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CHAPTER III
An Unimprovability Result for the Public Good
Problem
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 analyzed the problem of designing a mechanism for the public good
problem when the mechanism designer does not make assumptions about agents’
types, but instead considers a wide range of type spaces as plausible descriptions
of agents’ preferences and beliefs. I looked specifically at the approach of finding a
weakly undominated (or “unimprovable”) mechanism when considering performance
across a range of type spaces. I showed that mechanisms exist that are unimprovable
on finite type spaces. However, these mechanisms may be too complicated in practice
to be of much use to a mechanism designer. Consequently it may be useful to restrict
attention to a smaller set of mechanisms that a mechanism designer could realistically
implement.
In this paper I attempt such an analysis by focusing on mechanisms with finite
actions. I also take the relevant concept of improvability to be that a mechanism
is improvable if there exists a mechanism Mˆ with finite actions that improves on
M . To model the uncertainty of the mechanism designer regarding the preferences
and beliefs of agents, I assume the mechanism designer considers outcomes on the
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universal type space.
In this paper I demonstrate a finite action mechanism, the All or Nothing mech-
anism, that is unimprovable among the set of mechanisms with finite actions. I first
describe the mechanism and then provide the result regarding unimprovability. A
weakness of the result is that the method of proof is not particularly generalizable
to other mechanisms. However, the result does show both that a relatively simple
mechanism can be unimprovable, and that such a result can be proven using relatively
unsophisticated (if involved) methods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly summarizes the public good
environment (described in more detail in the companion paper) and highlights the
differences between the setting in this paper and the companion paper. Section 3.3
presents the All or Nothing mechanism. Section 3.4 establishes some useful lemmas
for proving the main result. Section 3.5 contains the proof that the All or Nothing
mechanism is unimprovable. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Mechanism Design Problem
In general I follow the assumptions and notations of chapter 2; I refer the reader
to that document for definitions and assumptions. However, I make some changes
to the environment for this paper. I assume that v > c, that is the highest possible
valuation is greater than the cost of the public good. For technical reasons, I also
assume that mechanisms have a finite number of actions. Furthermore I focus on the
case that there are exactly two agents, i.e. N = 2.
I assume that the mechanism designer’s uncertainty about agents’ preferences
and beliefs can be captured by the mechanism designer considering outcomes over
the universal type space. In the notation of chapter 2, I assume that Ω = {S}. This
simplifies description of equilibria by not requiring the equilibrium to be defined over
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more than one type space.
I restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria in non-weakly dominated strategies.
I make one further non-standard restriction on the equilibria under consideration: in
equilibrium, every action is somewhere strictly preferred. By this I mean for each
agent, and each action of that agent played in equilibrium, there exists a type of that
agent in the universal type space for whom that action is a strict best response.
Definition III.1. An equilibrium a∗ satisfies every action played in equilibrium is
somewhere strictly preferred on {S} if for all i and all ti ∈ Ti, where Ti is the typespace
for agent i in the universal typespace, there exists tˆi such that
Ui(tˆi, a
∗
i (tˆi)) > Ui(tˆi, a
′
i) (3.1)
for all a′i 6= a∗i (ti).
3.3 The All or Nothing Mechanism
I assume in the following discussion that there are two agents, 1 and 2. I normalize
the cost of the public good to 1, and assume the lowest possible valuation v = 0. I
furthermore assume v > 1. The All or Nothing Mechanism is a simplified “take it
or leave it” offer by agent 1, where agent 1 must either offer to pay the whole cost
or force agent 2 to pay the entire cost if the public good is built. Alternatively,
this mechanism is equivalent to a simplified additional contribution mechanism with
initial shares s01 = 0 and s
0
2 = 1, where the first agent can raise her own cost share,
but only has the option of raising that share to the entire cost. (See chapter 2 for
discussion of the additional contribution mechanism.)
Formally, The All or Nothing Mechanism is M˜ =
{
(A˜1, A˜2), y
}
where
• A˜1 = {“PAY”, “DON’T PAY”}
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• A˜2 = {“pay”, “don’t pay”}
• y˜(a1, a2) = (q˜(a1, a2), τ˜(a1, a2)) is defined by the values in table 1.
q˜(a1, a2) =
Actions pay don’t pay
PAY 1 1
DON’T PAY 1 0
τ˜(a1, a2) =
Actions pay don’t pay
PAY (1,0) (1,0)
DON’T PAY (0,1) (0,0)
Table 3.1: Outcomes under the All or Nothing Mechanism
The following strategies are an equilibrium of the All or Nothing Mechanism.
a˜∗1(t1)) =

“PAY” if vˆ1(t1) > 1,
pˆit1 [vˆ2(t2) < 1] ≥ 1vˆ1(t1)
“DON’T PAY” otherwise
a˜∗2(t2)) =

“pay” if vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1
“don’t pay” if vˆ2(t2) < 1
Lemma III.2. The strategies a˜∗1(t1) and a˜
∗
2(t2) are an equilibrium of the All or Noth-
ing mechanism on the universal type space.
Proof. For agent 2, inspection shows that “pay” is a weakly dominant strategy when
vˆ2(t2) > 1 and “don’t pay” is a weakly dominant strategy when vˆ2(t2) < 1. When
vˆ2(t2) = 1 then agent 2 is indifferent between the two actions regardless of his beliefs.
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Therefore agent 2 has no incentive to deviate from a˜∗2(t2)) regardless of agent 1’s
strategy.
Given agent 2’s strategy is a˜∗2(t2), agent 1’s payoff for each action correspond to:
U(t1, “PAY”) = vˆ1(t1)− 1
and
U(t1, “DON’T PAY”) = pˆit1 [vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1] · vˆ1(t1)
Therefore, the action “DON’T PAY” has a higher payoff for agent 1 when
U(t1, “DON’T PAY”) ≥ U(t1, “PAY”)
which is equivalent to
pˆit1 [vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1] · vˆ1(t1) ≥ vˆ1(t1)− 1
which is equivalent to
pˆit1 [vˆ2(t2) < 1] ≥
1
vˆ1(t1)
.
Therefore a˜∗1(t1) specifies that agent 1 play the action “DON’T PAY” exactly when
is it incentive compatible to do so.
3.4 The Focus Lemma
This section introduces a result that will be used repeatedly in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. It will be useful therefore to state and prove the result before proceeding to
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the main proof. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i.
Definition III.3. Given a set of distributions {p˜ini }i=1,...,N such that p˜ini ∈ ∆(Tj) for
all n, the set Bi({p˜ini }, vi) ∈ Ai is defined by
• Bi({p˜i1i }, vi) ⊂ Ai is the set of equilibrium best responses to p˜i1i .
• For m ∈ {2, 3, ..., N}, Bi({p˜ini }n=1,...,m, vi) ⊂ Bi({p˜ini }n=1,...,m−1, vi) is the set of
actions that are best responses to p˜imi conditional on being inBi({p˜ini }n=1,...,m−1, vi).
Finiteness of Ai ensures that Bi({p˜ini }, vi) ∈ Ai is non-empty. I now prove the
following useful result, which I refer to as the “focus lemma.”
Lemma III.4 (focus lemma). If for some {p˜ini }n=1,...,N and ~ = (1, ..., N),
pˆii(ti)[E] =
N∑
n=1
np˜i
n
i [E] (3.2)
and
 ≡ max
1≤n<N
n+1
n
< 1 (3.3)
Then  sufficiently small implies a∗i (ti) ∈ Bi({p˜ini }n=1,...,N , vˆi(ti)).
Proof. By induction on n.
• n = 1. Because Ai is finite, there is some κ1 > 0 such that for any action
aˆi 6∈ Bi({p˜i1i }, vˆi(ti)), conditional on the distribution p˜i1i the difference between
the expected payoff of any action ai ∈ Bi({p˜i1i }, vˆi(ti)) and the expected payoff
of aˆi is at least κ1. Because A is finite, the set of possible realized utilities for
agent i (condition on vˆi(ti, )) is also finite; let λ designate the difference between
the maximal and the minimal possible realized utilities. Then the difference in
expected utility for playing aˆi versus ai is bounded by
Ui(ti, aˆi)− Ui(ti, ai) ≤ 1(−κ1) + (1− 1) · λ (3.4)
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Note that neither κ1 nor λ depend on the choice of ~. Equation (3.3) implies
that
1− 1 =
N∑
n=2
n ≤ (N − 1) · 1. (3.5)
subsituting into equation (3.4) yields
Ui(ti, aˆi)− Ui(ti, ai) ≤ 1(−κ1) + ((N − 1) · 1) · λ (3.6)
which implies
−κ1 + (N − 1) · λ < 0 ⇒ Ui(ti, aˆi)− Ui(ti, ai) < 0 (3.7)
and consequently, if
 <
κ1
(N − 1)λ (3.8)
then Ui(ti, aˆi) < Ui(ti, ai) for all aˆi 6∈ Bi({p˜i1i }, vˆi(ti)) and therefore a∗i (ti) ∈
Bi({p˜i1i }, vˆi(ti)).
• n > 1. By the inductive hypothesis, a∗i (ti) ∈ Bi({p˜imi }m=1,...,n−1, vˆi(ti)). I
now look at the payoff of playing any action aˆi ∈ Bi({p˜imi }m=1,...,n−1, vˆi(ti)) \
Bi({p˜imi }m=1,...,n, vˆi(ti)) and an action ai ∈ Bi({p˜imi }m=1,...,n, vˆi(ti)). As in the
n = 1 case, let κn > 0 be the minimal difference between the expected payoff
of any such ai and the expected payoff of any such action aˆi, conditional on
the distribution p˜ini . (If no such aˆi exist then the inductive step is immediately
satisfied). Note that κn only depends on {p˜imi }m=1,...,n. The difference in payoffs
must be bounded by
Ui(ti, aˆi)− Ui(ti, ai) ≤ n(−κn) +
(
N∑
m=n+1
m
)
· λ (3.9)
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Note that equation (3.3) implies that
N∑
m=n+1
m < (N − n) · n. Then a simple
calculation similar to the n = 1 case shows that the right side of equation (3.9)
is negative if
 <
κn
(N − n)λ (3.10)
Therefore if equation (3.10) is satisfied for all n ≤ N , then the result holds. This
completes the proof.
3.5 The All or Nothing Mechanism is Unimprovable
Now I can state the proposition.
Proposition III.5. Given Ω = {S}, the universal type space, the All or Nothing
mechanism, with the equilibrium described above, is not improvable by any mechanism
with finite actions and a pure-strategy equilibrium in non-weakly dominated strategies
where every action played in equilibrium is somewhere strictly preferred.
Proof. First I show that another proposition, proposition III.7, is equivalent to propo-
sition III.5. I then prove proposition III.7 to complete the proof.
The proof takes into account the following observations regarding what it would
mean for a mechanism and its equilibrium to improve on the All or Nothing mech-
anism. Another way to state the claim is that if there is a mechanism M = (A, yˆ)
with equilibrium a∗ that is as efficient for any realization of agents’ types t as the
All or Nothing mechanism M˜ with equilibrium a˜∗, then for all realizations of agents’
types t, M and M˜ must be equally efficient. The proof focuses on this phrasing of
the claim.
M as efficient as M˜ : The All or Nothing mechanism is efficient whenever vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1
or a˜∗1(t1) =“PAY”. In the first case, the public good is produced because a˜
∗
2(t2) =“pay”,
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and because vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1 the sum of the agents’ valuations is at least one. In the second
case, the public good is produced and a˜∗1(t1) =“PAY” implies that vˆ1(t1) ≥ 1 so the
sum of the agents’ valuations are at least one. For the first case, M and a∗ as efficient
as M˜ and a˜∗ implies that for all
a2 ∈ {a2 ∈ A2|∃t2 ∈ T2, vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1, a∗2(t2) = a2},
q(a1, a2) = 1 ∀a1 ∈ A1 (3.11)
that is, for any action that is played in equilibrium by some t2 with a valuation at least
1, it must be that the public good is produced when that action is played, regardless
of the action of agent 1. That implies that ∀a1 ∈ A1,∀t1 ∈ T1,
Q1(t1, a1) ≥ pˆi1(t1)[vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1]. (3.12)
Similarly for the second case, for any
a1 ∈ {a1 ∈ A1|∃t1 ∈ T1, a˜∗1(t1) = “PAY”, a∗1(t1) = a1} ,
q(a1, a2) = 1 ∀a2 ∈ A2
that is, for any action played in equilibrium by a type of agent 1 who would play
“PAY” under the equilibrium of the All or Nothing mechanism, it must be that when
that action is played the public good is produced regardless of the action of agent 2.
The All or Nothing mechanism is also efficient when vˆ1(t1) + vˆ2(t2) < 1, that is when
producing the public good is inefficient. In this situation a˜∗ dictates that agent 1
plays “DON’T PAY” and agent 2 plays “don’t pay”, as both agents’ valuations are
less than one.
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How M could be more efficient than M˜ : The All or Nothing mechanism is not
efficient in the remaining situations, where vˆ2(t2) < 1 and a˜
∗
1(t1) =“DON’T PAY”,
but vˆ1(t1) + vˆ2(t2) > 1. If M and a
∗ improve on M˜ and a˜∗, it must be for some t that
fits this description. Therefore to prove the proposition, I need to show the following:
Proposition III.6. If M = (A, yˆ) and a∗ are as efficient as M˜ and a˜∗ for all t, then
for all t such that
• vˆ2(t2) < 1, and
• a˜∗1(t1) =“DON’T PAY”,
it must be that in equilibrium a∗ of M ,
q(a∗1(t1), a
∗
2(t2)) = 0. (3.13)
Given the observations above about when the All or Nothing mechanism is efficient,
this proposition says that in those situations where the All or Nothing mechanism is
not efficient, neither is M .
Expectations and ex-post improvement. Proposition III.6 looks at ex-post
outcomes, but it will be useful to rephrase the required result in terms of agents’
expectations. Define
Q1(t1) ≡ Epˆi1(t1) [q(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))]
and
Q˜1(t1) ≡ Epˆi1(t1) [q˜(a˜∗1(t1), a˜∗2(t2))] .
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Clearly if proposition III.6 holds then Q1(t1) = Q˜1(t1) for all t1. What we will
take advantage of is the opposite fact, that if Q1(t1) = Q˜1(t1) for all t1, proposition
III.6 holds. It is more complicated to show that Q1(t1) = Q˜1(t1) for all t1 implies
proposition III.6. To do so, we observe that by the assumption that every action
played in equilibrium is somewhere strictly preferred, for all a1 ∈ A1 there exists a type
t1 such that a
∗(t1) = a1 and t1 strictly prefers a1 to any other action, in equilibrium.
Then there exists some pˆi′1 ∈ ∆(T2) arbitrarily close to pˆi(t1) with pˆi′1[a∗2(t2) = a′2] > 0
for all a′2, and such that if t˜1 has pˆi1(t˜1) = pˆi
′
1 and vˆ1(t˜1) = vˆ1(t1) then a
∗
1(t˜1) = a
∗
1(t1).
As observed above, M at least as efficient as M˜ implies that q(a∗(t)) ≥ q˜(a˜∗(t)) for all
t ∈ T . Therefore if Q1(t˜1) = Q˜1(t˜1) then it must be that q(a∗1(t˜1), a2) = q˜(a˜∗1(t˜1), a2)
for all a2 ∈ A2, and we can make a similar statement for every a1 ∈ A1. Therefore, the
following proposition is equivalent to proposition III.6, and consequently proposition
III.5.
Proposition III.7. If M = (A, yˆ) and a∗ are as efficient as M˜ and a˜∗ for all t, then
for all t1 it must be that in equilibrium a
∗ of M ,
Q1(t1) = Q˜1(t1). (3.14)
In what follows I prove Proposition III.6, and thus Proposition III.5.
Proof. M as efficient as M˜ ensures that Q1(t1) = Q˜1(t1) = 1 when a˜
∗
1(t1) =“PAY”,
so I focus on the case that a˜∗1(t1) =“DON’T PAY.”
I split the proof into two cases (see figure 3.1).
• Case 1 applies when t1, the type of agent one, puts probability 1 on agent two’s
valuation being less than one (the thick line segment indicated in figure 1). If
58
Figure 3.1: Cases 1 and 2 for the proof of Proposition III.6
a∗1(t1) =“DON’T PAY” then it must be that vˆ1(t1) ≤ 1. In this case I show
that Q1(t1) = 0 = Q˜1(t1).
• Case 2 applies when t1 puts probability less than 1 on agent two’s valuation
being below one (or equivalently, puts some probability on agent two’s valuation
being at least one), and a˜∗1(t1) =“DON’T PAY” (the area under the curve in
figure 1). The proof of Case 2 uses Case 1, by showing that if there was an
improvement in efficiency for t1, then there would be a type of agent 1 fitting
Case 1 that would also have an improvement in efficiency. Because Case 1 rules
this out, it must be that there is no increase in efficiency for t1.
The formal statement of Case 1 is as follows:
Case 1. If M and a∗ is at least as efficient as M˜ and a˜∗, then for all t1 such that
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pˆi1(t1)[vˆ2(t2) < 1] = 1 and vˆ1(t1) < 1,
Q1(t1) = 0 = Q˜1(t1) (3.15)
in equilibrium.
proof Fix some t′1 that fits case 1. The exact valuation of t
′
1 is unimportant, as we
will show the result for all types of agent 1 with the same beliefs as t′1 and valuations
less than 1. To do that, we look at the maximum expected probability of the public
good being produced among those types:
Define t′1,v˜ by vˆ1(t
′
1,v˜) = v˜ and pˆi1(t
′
1,v˜) = pˆi1(t
′
1) (so for example t
′
1 = t
′
1,vˆ1(t′1)
). Then
define
Q = max
v˜<1
Q1(t
′
1,v˜, a
∗
1(t
′
1,v˜)). (3.16)
I shall prove the proposition by showing that Q = 0. A pure strategy equilibrium
and finite action space imply the maximum that defines Q exists.
The proof of Case 1 consists of two parts. I start by positing the existence of
actions and types with certain properties that will be useful for the proof. Lemma
III.8 describes these posited types and actions, and then shows that the requirement
that M be as efficient as M˜ everywhere, combined with incentive compatibility for
these and other types, implies that Q = 0. Lemma III.9 then proves that actions and
types matching those posited in Lemma III.8 exist.
Lemma III.8. If there are actions {a1, a1} ∈ A1 and {aˆ2, a2, a2} ∈ A2 and a sequence
of subsets of T indicated by T n = T n1 × T n2 =
{
t
n
1 , t
n
1
}× {tˆn2 , tn2 , tn2} such that
1. for all n, the following are true of a1 and t
n
1 :
• a∗1(tn1 ) = a1
• vˆ1(tn1 ) > 1; furthermore a˜∗1(tn1 ) = “PAY”
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• Given a valuation of v1 = 1, a1 is a best response to pˆi1(t′1); within that
set of best responses a1 is a best response to aˆ2; within that set a1 is a best
response to a2.
2. for all n, the following are true of a1 and t
n
1 :
• a∗1(tn1 ) = a1
• vˆ1(tn1 ) < 1
• Given a valuation of v1 = 1, a1 is a best response to pˆi1(t′1); within that
set of best responses a1 is a best response to aˆ2; within that set a1 is a best
response to a2.
3. for all n, the following are true of aˆ2 and tˆ
n
2 :
• a∗2(tˆn2 ) = aˆ2
• vˆ2(tˆn2 ) < 1 and lim
n→∞
vˆ2(tˆ
n
2 ) = 1
• Given vˆ2(tˆn2 ), aˆ2 is a best response to a1; within that set of best responses
aˆ2 is a best response to a1.
4. for all n, the following are true of a2 and t
n
2 :
• a∗2(tn2 ) = a2
• vˆ2(tn2 ) > 1 and lim
n→∞
vˆ2(t
n
2 ) = 1
• Given vˆ2(tn2 ), a2 is a best response to a1; within that set of best responses
a2 is a best response to a1.
5. for all n, the following are true of a2 and t
n
2 :
• a∗2(tn2 ) = a2
• 0 < vˆ2(tn2 ) < 1− vˆ1(tn1 )
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• Given vˆ2(tn2 ), a2 is a best response to a1; within that set of best responses
a2 is a best response to a1.
then Q = 0.
Proof. Define Qˆ ≡ pˆi1(t′1)[q(a1, a∗2(t2)) = 1], the expected probability that the public
good will be produced when the action a1 is played and given the beliefs of agent t
′
1 .
By monotonicity of Q1(t1) when beliefs are fixed and valuations are varied (implied by
incentive compatibility) and the fact that a1 is a best response to pˆi1(t
′
1) for valuation
1,
Qˆ ≥ Q. (3.17)
Thus a1 will fulfill the role of the action played by agents with valuation less than 1
and beliefs that are (roughly) the same as t′1. For simplicitly, assume Qˆ = Q. This
is without loss of generality because I will show that Qˆ = 0, which through equation
(3.17) implies Q = 0. Therefore to avoid extra notation I assume that Qˆ and Q are
equal.
The proof of lemma III.8 uses incentive compatibility constraints, and the re-
quirement that M be as efficient as M˜ everywhere, to pin down the outcomes when
the posited actions are played. The proof has the following structure. Sublemma 1
uses the assumed best response properties of a1 and a1 to establish facts about the
relative transfers and production of the public good when agent one plays a1 and
a1. Sublemma 2 uses those facts and the descriptions of the posited actions and
types to further describe the outcomes of these actions under M . Sublemma 3 then
uses the results of sublemmas 1 and 2 to show that if M is incentive compatible and
everywhere as efficient as M˜ , then Q = 0.
The following sublemma uses the best response properties assumed of a1 and
a1 to show that the differences in outcomes between a1 and a1 must satisfy certain
conditions.
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Sublemma 1. The outcomes for actions a1 and a1 obey the following conditions:
1. Given beliefs pˆi1(t
′
1) the following holds:
Epˆi1(t′1)[τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2))−τ1(a1, a∗2(t2))] = Epˆi1(t′1)[q(a1, a∗2(t2))−q(a1, a∗2(t2))] (3.18)
2. When a2 = aˆ2, the following holds:
τ1(a1, aˆ2)− τ1(a1, aˆ2) = q(a1, aˆ2)− q(a1, aˆ2) (3.19)
3. When a2 = a2, the following holds:
τ1(a1, a2)− τ1(a1, a2) = q(a1, a2)− q(a1, a2) (3.20)
Proof. The sublemma follows from the assumptions that if v1 = 1 then a1 and a1 are
best responses to pˆi1(t
′
1), which implies equation (3.18); and that within that set of
best responses both actions are best responses to aˆ2, which implies equation (3.19);
and that within that set both actions are best responses to a2, which implies equation
(3.20).
Now I show the outcomes when a ∈ {a1, a1} × {aˆ2, a2, a2}. Define the following
value, which corresponds to the lowest transfer agent 2 can pay when agent 1 plays
a1:
τ 2(a1) ≡ min
a′2∈A2
τ2(a1, a
′
2). (3.21)
Sublemma 2 shows that the properties stated in lemma III.8, combined with
sublemma 1, determine the following features of the outcomes under M when a ∈
{a1, a1} × {aˆ2, a2, a2}:
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q(a1, a2)
Actions a2 aˆ2 a2
a1 1 1 1
a1 0 0 1
τ2(a1, a2)
Actions a2 aˆ2 a2
a1 τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1)
a1 τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1) + 1
Table 3.2: Outcomes under M implied by sublemmas 1 and 2
(Because we have strict budget balance, τ1(a) is also determined.) These values
will be useful in showing that the type t∗1 (which will be constructed in sublemma 3)
prefers a1 to a1. Sublemma 2 establishes the above tables through a series of claims.
Sublemma 2. Given the conditions specified in lemma III.8, the following claims
are true of yˆ(a) when a ∈ {a1, a1} × {aˆ2, a2, a2}.
1. For all a2 ∈ {aˆ2, a2, a2},
q(a1, a2) = 1 (3.22)
and
τ2(a1, a2) = τ 2(a1). (3.23)
2. For a2 ∈ {aˆ2, a2},
q(a1, a2) = 0 (3.24)
and
τ2(a1, a2) = τ 2(a1) (3.25)
3. For a2, the following are true:
q(a1, a2) = 1 (3.26)
and
τ2(a1, a2) = τ 2(a1) + 1 (3.27)
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Proof. I show each claim in turn. Some claims require the earlier claims for their
proof.
Claim 1: To prove equation (3.22), recall that by assumption a˜∗1(t
n
1 ) =“PAY ALL”
and vˆ1(t
n
1 ) > 1 for all n. Therefore given that M is at least as efficient as M˜ , for all
a2 ∈ A2,
q(a1, a2) = 1 (3.28)
which is equation (3.22).
Equation (3.23) is an immediate implication of equations (3.21) and (3.22) and the
focus lemma.
Claim 2:
Equation (3.25) is a straightforward implication of claim 1 and sublemma 1 con-
ditions 2 and 3. Substituting equations (3.22) and (3.23) into equation (3.20) yields:
(1− τ 2(t1))− τ1(a1, aˆ2) = 1− q(a1, aˆ2)
which implies
q(a1, aˆ2)− τ1(a1, aˆ2) = τ 2(t1).
By budget balance, τ2(a1, aˆ2) = q(a1, aˆ2)− τ1(a1, aˆ2). Substituting, we get
τ2(a1, aˆ2) = τ 2(t1). (3.29)
A parallel argument using equations (3.19), (3.22) and (3.23) shows that
τ2(a1, a2) = τ 2(t1). (3.30)
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Then equations (3.29) and (3.30) together imply equation (3.25).
Now I prove equation (3.24). By assumption on tn2 , for any n we have vˆ1(t
n
1 ) +
vˆ2(t
n
2 ) < 1. Then M as efficient as M˜ implies that
q(a1, a2) = 0. (3.31)
Claim 1 and equations (3.25) and (3.31) imply the following transfers and outcomes
regarding the public good being produced depending on the actions (the “?” indicates
the value we want to determine):
q(a1, a2) =
Actions a2 aˆ2
a1 1 1
a1 0 ?
τ2(a1, a2) =
Actions a2 aˆ2
a1 τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1)
a1 τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1)
Table 3.3: Outcomes under M implied by claim 1 and equations (3.25) and (3.31)
Given the construction of tn2 it is immediate that if q(a1, aˆ2) = 1 then t
n
2 would
want to deviate to aˆ2 for all n. Therefore
q(a1, aˆ2) = 0. (3.32)
Together (3.31) and (3.32) imply equation (3.24).
Claim 3:
Given that vˆ2(t
n
2 ) > 1, equation (3.11) and M as efficient as M˜ implies that
q(a1, a2) = 1 ∀a1 ∈ A1
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which implies in particular that q(a1, a2) = 1, which proves equation (3.26).
To determine τ2(a1, a2), I observe that claims 1 and 2 with equation (3.26) establish
the following values for transfers and whether the public good is produced (the “?”
indicates the value we want to determine):
q(a1, a2) =
Actions a2 aˆ2 a2
a1 1 1 1
a1 0 0 1
τ2(a1, a2) =
Actions a2 aˆ2 a2
a1 τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1)
a1 τ 2(a1) τ 2(a1) ?
Table 3.4: Outcomes under M implied by claims 1 and 2 with equation (3.26)
Equation (3.27) is then implied by incentive compatibility. If
τ2(a1, a2) < τ 2(a1) + 1
then vˆ2(tˆ
n
2 ) →− 1 implies that for some n, tˆn2 would want to deviate from aˆ2 to a2.
However, if
τ2(a1, a2) > τ 2(a1) + 1
then vˆ2(t
n
2 )→+ 1 implies that for some n, tn2 would want to deviate to aˆ2. Therefore
equation (3.27) must hold.
The following sublemma uses the results from sublemmas 1 and 2 to prove lemma
III.8. I construct a new type, t∗1 for agent 1 that under the equilibrium of the all
or nothing mechanism always achieves an efficient outcome. Among actions under
M that always produce the public good (and therefore achieve an efficient outcome),
t∗1’s optimal action is a1. However, if Q > 0 then t
∗
1 prefers a1 to a1, which implies
that a∗1(t
∗
1) must not always produce the public good and therefore does not always
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achieve an outcome as efficient as under M˜ . Therefore if M is as efficient as M˜ then
it must be that Q = 0.
Sublemma 3. If the conditions of sublemma 1 hold and if Q > 0 then there exists
a t∗1 such that
a˜∗1(t
∗
1) = “PAY ” (3.33)
and
Q1(t
∗
1, a
∗
1(t
∗
1)) < 1. (3.34)
Proof. Recall that I have assumed without loss of generality that
Qˆ ≡ pˆi1(t′1)[q(a1, a∗2(t2)) = 1] = Q. (3.35)
I now define a type t
∗
1 that will help me construct t
∗
1. Let the type t
∗
1 be defined
by, for some n, vˆ1(t
∗
1) = vˆ1(t
n
1 ) and for some ∗,
pˆi1(t
∗
1)[E] ≡ pˆi1(t′1)[E] · (1− ∗) + (∗ − 2∗) · Itˆn2∈E
+(2∗ − 3∗) · Itn2∈E + 3∗ · Itn2∈E (3.36)
where ∗ is small enough that the focus lemma implies that a∗1(t
∗
1) is a best response,
conditional on vˆ1(t
∗
1), to pˆi1(t
′
1); within that set of best responses a
∗
1(t
∗
1) is a best
response to aˆ2; within that set a
∗
1(t
∗
1) is a best response to a2. Furthermore I require
that pˆi1(t
∗
1)[vˆ2(t2) < 1] = 1− 3∗ > 1vˆ1(tn1 ) to ensure that a˜
∗
1(t
n
1 ) =“PAY”.
This best response condition result implies that U1(t
∗
1, a
∗
1(t
∗
1)) = U1(t
∗
1, a1) by con-
struction of a1, as a1 satisfies the same best response condition for all v1 ≥ 1, and
therefore in particular vˆ1(t
n
1 ). Furthermore, by M as efficient as M˜ both actions pro-
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duce the public good whatever action the other agent takes. Therefore without loss
of generality we can assume that a1 = a
∗
1(t
∗
1).
Now I look at types with the same beliefs as t
∗
1 but with different valuations. One
such type will be our t∗1. For any v, define t
∗
1(v) by vˆ1(t
∗
1(v)) = v and pˆi1(t
∗
1(v)) =
pˆi1(t
∗
1)). I first calculate the difference in expected utility for such types when taking
the action a1 compared to the action a1. Equation (3.36) translated into relative
utilities is as follows:
U1(t
∗
1(v), a1)−U1(t∗1(v), a1) = (1−∗) ·Epˆi1(t′1)[u1(v, yˆ(a1, a∗2(t2)))−u1(v, yˆ((a1, a∗2(t2)))]
+(∗ − 2∗) · (u1(v, yˆ(a1, aˆ2))− u1(v, yˆ(a1, aˆ2)))
+(2∗ − 3∗) · (u1(v, yˆ(a1, a2))− u1(v, yˆ(a1, a2)))
+3∗ · (u1(v, yˆ(a1, a2))− u1(v, yˆ(a1, a2))) (3.37)
Sublemma 1, condition 1 implies that for any v, we can make the following sub-
stitution for the first term on the right side of equation (3.37):
Epˆi1(t′1)[u1(v, yˆ(a1, a
∗
2(t2)))− u1(v, yˆ(a1, a∗2(t2))] = (1−Q) · (v − 1). (3.38)
To find expressions for the other terms in equation (3.37), note that for any v1
and a2 ∈ A2,
u1(v, yˆ(a1, a2))− u1(v, yˆ(a1, a2)) = [q(a1, a2)− q(a1, a2)] · v − (τ1(a1, a2)− τ1(a1, a2))
(3.39)
that is, the difference in utility is the difference in whether the public good is produced
69
times the valuation, minus the difference in transfers. We can determine values for
equation (3.39) when a2 ∈ {aˆ2, a2, a2} using the results for sublemma 2. We can write
the following tables for transfers and production of the public good based on certain
specific actions (note that for this table I list transfers by agent 1, not agent 2 as in
previous tables):
q(a1, a2) =
Actions a2 aˆ2 a2
a1 1 1 1
a1 0 0 1
τ1(a1, a2) =
Actions a2 aˆ2 a2
a1 1− τ 2(a1) 1− τ 2(a1) 1− τ 2(a1)
a1 −τ 2(a1) −τ 2(a1) −τ 2(a1)
Table 3.5: Outcomes under M
These tables gives us the information needed to use equation (3.39) to assign
values to the last three terms in equation (3.37). I make these substitutions, and
substituting equation (3.38), into equation (3.37) to get
U1(t
∗
1(v), a1)− U1(t∗1(v), a1) = (1− ∗) ·
[
(1−Q) · (v − 1)]
+(∗ − 2∗) · [v − 1] + (2∗ − 3∗) · [v − 1] + 3∗ · [−1]
=
[
(1− ∗) · (1−Q) + (∗ − 3∗)
] · (v − 1)− 3∗ (3.40)
By comparison, the similar result for the actions “PAY” and “DON’T PAY” under
M˜ is
U M˜1 (t
∗
1(v), “PAY ”)− U M˜1 (t∗1(v), “DON ′TPAY ”) = (1− 3∗) · (v − 1)− 3∗ (3.41)
This is easily verified by inspection of the equilibrium a˜∗ of the All or Nothing Mech-
anism M˜ .
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Note that by inspection equation (3.41) is greater than (3.40) for v > 1 given that
Q > 0. I now generate a type where equation (3.41) is equal to 0, which implies that
the agent plays “PAY” under M˜ . At the same time that implies that equation (3.40)
is negative, although I calculate this explicitly. I show these two facts and then use
them to prove Q1(t
∗
1) < 1.
Define t∗1 = t
∗
1(
1
1−3∗ ). By construction of pˆi1(t
∗
1) it is the case that pˆi1(t
∗
1)[vˆ2(t2) <
1] = 1− 3∗ = 1vˆ1(t∗1) . That implies that a˜
∗
1(t
∗
1) = “PAY”, satisfying equation (3.33).
To prove equation (3.34), I observe that by construction equation (3.40) is equal
to 0 when v = vˆ1(t
∗
1). Then by inspection equation (3.41) is strictly negative given
that Q > 0 by assumption. So U1(t
∗
1, a1) > U1(t
∗
1, a1).
Because a1 is a best response for t1, it must be that among actions that produce
the public good with certainty a1 is transfer-minimizing given pˆi1(t
∗
1) and therefore
optimal for t∗1 within that set. Therefore if U1(t
∗
1, a1) > U1(t
∗
1, a1) then it must be that
a∗1(t
∗
1) does not always produce the public good, and in fact that Q1(t
∗
1, a
∗
1(t
∗
1)) < 1.
That proves equation (3.34) and completes the proof of the sublemma.
Sublemma 3 implies thatM as efficient as M˜ requires thatQ = 0, and by definition
of Q it must be that Q1(t
′
1) ≤ Q = 0, which proves equation (3.15). This completes
the proof of lemma III.8.
Lemma III.9. There exists actions {a1, a1} ∈ A1 and {aˆ2, a2, a2} ∈ A2 and a se-
quence of subsets of T indicated by T n = T n1 ×T n2 =
{
t
n
1 , t
n
1
}×{tˆn2 , tn2 , tn2} that satisfy
the conditions in lemma III.8.
Proof. I start by constructing the type spaces {T n}, and then show the existence of
actions fitting the conditions on {a1, a1} and {aˆ2, a2, a2}.
Each T n will belong to a class of subsets of the universal type space of the form
T n,m,, defined in the following way: For n and m positive integers and  > 0, let
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T n,m, = T n,m,1 × T n,m,2 where T n,m,1 = {t1, t1, t01} and T n,m,2 = {tˆ2, t2, t2}. The
valuations and beliefs of the types are defined below. First I comment briefly on the
role of n, m and  respectively.
• n. Taking the limit as n goes to infinity will ensure that the best response
conditions for a1 and a1 hold, by use of the focus lemma. It will also ensure
that the conditions on the valuations of tˆ2 and t2 hold. Taking a sequence of n
(and appropriately chosen m and ) will give us a sequence of T n,m, from which
the sequence T n will be drawn.
• m. For each n, taking the limit as m goes to infinity will ensure that the best
response condition for a1 and a1 hold specifically at the valuation v1 = 1. m
positive ensures that the condition on the valuations of t
n
1 , t
n
1 and t
n
2 hold. m
will be chosen as a function of n.
• . Choosing a sufficiently small  for each n and m combination will ensure that
the best response conditions for aˆ2, a2 and a2 hold.
Valuations: For simplicity I present the valuations in table form.
vˆ1(t1)
t1 1 +
1
m
t1 1− 1m
t01 1
vˆ2(t2)
t2
1
2·m
tˆ2 1− 1n
t2 1 +
1
n
Table 3.6: Valuations of the constructed types in T n,m,
Note that if m > 0 (as we require), and we let n→∞ then the valuations of these
types match the requirements on the corresponding types t
n
1 , t
n
1 , t
n
2 , tˆ
n
2 and t
n
2 . (t
0
1 has
no corresponding type in T n.)
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Beliefs: the beliefs of the types of agent 1 are a function of n, while the beliefs
of the types of agent 2 are a function of . For all t1 ∈ T n,m,1 beliefs are defined by
the following p2 ∈ ∆T2. For all E ⊂ T2,
p2[E] = pˆi1(t1)[E] = pˆi1(t1)[E] = pˆi1(t
0
1)[E]
= (1− 1
n
)pˆi1(t
′
1)[E] +
1
n
(1− 1
n
) · Itˆ2∈E +
1
n
2
· It2∈E (3.42)
that is, types of agent 1 expect agent 2’s type to be distributed according to pˆi1(t
′
1)
with probability 1− 1
n
, and the other 1
n
probability is assigned to tˆ2 and t2 at a ratio
of 1− 1
n
to 1
n
respectively.
Similarly, for all t2 ∈ T n,m,2 beliefs are defined by the following p1 ∈ ∆T1. For all
E ⊂ T1,
p1[E] = pˆi2(tˆ2)[E] = pˆi2(t2)[E] = pˆi2(t2)[E]
= (1− ) · It1∈E +  · It1∈E (3.43)
that is, types of agent 2 expect agent 1’s type to be t1 with probability 1 − , and
expect that agent 1’s type will be t1 otherwise.
I now construct a series of T n,m, by first holding n,m constant and finding an
appropriate  for each (n,m) combination. Then I hold n constant and find an
appropriate m for each n. Finally I take the sequence created by varying n and find
a subsequence of that sequence that I use to construct {T n}.
Holding n and m fixed. For each possible n,m the focus lemma implies that
we can find an (n,m) small enough that tˆ2, t2 and t2 best respond (given their
valuations) to t1, and conditional on that best respond to t1. Fix such an (n,m) for
all n and m.
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Holding n fixed. Consider the set {T n,m,(n,m)}m∈{1,2,...}. Define
an,m =
{
a∗1(t1), a
∗
1(t1), a
∗
1(t
0
1), a
∗
2(t2), a
∗
2(tˆ2), a
∗
2(t2)
} ≡ {an,m1 , an,m1 , a0,n,m1 , an,m2 , aˆn,m2 , an,m2 }.
(3.44)
where {t1, t1, t01, t2, tˆ2, t2} correspond to the elements in T n,m,(n,m)1 and T n,m,(n,m)2 .
Because M has finite actions, and we assume a pure strategy equilibrium, the
sequence {an,m}m∈{1,2,...} has a constant subsequence, with constant term I will call
an. Let m(n) correspond to some m such that an,m(n) = an. Let (n) ≡ (n,m(n)),
and let T˜ n = T n,m(n),(n,m).
Sublemma 4. For the type t01 ∈ T˜ n1 , the actions a∗1(t01), a∗1(t1) and a∗1(t1) are all best
responses in equilibrium.
Proof. By construction, there exists arbitrarily large m′ such that
{
a∗1(t1), a
∗
1(t1), a
∗
1(t
0
1), a
∗
2(t2), a
∗
2(tˆ2), a
∗
2(t2)
}
= an
for t1, t1 ∈ T n,m
′,(n,m′)
1 . That implies that for the beliefs p2 (defined relative to
T n,m
′,(n,m′)) and valuations 1 + 1
m′ arbitrarily close to 1, a
∗
1(t1) is a best response.
Similarly, given beliefs p2 and valuations 1− 1m′ arbitrarily close to 1, a∗1(t1) is a best
response. These facts imply that both actions are best responses for a type with
beliefs p2 and valuation 1, which describes t
0
1.
Varying n. Now we can find a constant subsequence of the series {an}. Let
an = {a1, a1, a01, a2, aˆ2, a2} be the constant term in the subsequence. Take the corre-
sponding subsequence {T˜ n} and let {T n} be defined by T n1 = T˜ n1 \ {t01} and T n2 = T˜ n2 .
Unsurprisingly, these will be our candidates for the objects assumed in lemma III.8.
Sublemma 5. The actions {a1, a1} ∈ A1 and {aˆ2, a2, a2} ∈ A2 and the sequence
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T n = T n1 ×T n2 =
{
t
n
1 , t
n
1
}×{tˆn2 , tn2 , tn2} satisfy the conditions assumed in lemma III.8.
Proof. There are three types of properties posited in lemma III.8: equilibrium actions,
valuations, and best response properties. I show each in turn.
Equilibrium actions: Because the types in T n correspond to the types in T˜ n,
where an = an,
{
a∗1(t
n
1 ), a
∗
1(t
n
1 ), a
∗
2(t
n
2 ), a
∗
2(tˆ
n
2 ), a
∗
2(t
n
2 )
}
= {a1, a1, a2, aˆ2, a2}
which establishes the equilibrium action conditions.
Valuations: By construction, (vˆ1(t
n
1 ), vˆ1(t
n
1 ), vˆ1(t
n
2 ), vˆ2(tˆ
n
2 ), vˆ2(t
n
2 )) = (1+
1
m(n)
, 1−
1
m(n)
, 1
2m(n)
, 1 − 1
n
, 1 + 1
n
). By inspection these values satisfy the conditions assumed
in lemma III.8 as n→+ ∞.
Best response properties: This is the most complicated set of properties to
show. By the choice of (n,m) we have that tn2 , tˆ
n
2 and t
n
2 all best respond to a1
given their valuations, and conditional on that best respond to a1. We also have,
by construction, that their equilibrium actions are a2, aˆ2, and a2 respectively, so the
property is proved for these actions.
The argument for a1 and a1 is more complicated, and uses sublemma 4. Let
t0,n1 correspond to t
0
1 ∈ T˜ n. Then for all n, sublemma 4 implies that for t0,n1 , the
actions a1 and a1 are best responses. Note that for all n, vˆ1(t
0,n
1 ) = 1 by construction.
Furthermore, t0,n1 ’s beliefs in equilibrium correspond to equation (3.42) for n tending
to ∞. Therefore we can find a sufficiently large n′ such that t0,n1 ’s beliefs and the
focus lemma imply that any best response, given the valuation 1, must be a best
response to pˆi1(t
′
1), and conditional on that a best response to tˆ2, and conditional on
that a best response to t2. As both a1 and a1 are best response for the t
0,n
1 , the best
response property for those actions is proved.
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Sublemma 5 completes the proof of lemma III.9 by showing that there exist {T n}
and {a1, a1, aˆ2, a2, a2} that satisfy the conditions posited in lemma III.8.
Together, lemmas III.8 and III.9 prove Case 1.
Case 2. If M is at least as efficient at M˜ then for all t1 such that a
∗
1(t1) =“DON’T
PAY”, pˆi1(t1)[vˆ2(t2) < 1] < 1,
Q1(t1) = Q˜1(t1). (3.45)
Proof. Let t′1 be a type of agent 1 that fits the conditions of case 2. Note that M as
efficient as M˜ implies
Q1(t
′
1) ≥ Q˜1(t′1) = pˆi1(t′1)[vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1]
because the public good must be produced whenever vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1. Therefore to prove
equation (3.45) only requires showing that Q1(t
′
1) is not strictly greater than Q˜1(t
′
1).
I prove case 2 (as with case 1) with two lemmas. Lemma III.10 assumes the
existence of certain types related to the posited type where there is an improvement,
and proves the result given the existence of those types. Lemma III.11 proves the
existence of the described types.
Lemma III.10. If there are types tˆ1, t1 and t1 such that
• For tˆ1 the following conditions hold:
(A1) vˆ1(tˆ1) > max{vˆ1(t′1), 1}.
(A2) pˆi1(tˆ1)[vˆ2(t2) < 1] =
1
vˆ1(tˆ1)
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(A3) ∀a2 ∈ A2
pˆi1(tˆ1)[a
∗
2(t2) = a2, vˆ2(t2) < 1] ≥ pˆi1(t′1)[a∗2(t2) = a2, vˆ2(t2) < 1]
(A4) ∀a1 ∈ A1,
Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) = Epˆi1(t′1) τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2))
• For t1 the following conditions hold:
(B1) vˆ1(t1) = vˆ1(tˆ1)
(B2) pˆi1(t1)[vˆ2(t2) < 1] = 1
(B3) ∀a2 ∈ A2
pˆi1(t1)[a
∗
2(t2) = a2, vˆ2(t2) < 1] ≥ pˆi1(t′1)[a∗2(t2) = a2, vˆ2(t2) < 1]
(B4) ∀a1 ∈ A1,
Epˆi1(t1) τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) = Epˆi1(t′1) τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2))
• For t1 the following conditions hold:
(C1) vˆ1(t1) = 0
(C2) pˆi1(t1) = pˆi1(t1)
then Q1(t
′
1) = Q˜1(t
′
1).
Proof. The proof shows that if Q1(t
′
1) > Q˜1(t
′
1) then type tˆ1 would want to deviate to
the equilibrium action of t′1. To show this, I prove that tˆ1 is indifferent between its own
equilibrium action and the equilibrium action of t1, but unless Q1(t
′
1) = Q˜1(t
′
1) holds,
tˆ1 prefers the equilibrium action of t
′
1 to the equilibrium action of t1 and therefore
also to its own equilibrium action.
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To show that tˆ1 is indifferent between its own equilibrium action and the equilib-
rium action of t1, I will need the result that tˆ1 is indifferent between its equilibrium
action and that of t1. I prove this first in sublemma 6.
Sublemma 6. tˆ1 is indifferent between a
∗
1(tˆ1) and a
∗
1(t1), i.e.
U1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(tˆ1)) = U1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t1)) (3.46)
Proof. Combining property (A4) of tˆ1 and (B4) of t1 shows that for all a1 ∈ A1,
Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) = Epˆi1(t1) τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) (3.47)
that is, tˆ1 and t1 have the same expected transfer for any action.
Together (A1) and (A2) imply that a∗1(tˆ1) =“PAY”, while (B1) and (B2) together
imply that a∗1(t1) =“PAY”. Therefore, because M is as efficient as M˜ , and all actions
are played in equilibrium,
q(a∗1(tˆ1), a2) = 1 = q(a
∗
1(t1), a2) ∀a2 ∈ A2 (3.48)
Given that a∗(tˆ1) and a∗(t1) both produce the public good with certainty, and given
tˆ1 and t1 have the same expected transfer for any action, it must be that
Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a
∗
1(tˆ1), a
∗
2(t2)) = Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a
∗
1(t1), a
∗
2(t2)) (3.49)
or else either tˆ1 would want to deviate to a
∗
1(t1) or t1 would want to deviate to a
∗
1(tˆ1).
Equations (3.48) and (3.49) imply equation (3.46) and complete the proof of the
sublemma.
Now I can show that tˆ1 is indifferent between its own equilibrium action and that
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of t1, by showing that tˆ1 is indifferent between a
∗
1(t1) and a
∗
1(t1). This result will be
used in the proof of sublemma 8, which shows that tˆ1’s indifference condition only
holds if Q1(t
′
1) = Q˜1(t
′
1).
Sublemma 7. tˆ1 is indifferent between a
∗
1(t1) and a
∗
1(t1), i.e.
U1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t1)) = U1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t1)) (3.50)
Proof. The result to be shown can be written as
vˆ1(tˆ1) ·Q1(tˆ1, a∗1(t1))− Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))
= vˆ1(tˆ1) ·Q1(tˆ1, a∗1(t1))− Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2)) (3.51)
Because a˜∗1(t1) =“PAY”, and M as efficient as M˜ ,
Q1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t1)) = 1 (3.52)
while vˆ1(t1) = 0 and M as efficient as M˜ implies that
Q1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t1)) = pˆi1(tˆ1)[vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1]. (3.53)
Recall (A2) requires that pˆi1(tˆ1)[vˆ2(t2) < 1] =
1
vˆ1(tˆ1)
. Therefore (A2) together with
equations (3.52) and (3.53) implies that equation (3.51) can be written as
vˆ1(tˆ1)− Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2)) = vˆ1(tˆ1)
(
1− 1
vˆ1(tˆ1)
)
− Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))
which a little rearrangment shows is equivalent to:
Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a
∗
1(t1), a
∗
2(t2))− Epˆi1(tˆ1) τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2)) = 1. (3.54)
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For any agent 1 action, condition (A4) says that tˆ1’s expected transfer is the same
as t′1’s expected transfer, while condition (B4) says that t1’s expected transfer is also
the same as t′1’s expected transfer. Therefore for any action tˆ1 and t1 have the same
expected transfer. Then the expectations in equation (3.54) can be are taken with
respect to pˆi1(t1) instead of pˆi1(tˆ1):
Epˆi1(t1) τ1(a
∗
1(t1), a
∗
2(t2))− Epˆi1(t1) τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2)) = 1. (3.55)
To show that (3.55) holds I use Case 1 (to show that the left side is at least as great
as 1) and M as efficient as M˜ (to show the left side is no greater than 1).
I can use Case 1 because condition (B2) implies that for any v1 ∈ (0, 1) and
any t1 ∈ T1 such that vˆ1(t1) = v1 and pˆi1(t1) = pˆi1(t1) = pˆi1(t1), Case 1 applies
to t1. Then Q1(t1) = 0 = Q1(t1). Because t1 and t1 evaluate expected transfers
the same, it must be that t1 is indifferent between its equilibrium action and a
∗
1(t1).
The difference in utility for t1 of playing a
∗
1(t1) and a
∗
1(t1) is v1 minus the difference
in expected transfers (because playing a∗1(t1) ensures the public good is produced,
while t1 expects the public good to never be produced under its equilibrium action).
Therefore for t1 to not want to deviate for any v1 < 1 it must be that
Epˆi1(t1) τ1(a
∗
1(t1), a
∗
2(t2))− Epˆi1(t1) τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2)) ≥ 1. (3.56)
Now we use the fact that M is as efficient as M˜ to prove an analogous argument
for v1 > 1. Let t1 be defined as in the last paragraph, except now take v1 ∈ (1, v).
Clearly with pˆi1(t1)[vˆ2(t2) < 1] = pˆi1(t1)[vˆ2(t2) < 1] = 1, a˜
∗
1(t1) =“PAY”, and therefore
M as efficient as M˜ implies that Q1(t1) = 1. Given that t1 and t1 have the same
beliefs, they evaluate transfers the same, and since both agents’ equilibrium actions
produce the public good with certainty t1 must be indifferent between a
∗
1(t1) and
a∗1(t1). The difference in utility for t1 of playing a
∗
1(t1) and a
∗
1(t1) is v1 minus the
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difference in expected transfers (because playing a∗1(t1) ensures the public good is
produced, while t1 expects the public good to never be produced under its equilibrium
action). Therefore for t1 to not want to deviate for any v1 > 1 it must be that
Epˆi1(t1) τ1(a
∗
1(t1), a
∗
2(t2))− Epˆi1(t1) τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2)) ≤ 1. (3.57)
Clearly equations (3.56) and (3.57) imply equation (3.55). As noted above, equation
(3.55) (and therefore equation (3.54) is equivalent to proving the sublemma.
Sublemma 8. If
Q1(t
′
1) > Q˜1(t
′
1) (3.58)
then
U1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t
′
1)) > U1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t1)) (3.59)
Proof. It is notable that equation (3.58) mentions Q˜1(t
′
1) while equation (3.59) men-
tions a∗1(t1). The connection is the following. By construction of a˜
∗,
Q˜1(t
′
1) = pˆi1(t
′
1)[vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1]
while M as efficient as M˜ and vˆ1(t1) = 0 implies that
Q˜1(t
′
1, a
∗
1(t1)) = pˆi1(t
′
1)[vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1]
So equation (3.58) is equivalent to
Q1(t
′
1, a
∗
1(t
′
1)) > Q1(t
′
1, a
∗
1(t1)) (3.60)
The rest of the proof has the following structure: I start by looking at the incen-
tive compatibility constraint for t′1 to not want to deviate to a
∗
1(t1) and show that
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combining it with equation (3.60) implies a relationship between the relative proba-
bility of receiving the public good and the relative transfers between a∗1(t
′
1) and a
∗
1(t1).
Then using the properties of tˆ1 I show that relationship implies equation (3.59). By
incentive compatibility of M for t′1, we have
U1(t
′
1, a
∗
1(t
′
1)) ≥ U1(t′1, a∗1(t1)) (3.61)
which is equivalent to
(Q1(t
′
1, a
∗
1(t
′
1))−Q1(t′1, a∗1(t1)))·vˆ1(t′1) ≥ Epˆi1(t′1) [τ1(a∗1(t′1), a∗2(t2))− τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))] .
(3.62)
Note that by equation (3.60), the left side of this equation is strictly positive. By M as
efficient as M˜ , both a∗1(t
′
1) and a
∗
1(t1) must produce the public good when vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1.
So I can rewrite equation (3.62) as
(
Epˆi1(t′1)
[
q(a∗1(t
′
1), a
∗
2(t2)) · Ivˆ2(t2)<1
]
+ pˆi1(t
′
1)[vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1]− pˆi1(t′1)[vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1]
) · vˆ1(t′1)
≥ Epˆi1(t′1) [τ1(a∗1(t′1), a∗2(t2))− τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))]
which simplifies to
Epˆi1(t′1)
[
q(a∗1(t
′
1), a
∗
2(t2)) · Ivˆ2(t2)<1
]·vˆ1(t′1) ≥ Epˆi1(t′1) [τ1(a∗1(t′1), a∗2(t2))− τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))]
(3.63)
As with equation (3.62) the left side of equation (3.63) is strictly greater than 0. I
now show that equation (3.63) combined with the conditions on tˆ1 imply equation
(3.59). Condition (A3) implies that
Epˆi1(tˆ1)
[
q(a∗1(t
′
1), a
∗
2(t2)) · Ivˆ2(t2)<1
] ≥ Epˆi1(t′1) [q(a∗1(t′1), a∗2(t2)) · Ivˆ2(t2)<1] > 0 (3.64)
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(Again the right side greater than zero is implied by (3.60) .) Condition (A1) implies
vˆ1(tˆ1) > vˆ1(t
′
1) (3.65)
while (A4) implies that
Epˆi1(tˆ1) [τ1(a
∗
1(t
′
1), a
∗
2(t2))− τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))] = Epˆi1(t′1) [τ1(a∗1(t′1), a∗2(t2))− τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))] .
(3.66)
Substituting equations (3.64), (3.65), and (3.66), into (3.63) yields
Epˆi1(tˆ1)
[
q(a∗1(t
′
1), a
∗
2(t2)) · Ivˆ2(t2)<1
]·vˆ1(tˆ1) > Epˆi1(tˆ1) [τ1(a∗1(t′1), a∗2(t2))− τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))]
(3.67)
By the same logic that shows equations (3.62) and (3.63) are equivalent, equation
(3.67) is equivalent to
(
Q1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t
′
1))−Q1(tˆ1, a∗1(t1))
)·vˆ1(tˆ1) > Epˆi1(tˆ1) [τ1(a∗1(t′1), a∗2(t2))− τ1(a∗1(t1), a∗2(t2))] .
(3.68)
Equation (3.68) is in turn equivalent to
U1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t
′
1)) > U1(tˆ1, a
∗
1(t1)) (3.69)
which, combined with sublemmas 6 and 7 implies equation (3.59).
This completes the proof of lemma III.10, as sublemma 8 implies that Q1(t
′
1) =
Q˜1(t1).
Lemma III.11 completes the proof of Case 2 by showing that types exist that
satisfy the conditions posited in lemma III.10.
Lemma III.11. There exists types tˆ1, t1 and t1 that satisfy the conditions assumed
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in lemma III.10.
Proof. Valuations can be assigned arbitrarily, so the complicated part of the proof
is showing that there exist beliefs that satisfy conditions (A2), (A3) and (A4) to
construct tˆ1, and (B2), (B3) and (B4) to construct t1 and t1. The construction of
beliefs in both cases uses sublemma 10. Sublemma 9 establishes an important result
for the proof of sublemma 10, so I prove it first. Before getting to the sublemmas, I
introduce some useful terminology for distinguishing between actions played by types
of agent 2 with valuations below and (weakly) above 1.
Actions played by types of agent 2 with valuations above and below 1.
First I look at the restrictions put on outcomes by the fact that outcomes must be as
efficient under M and M˜ for any agent 2.
Let A∗2 = {a2 ∈ A2 | ∃t2 ∈ T2, vˆ2(t2) ≥ 1, a∗2(t2) = a2}
Let A2 = A2 \ A∗2.
If t˜2’s valuation is at least one, t˜2 must have a˜
∗
2(t˜2) =“pay” and must produce the
public good under M˜ for any action by agent 1. If t˜2’s valuation is less than one, t˜2
must have a˜∗2(t˜2) =“don’t pay” and agent 2 does not produce the public good under
M˜ if agent 1 plays “DON’T PAY”. If M as efficient as M˜ , then it must be that agent
2’s action does not produce the public good for some action(s) by agent 1 under M
(because it would be inefficient when agent 1’s valuation is 0), whereas it still must
be true that when agent 2’s valuation is at least 1 then agent 2 produces the public
good for any action by agent 1. Therefore for all t˜2 ∈ T2, vˆ2(t˜2) ≥ 1 ⇔ a
∗
2(t˜2) ∈ A∗2
vˆ2(t˜2) < 1 ⇔ a∗2(t˜2) ∈ A2
(3.70)
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Now I show the following relationship between actions in A∗2 and A2. For every
action in A∗2, I can find an action in A2 such that I can change an agent 1 type’s beliefs
by shifting weight from one action onto the other action without changing expected
transfers for any action agent 1 might take. This will be crucial in the construction
used in sublemma 10.
Sublemma 9. For any action aˆ2 ∈ A∗2 there exists an action a2(aˆ2) ∈ A2 such that
∀a1 ∈ A1,
τ1(a1, aˆ2) = τ1(a1, a2(aˆ2)) (3.71)
Proof. We can use budget balance to rewrite equation (3.71) in terms of transfers for
agent 2. Then it becomes, ∀a1 ∈ A1,
q(a1, aˆ2)− τ2(a1, aˆ2) = q(a1, a2(aˆ2))− τ2(a1, a2(aˆ2)) (3.72)
which is what I will prove.
I show the result in the following steps (the result to be proved is in bold):
1. aˆ2 is a strict best response for some type tˆ2 with valuation greater
than 1. By the assumption that all actions are somewhere strictly preferred in
equilibrium, there exists a type tˆ2 such that tˆ2 strictly prefers aˆ2 in equilibrium.
aˆ2 ∈ A∗2 implies that vˆ2(tˆ2) ≥ 1. In fact it must be that vˆ2(tˆ2) > 1, because oth-
erwise types with the same beliefs as tˆ2 and valuations less than but arbitrarily
close to 1 would strictly prefer to play aˆ2 ∈ A∗2, which would violate equation
(3.70).
2. aˆ2 is a strict best response for an open set of types t

2 with valuation
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greater than 1. By the focus lemma, and that tˆ2 strictly prefers aˆ2, there
exists some  > 0 such that for any t2 where vˆ2(t

2) = vˆ2(tˆ2) and for all E ⊂ T1,
|pˆi2(t2)[E] − pˆi2(tˆ2)[E]| < , t2 also strictly prefers aˆ2 in equilibrium. Let T 2 be
the set of such t2.
3. aˆ2 is a (weak) best response for an open set of types t˜

2 with valuation
1. Consider any such t2 ∈ T 2 . aˆ2 ∈ A∗2 implies that aˆ2 must produce the public
good under M˜ for any action by agent 1. Therefore Q2(t

2, aˆ2) = 1. For any
valuation v˜ ≥ 1, let t2,v˜ be the type with beliefs pˆi2(t2,v˜) = pˆi2(t2) and valuation
vˆ2(t

2,v˜) = v˜. Let t˜

2 be the type where pˆi2(t˜

2) = pˆi2(t

2) and vˆ2(t˜

2) = 1. Then
a∗2(t˜

2) ∈ A∗2 which implies Q2(t˜2, a∗2(tˆ2)) = 1.
Because t2 and t˜

2 have the same beliefs, and Q2(t

2) = Q2(t˜

2) = 1, it must
be that their equilibrium actions are optimal in equilibrium for each other.
Therefore aˆ2 is a best reply for t˜

2.
Let T˜ 2 be the set of t˜

2 constructed as above. Let t˜2 ∈ T˜ 2 be the type such that
pˆi2(t˜2) = pˆi2(tˆ2) and vˆ2(t˜2) = 1.
4. There exists a a˜2 ∈ A2 that is also a best response for t˜2. Take a sequence
of valuations {vn} with vn < 1 for all n and such that the limit of the sequence
is 1. Let t˜2,vn be the type of agent 2 where pˆi2(t˜2,vn) = pˆi2(t˜2) and vˆ2(t˜2,vn) = vn.
Because A2 is finite, it must be the case that the sequence a
∗
2(t˜2,vn) has a constant
subsequence. Call the action in the constant subsequence a˜2. Then there exist
types with the same beliefs as t˜2 and valuations less than but arbitrarily close
to 1 that play a˜2 in equilibrium. It is then immediate that a˜2 must be a (weak)
best reply for t˜2.
5. Then t˜2 indifferent between aˆ2 and a˜2, and aˆ2 a best response for all
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t˜2 ∈ T˜ 2 implies equation (3.72). t˜2 indifferent between aˆ2 and a˜2 implies
Epˆi2(tˆ2) [q(a1, aˆ2)− τ2(a1, aˆ2)] = Epˆi2(tˆ2) [q(a1, a˜2)− τ2(a1, a˜2)] (3.73)
Take any a1 ∈ A1, and a t˜1 such that a∗1(t˜1) = a1. For a small enough  we can
construct t˜2 ∈ T˜ 2 such that
pˆi2(t˜
′
2 )[E] = (1− ′) · pˆi2(t˜2)[E] + ′ · It˜1∈E. (3.74)
Then t˜
′
2 ∈ T˜ 2 and aˆ2 a best reply for all types in T˜ 2 implies
U2(t˜

2, aˆ2) ≥ U2(t˜2, a˜2) (3.75)
which is equivalent to
(1− ) · U2(t˜2, aˆ2) +  · (q(a1, aˆ2)− τ2(a1, aˆ2))
≥ (1− ) · U2(t˜2, a˜2) + ′ · (q(a1, a˜2)− τ2(a1, a˜2)) (3.76)
which is equivalent to
q(a1, aˆ2)− τ2(a1, aˆ2) ≥ q(a1, a˜2)− τ2(a1, a˜2). (3.77)
Because equation (3.77) must hold for all a1 ∈ A1, then equations (3.77) and
(3.73) together imply that for all a1 ∈ A1,
q(a1, aˆ2)− τ2(a1, aˆ2) = q(a1, a˜2)− τ2(a1, a˜2). (3.78)
which is the same as equation (3.72), and therefore, as explained above, is equivalent
to proving the lemma.
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The next sublemma uses the previous result to show that beliefs can be constructed
that have the properties we need to find suitable beliefs for tˆ1, t1, and t1.
Sublemma 10. For any pi′1 ∈ ∆(T2), if pi′1[vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] ≡ α < 1 then for any δ ∈ (α, 1]
there exists a piδ1 such that
piδ1[vˆ2(t2) < 1] = δ (3.79)
for all a1 ∈ A1,
Epiδ1τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) = Epi′1τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) (3.80)
and ∀a2 ∈ A2
piδ1[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a2, vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] ≥ pi′1[a∗2(t˜2) = a2, vˆ2(t˜2) < 1]. (3.81)
Proof. First I prove equation (3.80). I start by constructing some beliefs pi11 that I
will use to define piδ1. Relabel A2 = {a12, ..., a|A2|2 }. For 1 ≤ n ≤ |A2| find tn2 such that
a2(t
n
2 ) = a
n
2 .
For an2 ∈ A∗2, define a2(an2 ) as in the lemma 9. For an2 ∈ A2, define a2(an2 ) ≡ an2 .
This construction ensures that for all a2 ∈ A2,
a2(a
n
2 ) ∈ A2. (3.82)
Define the following beliefs for agent 1:
pi11(t
n
2 ) =
|A2|∑
m=1
Ia2(am2 )=an2 · pi′1[a∗2(t˜2) = am2 ]. (3.83)
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Note that equation (3.83) implies
pi11[vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] = 1. (3.84)
Now I want to show that for any a1 ∈ A1, the expected transfer given beliefs pˆi11 and
pi′1 are equal. The following calculation shows that this is true:
Epi11τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) =
|A2|∑
m=1
τ1(a1, a
n
2 ) · pi11(tn2 ) (3.85)
=
|A2|∑
m=1
τ1(a1, a
n
2 )
 |A2|∑
m=1
Ia2(am2 )=an2 · pi′1[a∗2(t˜2) = am2 ]
 (3.86)
=
|A2|∑
n=1
|A2|∑
m=1
τ1(a1, a
n
2 )Ia2(am2 )=an2 · pi′1[a∗2(t˜2) = am2 ] (3.87)
=
|A2|∑
m=1
pi′1[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
m
2 ]
|A2|∑
n=1
τ1(a1, a
n
2 )Ia2(am2 )=an2 (3.88)
which by sublemma 9 is equivalent to
=
|A2|∑
m=1
pi′1[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
m
2 ] · τ1(a1, am2 ) (3.89)
= Epi′1τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)). (3.90)
Now I will construct piδ1. Let pi
δ
1 be defined by, for all E ⊂ T2,
piδ1(E) =
1− δ
1− αpi
′
1(E) +
δ − α
1− αpi
1
1(E) (3.91)
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Recall that α ≡ pi′1[vˆ2(t2) < 1], and equation (3.84) shows pi11[vˆ2(t2) < 1] = 1. There-
fore,
piδ1[vˆ2(t2) < 1] =
1− δ
1− αα +
δ − α
1− α · 1 = δ (3.92)
which proves equation (3.79), and
Epiδ1τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) (3.93)
=
1− δ
1− α · Epi′1τ1(a1, a2(t2)) +
δ − α
1− αEpi11τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) (3.94)
= Epi′1τ1(a1, a
∗
2(t2)) (3.95)
which proves equation (3.80).
To prove equation (3.81), observe that for all an2 ∈ A2, a2(an2 ) = an2 , which implies:
pi11[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
n
2 ] =
|A2|∑
m=1
(
Ia2(am2 )=an2 · pi′1[a∗2(t˜2) = am2 ]
) ≥ pi′2[a∗2(t˜2) = an2 ]. (3.96)
Furthermore, by equation (3.70) it must be the case that a∗2(t˜2) = a
n ∈ A2 implies
vˆ2(t˜2) < 1. Therefore,
pi11[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
n
2 , vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] = pi
1
1[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
n
2 ] (3.97)
and
pi′1[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
n
2 , vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] = pi
′
1[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
n
2 ] (3.98)
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and equations (3.96), (3.97) and (3.98) imply that for all an2 ∈ A2,
pi11[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
n
2 , vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] ≥ pi′1[a∗2(t˜2) = an2 , vˆ2(t˜2) < 1]. (3.99)
Furthermore, equation (3.70) implies that for all an2 ∈ A∗2,
pi11[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
n
2 , vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] = pi
′
1[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a
n
2 , vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] = 0. (3.100)
Together equations (3.99) and (3.100) imply that for all a2 ∈ A2,
pi11[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a2, vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] ≥ pi′1[a∗2(t˜2) = a2, vˆ2(t˜2) < 1]. (3.101)
and because piδ1 is a convex combination of pˆi
1
1 and pˆi
′
1 it must be that
piδ1[a
∗
2(t˜2) = a2, vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] ≥ pi′1[a∗2(t˜2) = a2, vˆ2(t˜2) < 1] (3.102)
which proves equation (3.81).
Sublemma 11. Let pi′1 = pˆi1(t
′
1). Then using the construction in sublemma 10, the
following types
• tˆ1 with a valuation vˆ1(tˆ1) > max{vˆ1(t∗1), 1} and pˆi1(tˆ1) = piδ1 where δ = 1vˆ1(tˆ1)
• t1 with valuation vˆ1(t1) = vˆ1(tˆ1) and pˆi1(t1) = pi11
• t1 with valuation vˆ1(t1) = 0 and pˆi1(t1) = pˆi1(t1)
satisfy conditions (A1)-(A4), (B1)-B(4), and (C1)-(C2) respectively.
Proof. By construction tˆ1 satisfies (A1) and (A2), and sublemma 10 implies tˆ1 satisfies
(A3) and (A4). Therefore a tˆ1 that satisfies (A1)-(A4) exists.
Similarly, by construction t1 satisfies (B1) and (B2), and sublemma 10 implies
that t1 satisfies (B3) and (B4).
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t1 satisfies (C1) and (C2) by construction.
Sublemma 11 completes the proof of lemma III.11 by providing explicit types that
satisfy the conditions posited in lemma III.10.
Together lemmas III.10 and III.11 complete the proof of case 2 by showing that
Q1(t
′
1) = Q˜1(t
′
1).
Together, the proofs of Case 1 and Case 2 complete the proof of proposition
III.7, which is equivalent to proposition III.5. Therefore no M and a∗ satisfying the
conditions in proposition III.5 improves on M˜ and a˜∗.
3.6 Conclusion
In chapter 2 I introduced the concept of improvability as a criterion for assessing
whether a public good mechanism can be considered efficient. While I showed the
existence of unimprovable mechanisms in that paper, I presented no examples. This
paper presents an example of an unimprovable mechanism, but also highlights some
of the difficulties in applying the unimprovability concept; although the mechanism
is simple the proof is quite involved, and some extra restrictions on the class of mech-
anism are required. Methods to characterize the class of unimprovable mechanisms,
and to determine whether a given mechanism is improvable or unimprovable, are
areas for further research.
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CHAPTER IV
Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy
Voting Rules
4.1 Introduction
Economic outcomes depend not only on market processes but also on political
processes. Economists have therefore a long-standing interest in political decision
making. Political decisions are often made through voting procedures. Consequently
it is interesting to investigate which voting procedures perform well in the sense of
helping to achieve some measure of economic welfare. One methodology that can be
used to address this question is the theory of mechanism design. In this paper we
consider the design of voting rules from the perspective of the theory of mechanism
design.
Our starting point is a classic result on voting rules, due to Alan Gibbard (1973)
and Mark Satterthwaite (1975). According to this result the only dominant strategy
voting rules for three or more alternatives are dictatorial voting rules. Gibbard and
Satterthwaite assumed the number of alternatives to be finite. Preferences were mod-
eled as complete and transitive orders of the set of alternatives. For every voter the
range of relevant preferences was taken to be the set of all possible preferences over
the alternatives (the full domain assumption). Gibbard and Satterthwaite then asked
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whether it is possible to construct a game form1 that determines which alternative
is chosen as a function of the strategies chosen by the voters, such that each voter
has a dominant strategy whatever this voter’s preferences are. A dominant strategy
was defined to be a strategy that is always a best reply to each of the other voters’
strategy combinations. Gibbard and Satterthwaite showed that the only game forms
that offer each voter for all preferences a dominant strategy are game forms that leave
the choice of the outcome to just one individual, the dictator.2
The motivation for considering dominant strategy game forms is not always ar-
ticulated in the literature. However, one explanation for the appeal that dominant
strategy mechanisms have for researchers is that dominant strategies predict rational
voters’ behavior without relying on any assumption about the voters’ beliefs about
each others’ preferences or behavior. If a voter does not have a dominant strategy,
then that voter’s optimal choice depends on his beliefs about other voters’ behavior
which in turn may be derived from beliefs about other voters’ preferences. It seems
attractive to bypass such beliefs, and to construct a game form in which a prediction
can be made that is independent of beliefs.
On closer inspection, this argument can be seen to consist of two parts:
(A) The design of a good game form for voting should not be based on
specific assumptions about voters’ beliefs about each other.
(B) A good game form for voting should allow us to predict rational voters’
choices uniquely from their preferences, without making specific assump-
tions about these voters’ beliefs about each other.3
These two parts are logically independent. Part (A) seems more convincing: often
1We use the terms game form and mechanism synonymously.
2The literature that builds on Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s seminal work is voluminous. For a
recent survey see Barbera` (2010).
3Blin and Satterthwaite (1977) emphasize the interpretation of the Gibbard Satterthwaite theo-
rem as a result about voting procedures in which each voter’s choice depends only on their prefer-
ences, and not on their beliefs about others’ preferences.
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voting schemes are constructed long before the precise context in which they will be
used is known. It seems wise not to make any special assumptions about agents’
knowledge about each other. Part (B) can perhaps be motivated by the idea that
game forms in which voters’ behavior can be uniquely predicted independent of their
beliefs are simpler than game forms in which each voter’s optimal choice depends
on the voter’s beliefs about other voters, but this point seems less compelling. The
implicit idea of simplicity is just one of several conceivable notions of simplicity.
In this paper we present an investigation of the theory of voting rules that is based
on the first part of the two part argument described above, but not on the second
part. In other words, we examine game forms for voting without making assumptions
about voters’ beliefs about each other, but we do not restrict attention to game forms
for which voters’ equilibrium strategies are independent of voters’ beliefs. Using the
terminology of game theory, the fact that we do not make any assumptions about
voters’ beliefs about each other is reflected by the fact that we analyze any proposed
game form for all possible type spaces. For each type space we look for a Bayesian
equilibrium of the given game form for that type space.4 However, we do not require
each voter’s choice, for a given preference of that voter, to be the same for all type
spaces.
One of the two main findings of this paper is that a mechanism designer who eval-
uates voting rules using the Pareto criterion can improve on dictatorial mechanisms
even when not making any assumption about voters’ beliefs about each other. A
Pareto improvement on dictatorship is possible in our framework when we consider
random dictatorship where all agents have a positive probability of being dictator.
To explain our results more fully, we need to briefly describe the set-up of our paper.
In order to be able to use the notion of Bayesian equilibrium we use a framework
4For the definitions of type space and Bayesian equilibrium see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp.
213-215).
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that is slightly different from the framework that Gibbard and Satterthwaite used. We
model voters’ attitudes towards risk, adopting the assumption that voters evaluate
risky prospects according to von Neumann Morgenstern utility theory. It then seems
natural to allow voting rules to map profiles of von Neumann Morgenstern utility
functions into probability distributions over outcomes. The first question that arises
is whether a version of Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s theorem holds for the setting
just described. This question has been answered affirmatively by Aanund Hylland
in 1980 in the unpublished (Hylland, 1980). When voters have von Neumann Mor-
genstern utilities, and lotteries are allowed as outcomes, then the only game forms
that offer each agent always a dominant strategy, and that pick an alternative if it
is unanimously preferred by all agents, are random dictatorships.5 In random dicta-
torships each voter gets to be dictator with a probability pi that is independent of
all preferences. If voter i is dictator, then the outcome that voter i ranks highest is
chosen.
We can now state the two main results of this paper. Both results address whether
there are game forms such that for all finite type spaces, there is at least one Bayesian
equilibrium of the game form that yields all voters’ types the same expected utility,
and in some type spaces, for some voters’ types, strictly higher expected utility than
random dictatorship. Obviously, the answer to this question can be positive only
when each voter’s probability of being dictator is strictly less than one. In our first
main result we show that in this case the answer to our question is indeed positive,6
provided that we consider interim expected utility, that is, each voter’s expected
5This result is Theorem 1* in Hylland (1980). It is also Theorem 1 in Dutta et. al. (2007) (see
also Dutta et. al., 2008) where an alternative proof is provided. Another proof is in Nandeibam
(2004).
6The game form that we use to prove our first main result is almost identical to the Full Consensus
or Random Ballot Fall-Back game form that Heitzig and Simmons (2010) have introduced. While
their motivation, like ours, is to consider voting systems that are more flexible than dictatorial
voting systems, and that allow for compromises, the focus of their formal analysis is on complete
information, correlated equilibria that are in some sense coalition proof. In this paper the focus is
on analyzing Bayesian equilibria in arbitrary, finite type spaces.
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utility is calculated when that voter’s type is known, but the other voters’ types
are not yet known.7 If an ex post perspective is adopted instead, that is, if voters’
expected utility is considered conditional on the vector of all voters’ types, then no
voting game form Pareto improves on random dictatorship. This is our second main
result. Our first main result thus indicates that a robust analysis of voting schemes
can lead to more positive results if the requirement that voters’ optimal strategies are
independent of their beliefs is abandoned. Our second main result shows that such
positive results depend on the details of how each voter’s expected utility is evaluated.
Our approach is related to Bergemann and Morris’ (2005) work on robust mech-
anism design. They consider, as we do, Bayesian equilibria of mechanisms on all
type spaces. Bergemann and Morris seek conditions under which the Bayesian im-
plementability of a social choice correspondence on all type spaces implies dominant
strategy implementability (or, more generally, implementability in ex post equilibria).
The conditions that they find apply to separable environments the prime example of
which are environments in which each agent’s utility depends on some physical allo-
cation and this agent’s monetary transfer. Bergemann and Morris point out (2005,
Section 6.3) that in non-separable environments, such as environments without trans-
ferrable payoffs considered by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, dominant strategy imple-
mentability may be a stronger requirement than Bayesian implementability on all
type spaces.8 Bergemann and Morris do not consider the problem of comparing dif-
ferent mechanisms from an efficiency or welfare point of view. Such comparisons are
a focus in our work.
The approach of this paper are also closely related to chapter 2 of this dissertation,
which analyzes the problem of designing a mechanism for public goods. Like we do
in this chapter, chapter 2 considers the performance of different mechanisms on all
7The notions of interim and ex post efficiency are due to Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983).
8The discussion paper version ((Bergemann and Morris, 2003) of Bergemann and Morris (2005)
includes a general characterization of Bayesian implementability on all type spaces, however we do
not make use of this characterization.
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type spaces. That chapter focuses on an ex post perspective, and demonstrates that
a mechanism designer can improve efficiency using a more flexible mechanism than
a dominant strategy mechanism. In this chapter, by contrast, when considering the
ex post perspective, we find that no mechanism can improve on dominant strategy
mechanisms.
The spirit of our work in this paper is also related to Bo¨rgers (1991) who showed,
in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite framework, the existence of mechanisms for which the
outcomes that result if all players chose a strategy from their sets of undominated
strategies are Pareto efficient, and (in a sense defined in that paper) less biased than
the outcomes of dictatorship. The set of undominated strategies is equal to the set of
expected utility maximizing strategies that a rational agent might choose if one con-
siders all possible beliefs. Thus, implicitly, Bo¨rgers (1991) considered implementation
on all type spaces with belief-dependent strategies, and contrasted this with Gibbard
and Satterthwaite’s dominant strategy requirement. However, Bo¨rgers used a frame-
work in which agents’ preferences were modeled using ordinal preferences rather than
von Neumann Morgenstern utilities. Moreover, his approach can be considered an
implementation approach, as he considered all undominated strategies, whereas our
approach here is a mechanism design approach in the sense that we study for every
type space some equilibrium, but not all Bayesian equilibria. We leave the further
exploration of the implementation approach in our framework to future research.
Section 4.2 explains the model and the definitions used in this paper. In Section
4.3 we adapt Hylland’s theorem on random dictatorship to our setting. In Section 4.4
we explain how we relax the requirement that voters’ choices, for given preferences,
are the same in all type spaces. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 contain our two main results.
Section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 The Voting Problem
There are n agents: i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The agents have to choose one alterna-
tive from a finite set A of alternatives. We assume that A has at least three elements.
The set of all probability distributions over A is ∆(A), where for δ ∈ ∆(A) we denote
by δ(a) ∈ [0, 1] the probability that δ assigns to alternative a. The agents are com-
monly known to be expected utility maximizers. We denote agent i’s von Neumann
Morgenstern utility function by ui : A→ R. We assume that a 6= b⇒ ui(a) 6= ui(b),
i.e., there are no indifferences. We define the expected utility for probability distri-
butions δ ∈ ∆(A) by ui(δ) =
∑
a∈A ui(a)δ(a).
A mechanism designer has a, possibly incomplete, ranking of the alternatives in
A that may depend on the agents’ utility functions. We shall be more specific about
the designer’s objectives later. The mechanism designer does not know the agents’
utility functions, nor does she know what the agents believe about each other. To
implement an outcome that potentially depends on the agents’ utility functions the
mechanism designer asks the agents to play a game form.
Definition IV.1. A game form G = (S, x) consists of:
(i) a set S ≡∏i∈I Si where for every i ∈ I the set Si is non-empty and finite;
(ii) a function x : S → ∆(A).
The set Si is the set of (pure) strategies available to agent i in the game form
G. We focus on finite sets of pure strategies, while allowing mixed strategies, to ease
exposition. Our results also hold when the sets Si of pure strategies are allowed to
be infinite. The function x assigns to every combination of pure strategies s the,
potentially stochastic, outcome x(s) that is implemented when agents choose that
combination of pure strategies. We write x(s, a) for the probability that x(s) assigns
to alternative a.
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Once the mechanism designer has announced a game form, the agents choose si-
multaneously and independently their strategies. Because the agents don’t necessarily
know each others’ utility functions or beliefs, this game may be a game of incomplete
information. A hypothesis about the agents’ utility functions and their beliefs about
each other can be described by specifying a type space.
Definition IV.2. A type space T = (T, pi, u) consists of:
(i) a set T ≡∏i∈I Ti, where for every i ∈ I the set Ti is non-empty and finite;
(ii) an array pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) of functions pii : Ti → ∆(T−i) where ∆(T−i) is the
set of all probability distributions over T−i ≡
∏
j 6=i Tj;
(iii) an array u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) of functions ui : Ti × A → R such that a 6= b ⇒
ui(ti, a) 6= ui(ti, b) for all ti ∈ Ti.
The set Ti is the set of types of agent i. Agent i privately observes his type. The
function pii describes for every type ti ∈ Ti the beliefs that agent i has about the
other agents’ types when agent i himself is of type ti. We write pii(ti, t−i) for the
probability that type ti assigns to the other players types being t−i. The function
ui(ti) describes player i’s utility when i is of type ti. We write ui(ti, a) for the utility
that ui(ti) assigns to alternative a. The utility functions ui(ti) satisfy the assumption
that we introduced earlier that there are no indifferences.9
In Definition V.2 beliefs are subjective. There may or may not be a common prior
for a particular type space. Different agents’ beliefs may be incompatible with each
other in the sense that one agent may attach probability one to an event to which
another agent attaches probability zero. Observe also that we assume type spaces to
be finite. We thus avoid technical difficulties associated with infinite type spaces.
9Observe that we suppress in the notation the dependence of pii and ui on the type space T . We
are not aware of any confusion that might arise from this simplification of our notation.
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We assume that the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the agents’ utility
functions or their beliefs. Therefore, the mechanism designer regards all type spaces
as possible descriptions of the environment in which the agents find themselves. We
denote the set of all type spaces by Υ.
The mechanism designer proposes to agents how they might play the game. She
may propose to the agents to randomize. For i ∈ I we denote by ∆(Si) the set of all
probability distributions on Si. For the agents to accept the mechanism designer’s
proposal, she must propose a Bayesian equilibrium. Because the mechanism designer
does not know the true type space, she has to propose a Bayesian equilibrium for
every type space.
Definition IV.3. A Bayesian equilibrium of game form G for every type space is an
array σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, . . . , σ
∗
n) such that for every i ∈ I:
(i) σ∗i is a family of functions (σ
∗
i (T ))T ∈Υ where for every T ∈ Υ the function
σ∗i (T ) maps the type space Ti corresponding to T into ∆(Si);
and, writing σ∗i (T , ti) for the mixed strategy assigned to ti, and writing σ∗i (T , ti, si)
for the probability that this mixed strategy assigns to si ∈ Si, we have for every
T ∈ Υ, i ∈ I, and ti ∈ Ti (where Ti corresponds to T ):
(ii) σ∗i (T , ti) maximizes the expected utility of type ti among all mixed strategies
in ∆(Si), where expected utility for any mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Si) is:
∑
t−i∈T−i
pii(ti, t−i)
∑
s∈S
ui(ti, x(s)) · σi(si) ·
∏
j 6=i
σ∗j (T , tj, sj). (4.1)
We postulate in this paper a mechanism designer who seeks to further the utility
of the agents rather than her own utility. We shall formalize this by assuming that
the mechanism designer evaluates different mechanisms and their equilibria using the
Pareto criterion. When evaluating the agents’ utility for a realized type combination
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t the mechanism designer can either only consider the outcomes that result from
the mixed strategies prescribed for these types, or she may consider the expected
utilities of these types, based on the types’ own subjective beliefs. In other words, the
mechanism designer may adopt an ex post or an interim perspective when evaluating
agents’ utilities. The interim perspective respects agents’ own perception of their
environment. The ex post perspective has a paternalistic flavor. On the other hand,
for example when agents’ beliefs are incompatible with each other, the mechanism
designer may be justified in discarding agents’ beliefs, on the basis that at least some
of them have to be wrong, as agents themselves will discover at some point. Thus
neither the interim nor the ex post perspective are clearly preferable. We pursue both
perspectives in this paper.
Definition IV.4. The game form G and the Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces
σ∗ interim Pareto dominate the game form G˜ and the Bayesian equilibrium for all
type spaces σ˜∗ if for all T ∈ Υ, i ∈ I, and ti ∈ Ti:
∑
t−i∈T−i
pii(ti, t−i)
∑
s∈S
ui(ti, x(s)) ·
∏
j∈I
σ∗j (T , tj, sj) ≥∑
t−i∈T−i
pii(ti, t−i)
∑
s∈S
ui(ti, x˜(s)) ·
∏
j∈I
σ˜∗j (T , tj, sj) (4.2)
with strict inequality for at least one T ∈ Υ, i ∈ I, and ti ∈ Ti.
Definition IV.5. The game form G and the Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces
σ∗ ex post Pareto dominate the game form G˜ and theBayesian equilibrium for all type
spaces σ˜∗ if for all T ∈ Υ, i ∈ I, and t ∈ T :
∑
s∈S
ui(ti, x(s)) ·
∏
j∈I
σ∗j (T , tj, sj) ≥∑
s∈S
ui(ti, x˜(s)) ·
∏
j∈I
σ˜∗j (T , tj, sj) (4.3)
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with strict inequality for at least one T ∈ Υ, i ∈ I, and t ∈ T .
Our main interest in this paper is in exploring how the extent to which the mech-
anism designer can achieve her objectives depends on the requirements that the
Bayesian equilibrium that the mechanism designer proposes has to satisfy. In the
next section, we consider a very restrictive requirement. In subsequent sections, we
relax this requirement.
4.3 Belief Independent Equilibria: Hylland’s Theorem
We begin by exploring the consequences of a restrictive requirement for the Bayesian
equilibria that the mechanism designer proposes. This requirement is implicit in the
work on dominant strategy mechanism design. It is that equilibria be belief inde-
pendent. Using the notion of belief independent equilibria, we can restate Hylland’s
version of the Gibbard Satterwhaite theorem in our setting.
Definition IV.6. A game form G and a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type
space, σ∗, are belief independent if for all i ∈ I, T , T˜ ∈ Υ, ti ∈ Ti and t˜i ∈ T˜i such
that ui(ti) = u˜i(t˜i) we have:
σ∗i (T , ti) = σ∗i (T˜ , t˜i), (4.4)
where Ti, ui correspond to T and T˜i, u˜i correspond to T˜ .
The reformulation of Hylland’s theorem presented below says that all game forms
and belief independent equilibria of these game forms that satisfy two unanimity
requirements are random dictatorships. To define the two unanimity requirements
and random dictatorship we need some notation. If u is a utility function, we denote
by b(u) the element of A that maximizes u, and by w(u) the element of A that
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minimizes u.10
Definition IV.7. A game form G and a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type
space, σ∗, satisfy
(i) positive unanimity if for every T ∈ Υ, t ∈ T , and a ∈ A such that b(ui(ti)) = a
for all i ∈ I, we have:
∑
s∈S
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T , ti, si) · x(s, a) = 1; (4.5)
(ii) negative unanimity if for every T ∈ Υ, t ∈ T , and a ∈ A such that w(ui(ti)) = a
for all i ∈ I, we have:
∑
s∈S
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T , ti, si) · x(s, a) = 0. (4.6)
Positive and negative unanimity are implied by, but weaker than ex post Pareto
efficiency. Next, we provide the formal definition of random dictatorship that we need
for our reformulation of Hylland’s theorem.
Definition IV.8. A game form G and a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type
space, σ∗, are a random dictatorship if there is some p ∈ [0, 1]n such that for every
T ∈ Υ, t ∈ T , and a ∈ A:
∑
s∈S
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T , ti, si) · x(s, a) =
∑
{i∈I:b(ui(ti))=a}
pi (4.7)
The following is implied by Hylland’s theorem.11
10Recall that we have assumed that there are no indifferences. Therefore, there is a unique element
of A that maximizes u, and a unique element of A that minimizes u.
11Theorem 1* in Hylland (1980). We use here the version of Hylland’s theorem that is Theorem
1 in Dutta et. al. (2007) with the correction in Dutta et. al. (2008).
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Proposition IV.9. A game form G and a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type
space, σ∗, are belief-independent and satisfy positive and negative unanimity if and
only if they are a random dictatorship.
Proof. The “if-part” is obvious. To prove the “only if-part” we derive from G and
σ∗ a “cardinal decision scheme” in the sense of Definition 1 in Dutta et. al. (2007),
and show that this cardinal decision scheme has the properties listed in Theorem 1 in
Dutta et. al. (2007) and the correction in Dutta et. al. (2008). It then follows from
Theorem 1 in Dutta et. al. (2007) that the cardinal decision scheme is a random
dictatorship. This then implies the “only if-part” of our Proposition IV.9.
Denote by U the set of all utility functions that have the property of no indif-
ferences (see Definition V.2). A cardinal decision scheme is a mapping φ : Un →
∆(A). We can derive from G and σ∗ a cardinal decision scheme by setting for any
(u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ Un and a ∈ A the probability φ(u1, u2, . . . , un, a) that φ(u1, u2, . . . , un)
assigns to a as:
φ(u1, u2, . . . , un, a) =
∑
s∈S
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T , ti, si) · x(s, a), (4.8)
where we can pick any T ∈ Υ and any t ∈ T such that ui(ti) = ui for all i ∈ I. By
belief-independence it does not matter which such T and t ∈ T we choose. Then φ
is a cardinal decision scheme as defined in Definition 1 of Dutta et. al. (2007).
We can complete the proof by showing that φ has the two properties listed in
Theorem 1 of Dutta et. al. (2007) and the additional property listed in the correction
Dutta et. al. (2008). The first property is unanimity: If b(ui) = a for all i ∈ I, then
φ(u1, u2, . . . , un, a) = 1. This is implied by the assumption that G and σ
∗ satisfy
positive unanimity.
The second property is strategy proofness: If (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ Un and u′i ∈ U ,
then ui(φ(ui, u−i)) ≥ ui(φ(u′i, u−i)), where u−i is the array (u1, u2, . . . , un) leaving
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out ui. To prove this we pick T ∈ Υ, ti, t′i ∈ Ti and t−i ∈
∏
j 6=i such that ui(ti) =
ui, ui(t
′
i) = u
′
i, and uj(tj) = uj for all j 6= i. Moreover, pii(ti) and pii(t′i) place
probability 1 on t−i. Then the fact that σ∗ is a Bayesian equilibrium of G for the
type space T implies:
∑
s∈S
ui(ti, x(s)) · σ∗i (T , ti, si) ·
∏
j 6=i
σ∗j (T , tj, sj) ≥∑
s∈S
ui(ti, x(s)) · σ∗i (T , t′i, si) ·
∏
j 6=i
σ∗j (T , tj, sj) (4.9)
By the definition of φ, this is equivalent to: ui(φ(ui, u−i) ≥ ui(φ(u′i, u−i)), that is,
strategy proofness.
The third property, introduced in the correctionDutta et. al. (2008), is a property
labelled (*) in Dutta et. al. (2007): If w(ui) = a for all i ∈ I, then φ(u1, u2, . . . , un, a) =
0. This is implied by the assumption that G and σ∗ satisfy negative unanimity.
From now on, when we refer to random dictatorship, we shall mean a specific
game form G, and a specific equilibrium σ∗ of G for every type space.
Definition IV.10. For any vector p ∈ [0, 1]n such that ∑i∈I pi = 1 the following
game form G and equilibrium σ∗ of G for every type space will be referred to as
p-random dictatorship:
(i) Si = A for all i ∈ I;
(ii) x(s, a) =
∑
{i∈I:b(ui(ti))=a} pi for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A;
(iii) σ∗i (T , ti, b(ui(ti))) = 1 for all i ∈ I, T ∈ Υ, and ti ∈ Ti.
It is immediate that σ∗ is a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type space, and
that G and this equilibrium are a random dictatorship. There are other game forms
and equilibria that are random dictatorships, but it is without loss of generality to
only consider the one described in Definition V.10.
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4.4 Consistent Equilibria
Our main interest in this paper is in considering the implications of relaxing the
requirement of belief independence for the Bayesian equilibria that the mechanism
designer chooses. We do not, however, completely dispense with any link between
players’ strategies in different type spaces. The Bayesian equilibria that we shall
investigate need to satisfy a consistency requirement. This requirement is implied by,
but does not imply belief independence.
Definition IV.11. A Bayesian equilibrium of game form G for every type space, σ∗,
are consistent if for all type spaces T , T˜ ∈ Υ such that:
(i) for every i ∈ I: T˜i ⊆ Ti (where T˜i corresponds to T˜ and Ti corresponds to T );
(ii) for every i ∈ I and every ti ∈ Ti: u˜i(ti) = ui(ti) and p˜ii(ti) = pii(ti) (where u˜i, p˜ii
correspond to T˜ , and ui, pii correspond to T ),
we have for every i ∈ I and every ti ∈ Ti:
(iii) σ∗(T˜ , ti) = σ∗(T , ti).
Observe that the type ti referred to in item (iii) of Definition V.4 has the same util-
ity function and hierarchy of beliefs in type space T and in type space T˜ . Therefore,
the consistency requirement is implied by the assumption that an agent’s equilibrium
choices only depend on that agent’s utility function and that agent’s hierarchy of
beliefs. This assumption seems reasonable because the type space, as opposed to the
utility function and the hierarchy of beliefs, is really only a construction by the mod-
eler, and not necessarily a construction that the agent is aware of. We don’t explicitly
formulate the stronger assumption that equilibrium choices should only depend on
agents’ utility functions and hierarchies of beliefs, but instead work with the weaker
consistency requirement, because the consistency requirement is easier to formulate,
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and is sufficient for our purposes. Our results would also go through if we made the
more demanding assumption for equilibria.
4.5 A Game Form that Interim Pareto Dominates
Random Dictatorship
The first main result of this paper examines interim Pareto dominance, while the
second main result concerns ex post Pareto dominance. The first result says that for
every p ∈ [0, 1]n such that ∑i∈I pi = 1 and p < 1 for all i ∈ I there are a game
form, and a Bayesian equilibrium of this game form for every type space, that interim
Pareto dominate p random dictatorship. We refer to the dominating game form as
p-random dictatorship with compromise.
Definition IV.12. For every p ∈ [0, 1]n such that ∑i∈I pi = 1 the following game
form is called a p-random dictatorship with compromise.
(i) for every i ∈ I:
Si = 2
A × A,
where 2A is the set of all non-empty subsets of A;
(ii) If ai = a for some a ∈ A and all i ∈ I, then:
x(s, a) = 1
(iii) If ai 6= aj for some i, j ∈ I, but
⋂
i∈I Ai 6= ∅, then there is some a ∈
⋂
i∈I Ai
such that
x(s, a) = 1.
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(iv) If ai 6= aj for some i, j ∈ I, and
⋂
i∈I Ai = ∅, then for all a ∈ A:
x(s, a) =
∑
{i∈I:ai=a}
pi.
In words, this game form offers each agent i the opportunity to nominate one
“preferred” alternative, ai, and also a set Ai of “acceptable” alternatives. If all voters
nominate the same preferred alternative, then that alternative is chosen with prob-
ability 1. If voters’ preferred alternatives differ, but there is at least one alternative
that all voters include in their set of acceptable alternatives, then one of the com-
monly acceptable alternatives is chosen with probability 1. Otherwise, the mechanism
reverts to random dictatorship. We refer to this game form as p random dictator-
ship with compromise because it offers agents the opportunity to compromise on a
mutually acceptable alternative in place of p random dictatorship.12
One Bayesian equilibrium of this game form is that all agents always choose ai
to be their most preferred alternative, and set Ai = {ai}. In this equilibrium, the
possibility of a compromise is not used by either agent. This is an equilibrium because
neither agent can unilaterally force a compromise. Any deviation that unilaterally
alters the set of acceptable alternatives has no effect. However, the next proposition
shows that p-random dictatorship with compromise also has a Bayesian equilibrium
for all type spaces that interim Pareto dominates random dictatorship. We also show
that this equilibrium respects positive and negative unanimity, to clarify that our
result does indeed result from weakening the belief independence requirement, and
not weakening any other property listed in Proposition IV.9.
12This game form was inspired by the idea of Approval Voting (see Brams and Fishburn, 2007),
which, like our game form, allows voters to indicate “acceptable” alternatives. However, in approval
voting the alternative that the largest number of agents regards as acceptable is selected, whereas
our game form requires unanimity. Moreover, our game form uses random dictatorship as a fallback,
whereas approval voting does not have any such fallback. When p is the uniform distribution, the
game form that we consider is almost identical to the Full Consensus or Random Ballot Fall-Back
game form that Heitzig and Simmons (2010) introduced. Heitzig and Simmons require the set Ai
to be a singleton.
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Proposition IV.13. For every p ∈ [0, 1]n such that ∑i∈I pi = 1 and pi < 1 for all
i ∈ I, p-random dictatorship with compromise has a consistent equilibrium for all
type spaces σ∗ that interim Pareto dominates p-random dictatorship and that satisfies
positive and negative unanimity.
The main difficulty in the proof below is not so much showing interim Pareto
dominance, but proving the existence of a consistent equilibrium. The argument in
the proof below can be used to show the existence of consistent Bayesian equilibria
for all type spaces of arbitrary finite games.
Proof. We construct the equilibrium σ∗. To begin with we restrict attention to strate-
gies such that ai = b(ui(ti)) and w(ui(ti)) /∈ Ai. This restriction of the strategy space
is innocuous, because any strategy that does not satisfy this restriction is weakly
dominated by a strategy that does satisfy it. This restriction implies that positive
and negative unanimity will automatically be satisfied.
We now proceed inductively. We begin by considering type spaces T where for
every i ∈ I the set Ti has exactly one element. In such type spaces it is common
belief among the agents that agent i has utility function ui(ti). We distinguish two
cases. The first is that there is some alternative a ∈ A such that for all i ∈ I we have:
ui(ti, a) >
∑
j∈I
pjui(ti, b(uj(tj))). (4.10)
Observe that the assumption p < 1 for all i ∈ I implies that some such type spaces
exist. For such type spaces the strategies are:
σi(T , ti) = ({b(ui(ti)), a}, b(ui(ti))) (4.11)
for i ∈ I. Note that these strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium of the complete
information game in which agents’ preferences are common knowledge, and that the
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outcome a strictly Pareto-dominates the outcome under random dictatorship. For all
other type spaces with just a single element for each player the strategies are:
σi(T , ti) = ({b(ui(ti))}, b(ui(ti))) (4.12)
Note that these strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium of the complete information
game in which agents’ preferences are common knowledge, and that the outcome is
exactly the same as under random dictatorship.
Now suppose we had constructed the equilibrium for all type spaces T in which
all the sets Ti have at most k elements. We first extend the construction to all type
spaces T in which T1 has at most k+ 1 elements and for j > 1 the set Tj has at most
k elements. Then we extend the construction to all type spaces T in which T1 and
T2 have at most k+ 1 elements and for j > 2 the set Tj has at most k elements. The
construction can then inductively continued until it is extended to all type spaces T
in which all the sets Ti have at most k + 1 elements.
Suppose first that we are considering a type space T in which Ti has at most k+1
elements and for j > 1 the set Tj has at most k elements. Consider all type spaces T˜
that are contained in T , i.e. for which conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition V.4 hold,
and such that at least for one agent the type set has fewer elements than in T . For
such type spaces we define for every i ∈ I and every ti ∈ T˜i:
σi (T , ti) = σi
(
T˜ , ti
)
. (4.13)
By the inductive hypothesis the right hand side of this equation has already been
defined. Observe that this is well-defined. If a type ti of player i is contained in
player i’s type set in two different type spaces T˜ and T̂ that are contained in T in
the sense of Definition V.4, then the intersection of these type spaces is also a type
space, and by consistency the same strategy is assigned to type ti in T˜ and in T̂ .
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If the previous step defines the equilibrium strategy for all types in T , then the
inductive step is completed. Otherwise, it remains to define strategies for types ti that
are not contained in any type set of a type space that is a subspace of T . We consider
the strategic game in which each such type is a separate player, and expected utilities
are calculated keeping the strategies of types that have already been dealt with in
the previous paragraph fixed, and using each type’s subjective beliefs to calculate
that type’s expected payoff. This strategic game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies. We define for each type ti that still has to be dealt with the strategy
σi(T , ti) to be type ti’s equilibrium strategy.
By construction these strategies satisfy the consistency requirement. Also, they
are by construction interim Bayesian equilibria: For types in typesets that corre-
spond to a smaller type space the Bayesian equilibrium property carries over from
the smaller type space. For all other types, their choices maximize expected utility
by construction.
We extend the construction to all type spaces T in which T1 and T2 have at most
k+ 1 and for i > 2 the set Ti has at most k elements in the same way as we extended
it to all type spaces T in which T1 has at most k + 1 elements and for i > 1 the set
Ti has at most k elements.
To conclude the proof we note that this equilibrium interim Pareto dominates
random dictatorship. First, we note that no type can have lower expected utility
than under random dictatorship. This is because each type can guarantee themselves
an outcome that is at least as good as the random dictatorship outcome by choosing
Ai = {b(ui(ti))}. Second, each type’s expected utility is increased on type spaces in
which each player’s type set has just a single element, and for which inequality (4.10)
holds.
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4.6 No Game Form Ex Post Pareto Dominates
Random Dictatorship
Proposition IV.14. For every p ∈ [0, 1]n such that ∑i∈I pi = 1 there is no game
form G that has a consistent equilibrium for all type spaces σ∗ that ex post Pareto
dominates p-random dictatorship.
Proof. Indirect. Suppose for some p ∈ [0, 1]n such that∑i∈I pi = 1 there were a game
form G and an equilibrium of G for all type spaces σ∗ that ex post Pareto dominate
p-random dictatorship. For the outcome resulting from G and σ∗ to be different from
p-random dictatorship, there must be some T̂ ∈ Υ, tˆ ∈ T̂ , and aˆ ∈ A such that:
∑
s∈S
x(s, aˆ) ·
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T̂ , tˆi, si) <
∑
{i∈I:b(ui(tˆi))=aˆ}
pi. (4.14)
That is, alternative aˆ is chosen with a probability that is strictly smaller than the
probability with which it is chosen under random dictatorship. Let Î be the set{
i ∈ I : b(ui(tˆi)) = aˆ
}
, and notice that this set must be non-empty for (4.14) to hold.
To complete the proof we construct a new type space T˜ , and infer from (4.14) that in
this type space there is a type vector such that the outcome of p-random dictatorship
conditional on this type vector is strictly preferred by the type of one of the players
in Î to the outcome in G resulting from the equilibrium σ∗. Therefore, G and σ∗ do
not ex post Pareto-dominate p-random dictatorship.
The type sets in T˜ are given by: T˜i = T̂i for all i ∈ Î, and T˜i = T̂i ∪ {t˜i} for all
i /∈ Î. For all i ∈ I The types in T̂i have the same utility functions and beliefs in T˜
as in T̂ . For all i /∈ Î type t˜i’s beliefs are given by:
pii(t˜i)
[((
tˆj
)
j∈Î ,
(
t˜j
)
j /∈Î
j<i
,
(
tˆj
)
j /∈Î
j>i
)]
= 1, (4.15)
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and type t˜i’s utility function is:
u˜i(t˜i, a) =

1 if a = a˜;
1− εa if a /∈ {aˆ, a˜};
0 if a = aˆ;
(4.16)
where a˜ denotes the second most preferred alternative of some player k’s type tˆk,
where k ∈ Î. We assume that 0 < εa < ε¯ for all a /∈ {aˆ, a˜} for some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1), and
that a, a′ /∈ {aˆ, a˜} and a 6= a′ implies εa 6= εa′ . This assumption ensures that the
utility functions satisfy the condition of no indifferences. Moreover, by letting ε¯ tend
to zero, we can ensure that all εa tend to zero, which is the case that we shall focus
on.
We now show that for ε¯ sufficiently small at type vector ((tˆi)i∈Iˆ , (t˜i)i/∈Î) the al-
ternatives other than aˆ are in equilibrium σ∗ chosen with a total probability that is
larger than 1 −∑i∈Î pi. Note that the proof of Proposition V.13 is concluded once
this assertion is established. This is because random dictatorship gives player k’s type
tˆk his top alternative aˆ with probability
∑
i∈Î pi, and type tˆk’s second most preferred
alternative a˜ with probability 1−∑i∈Î pi. By contrast, G and σ∗ yield aˆ with prob-
ability less than
∑
i∈Î pi, and some other alternative, not necessarily type tˆk’s second
most preferred alternative, with a probability larger than 1−∑i∈Î pi. Therefore, type
tˆk strictly prefers random dictatorship.
Consider the player i /∈ Î for whom i is smallest. We denote this player by i1.
This player, when type t˜i1, expects with probability 1 that the other players’ type
vector is tˆ−i1. Because σ∗ is consistent, type t˜i1 expects the types tˆ−i1 to choose
the same in T˜ as in T̂ . By the assumption of the indirect proof, type tˆi1 has a
strategy available that yields alternatives other than aˆ with probability of more than
1−∑i∈Î pi. Type t˜i1 will not necessarily choose the same strategy as type tˆi1. But,
114
for small enough ε¯, only a strategy that yields an alternative other than aˆ with some
probability p˜ > 1−∑i∈Î pi can be optimal. Choosing such a strategy yields for type
t˜i1 expected payoff greater than p˜(1 − ε¯) >
(
1−∑i∈Î pi) (1 − ε¯) whereas any other
pure strategy yields a a payoff that is no more than 1−∑i∈Î pi < p˜. For small enough
ε¯ the former expected payoff is larger than the latter.
Now consider the player i /∈ Î for whom i is second smallest. We denote this
player by i2. This player, when type t˜i2, expects with probability 1 the other players’
types to be tˆ−i2 except for player i1 whom i2 expects with probability 1 to be type
t˜i1. By the step of the previous paragraph, if t˜i2 chose the same strategy as tˆi2 does in
equilibrium, t˜i2 would expect an outcome other than aˆ with probability larger than
1−∑i∈Î pi. He might choose in equilibrium some other strategy, but, for small enough
ε¯, he will never make a choice that yields an outcome other than aˆ with a probability
that is not larger than 1−∑i∈Î pi.
The step of the previous paragraph can be iterated until we arrive at the player
i /∈ Î for whom i is largest. We denote this player by i(n−1). This player expects the
other players to be of type t˜−(i(n−1)) except for types i ∈ Î, whom this player expects to
be of type tˆi. By the same argument used in the previous two paragraphs, type t˜i(n−1)
chooses in equilibrium a strategy that he expects to yield an outcome other than aˆ
with probability larger than 1−∑i∈Î pi. But at type vector ((tˆi)i∈Iˆ , (t˜i)i/∈Î) this type
has correct expectations, and therefore at this type vector the equilibrium strategies
do indeed yield an outcome other than aˆ with probability larger than 1−∑i∈Î pi. As
explained above, this concludes the proof.
4.7 Conclusion
Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s theorem, and Hylland’s version of this theorem in
a cardinal utility setting, are central results of voting theory. We have argued that
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the insistence of the theorem on belief independent strategy choices may be overly
restrictive if a mechanism designer is considered who is concerned with Pareto im-
provements. Such a mechanism designer can find voting schemes that are superior to
random dictatorship if agents’ choices are allowed to depend on their beliefs. What-
ever those beliefs are, the outcomes will be at least as good as under random dic-
tatorship, and sometimes better. Such an improvement is only possible if agents’
subjective beliefs are accepted, and an interim perspective is adopted. From an ex
post perspective, such unambiguous improvements are not possible.
An important problem left open by our paper is the characterization of voting
rules than are not dominated in one of the senses considered in this paper. In chapter
4 the analogous question is investigated for public goods mechanisms. Chapter 4
proves for one particular mechanism that it is not dominated. That chapter shows
the subtleties of this problem. Other related work is by Azrieli and Kim (2011)
who consider interim efficient voting rules for 2 alternatives, restricting attention to
independent types, and Bo¨rgers and Postl (2009) who describe ex ante efficient voting
schemes over three alternatives, but who only consider a very restricted type space
with, in particular, independent types.
Another important step is the investigation of robust implementation as opposed
to robust mechanism design. Implementation, unlike mechanism design, considers all
equilibria of a given game form. One might ask whether there are mechanisms such
that all equilibria on all type spaces dominate random dictatorship. We leave this
question for future research.
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CHAPTER V
Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy
Voting Rules: The Relative Utilitarianism Case
5.1 Introduction
This paper extends the analysis of voting mechanisms in chapter 4, to the case in
which a mechanism designer considers the relative efficiency of mechanisms’ outcomes
from the perspective of relative utilitarianism. Both papers analyze efficiency without
making any assumption regarding voters’ knowledge about each other. Chapter 4
analyzed voting rules in terms of Pareto efficiency. It found that on full domains, the
only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships, and that the designer of
a voting rule can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing
rules in which voters’ behavior can depend on their beliefs, although the result only
holds for voters’ interim expected utilities, not for their ex post expected utilities.
This paper focuses on the two agent environment and extends the results to the
case where a mechanism designer considers an outcome efficient if it maximizes the
sum of agents’ utilities, after agents’ utilities have been normalized. This “rela-
tive utilitarian” welfare function was axiomatized by Dhillon (1998) and Dhillon and
Mertens (1999) for social choice problems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the voting problem, which
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is largely identical to chapter 4 except for the assumption that there are two agents,
and that utilities are normalized in a way that permits a utilitarian approach. Section
5.3 introduces our notions of efficiency and shows that the result, in chapter 4, that
random dictatorship is interim Pareto dominated immediately implies that random
dictatorship is also interim dominated from the relative utilitarianism perspective.
Section 5.4 extends the second main result from that paper by showing that no game
form ex post dominates random dictatorship when efficiency is defined in terms of
relative utilitarianism. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The Voting Problem
There are two agents: i ∈ {1, 2}. The agents have to choose one alternative from
a finite set A of alternatives. We assume that A has at least three elements. The
set of all probability distributions over A is ∆(A), where for δ ∈ ∆(A) we denote
by δ(a) ∈ [0, 1] the probability that δ assigns to alternative a. The two agents
are commonly known to be expected utility maximizers. We denote agent i’s von
Neumann Morgenstern utility function by ui : A→ R. We assume that each agent’s
von Neumann Morgenstern utility function is normalized such that mina∈A ui(a) = 0
and maxa∈A ui(a) = 1. We also assume that a 6= b⇒ ui(a) 6= ui(b), i.e., there are no
indifferences. We define the expected utility for probability distributions δ ∈ ∆(A)
by ui(δ) =
∑
a∈A ui(a) · δ(a).
A mechanism designer has a ranking of the alternatives in A that may depend on
the agents’ utility functions. We shall be more specific about the designer’s objectives
later. The mechanism designer does not know the agents’ utility functions, nor does
she know what the agents believe about each other. To implement an outcome that
potentially depends on the agents’ utility functions the mechanism designer asks the
agents to play a game form.
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Definition V.1. A game form G = (S1, S2, x) consists of:
(i) a non-empty finite strategy set Si for each agent i ∈ {1, 2};
We define: S ≡ S1 × S2.
(ii) an outcome function x : S → ∆(A).
The set Si is the set of (pure) strategies available to agent i in the game form
G. We focus on finite sets of pure strategies, while allowing mixed strategies, to ease
exposition. Our results also hold when the sets Si of pure strategies are allowed to
be infinite. The function x assigns to every combination of pure strategies s the,
potentially stochastic, outcome x(s) that is implemented when agents choose that
combination of pure strategies. We write x(s, a) for the probability that x(s) assigns
to alternative a.
Once the mechanism designer has announced a game form, the two agents choose
simultaneously and independently their strategies. Because the agents don’t neces-
sarily know each others’ utility functions or beliefs, this game may be a game of
incomplete information. A hypothesis about the agents’ utility functions and their
beliefs about each other can be described by specifying a type space.
Definition V.2. A type space T = (T1, T2, pi1, pi2, u1, u2) consists for each i ∈ {1, 2}
of:
(i) a nonempty, finite set Ti of types;
We write ∆(Ti) for the set of all probability distributions over Ti.
(ii) a belief function pii : Ti → ∆(Tj) (where j 6= i);
(iii) a utility function ui : Ti × A→ [0, 1].
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We write pii(ti, tj) for the probability that type i assigns to player j being type tj
(where j 6= i). We write ui(ti, a) for the utility that ui(ti) assigns to a.1 The utility
function satisfies for both i ∈ {1, 2} and all ti ∈ Ti the assumptions introduced earlier:
(a) min
a∈A
ui(ti, a) = 0 and max
a∈A
ui(ti, a) = 1;
(b) ui(ti, a) 6= ui(ti, b) whenever a 6= b.
The set Ti is the set of types of agent i. Agent i privately observes his type. The
function pii describes for every type ti ∈ Ti the beliefs that agent i has about the
other agents’ types when agent i himself is of type ti. We write pii(ti, t−i) for the
probability that type ti assigns to the other players types being t−i. The function
ui(ti) describes player i’s utility when i is of type ti. We write ui(ti, a) for the utility
that ui(ti) assigns to alternative a. The utility functions ui(ti) satisfy the assumption
that we introduced earlier that there are no indifferences.
In Definition V.2 beliefs are subjective. There may or may not be a common prior
for a particular type space. Different agents’ beliefs may be incompatible with each
other in the sense that one agent may attach probability one to an event to which
another agent attaches probability zero. Observe also that we assume type spaces to
be finite. We thus avoid technical difficulties associated with infinite type spaces.
We assume that the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the agents’ utility
functions or their beliefs. Therefore, the mechanism designer regards all type spaces
as possible descriptions of the environment in which agents find themselves. We
denote the set of all type spaces by Υ.
The mechanism designer proposes to agents how they might play the game. He
might propose to agents to randomize. For i = 1, 2 we denote by ∆(Si) the set of all
probability distributions on Si. For the agents to accept the mechanism designer’s
1Observe that we suppress in the notation the dependence of pii and ui on the type space T . We
are not aware of any confusion that might arise from this simplification of our notation.
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proposal, he must propose a Bayesian equilibrium. Because the mechanism designer
does not know the true type space, he has to propose a Bayesian equilibrium for every
type space.
Definition V.3. A Bayesian equilibrium of game form G for every type space is a
pair (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) such that for every i ∈ {1, 2}:
(i) σ∗i is a family of functions (σ
∗
i (T ))T ∈Υ where for every T ∈ Υ the function
σ∗i (T ) maps the type space Ti corresponding to T into ∆(Si).
We write σ∗i (T , ti) for the mixed strategy assigned to ti ∈ Ti, and σ∗i (T , ti, si) for the
probability that this mixed strategy assigns to si ∈ Si.
(ii) σ∗i (T , ti) maximizes the expected utility of type ti among all mixed strategies
in ∆(Si), where expected utility for any mixed strategy σ
∗
i ∈ ∆(Si) is:
∑
tj∈Tj
∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
(
ui(ti, x(s1, s2)) · σ∗i (T , ti, si) · σ∗j (T , tj, sj) · pi(ti, tj)
)
, (5.1)
where j 6= i.
The Bayesian equilibria that the mechanism designer proposes need to satisfy a
consistency requirement.
Definition V.4. A Bayesian equilibrium of game form G for every type space,
(σ∗1, σ
∗
2), is consistent if for all type spaces T , T˜ ∈ Υ such that:
(i) for every i ∈ {1, 2}: T˜i ⊆ Ti (where T˜i corresponds to T˜ and Ti corresponds to
T );
(ii) for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every ti ∈ Ti: u˜i(ti) = ui(ti) and p˜i(ti) = pi(ti) (where
u˜i, p˜ii correspond to T˜ , and ui, pii correspond to T ),
we have for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every ti ∈ Ti:
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(iii) σ∗(T˜ , ti) = σ∗(T , ti).
Observe that the type ti referred to in item (iii) of Definition V.4 has the same util-
ity function and hierarchy of beliefs in type space T and in type space T˜ . Therefore,
the consistency requirement is implied by the assumption that an agent’s equilibrium
choices should only depend on that agent’s utility function and that agent’s hierarchy
of beliefs. This assumption seems reasonable because the type space, as opposed to
the utility function and the hierarchy of beliefs, is really only a construction by the
modeler, and not necessarily a construction that the agent is aware of. We don’t
explicitly formulate the stronger assumption that equilibrium choices should only de-
pend on agents’ utility functions and hierarchies of beliefs, but instead work with
the weaker consistency requirement, because the consistency requirement is easier to
formulate, and is sufficient for our purposes. Our results would also go through if we
made the more demanding assumption for equilibria.
We postulate a mechanism designer who seeks to further the utility of the agents
rather than his own utility. In the companion paper, Bo¨rgers and Smith ?, we assume
that the mechanism designer seeks to achieve a Pareto efficient decision. In this
paper, we assume that the mechanism designer seeks to maximize the welfare function:
u1(a) + u2(a). Because we have normalized utilities, this corresponds to the “relative
utilitarian” welfare function axiomatized by Dhillon (1998) and Dhillon and Mertens
(1999).
When evaluating the utility of the two agents for a realized type combination
(t1, t2) the mechanism designer can either only consider the outcomes that result from
the mixed strategies prescribed for these two types, or she may consider the expected
utilities of these two types, based on the types’ own subjective beliefs. In other
words, the mechanism designer may adopt an ex post or an interim perspective when
evaluating agents’ utilities. The interim perspective respects agents’ own perception of
their environment. From this perspective, the ex post perspective has a paternalistic
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flavor. On the other hand, for example when agents’ beliefs are incompatible with
each other, the mechanism designer may be justified in discarding agents’ beliefs, on
the basis that at least some of them have to be wrong, as agents themselves will
discover at some point. Thus neither the interim nor the ex post perspective are
clearly preferable. We pursue both perspectives in this paper.
The considerations of the preceding two paragraphs lead to four possible formaliza-
tions of the mechanism designer’s objectives. We present these in the four definitions
that follow below. None of these definitions attributes a prior over type spaces in Υ
or over types in each type space to the mechanism designer. Instead, we work with
a dominance notion, that is prior free. Whatever the mechanism designer’s prior is,
if he has one, he will never choose a dominated game form in the sense described in
the four definitions below.
Definition V.5. The game form G with the consistent Bayesian equilibrium for all
type spaces (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ex post Pareto dominates the game form G˜ with the consistent
Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces (σ˜∗1, σ˜
∗
2) if for all i ∈ {1, 2}, T ∈ Υ, and
(t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2:
∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
ui(ti, x(s1, s2)) · σ∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ∗2(T , t2, s2) ≥∑
s1∈S˜1,s2∈S˜2
ui(ti, x˜(s1, s2)) · σ˜∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ˜∗2(T , t2, s2), (5.2)
with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}, T ∈ Υ, and (t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2. A
direct mechanism that is not ex post Pareto dominated will be called ex post Pareto
undominated.
Definition V.6. The game form G with the consistent Bayesian equilibrium for
all type spaces (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ex post utilitarian
2 dominates the game form G˜ with the
consistent Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces (σ˜∗1, σ˜
∗
2) if for all T ∈ Υ, and
2For simplicity, we use “utilitarian” rather than the more clumsy “relative utilitarian.”
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(t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2:
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
ui(ti, x(s1, s2)) · σ∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ∗2(T , t2, s2) ≥∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
s1∈S˜1,s2∈S˜2
ui(ti, x˜(s1, s2)) · σ˜∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ˜∗2(T , t2, s2), (5.3)
with strict inequality for at least one T ∈ Υ, and (t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2. A direct
mechanism that is not ex post utilitarian dominated will be called ex post utilitarian
undominated.
Note that if game form G with the consistent Bayesian equilibrium for all type
spaces (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ex post utilitarian dominates game form G˜ with the consistent Bayesian
equilibrium for all type spaces (σ˜∗1, σ˜
∗
2) if the former ex post Pareto dominates the
latter.
Definition V.7. The game form G with the consistent Bayesian equilibrium for all
type spaces (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) interim Pareto dominates the game form G˜ with the consistent
Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces (σ˜∗1, σ˜
∗
2) if for all i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j,
T ∈ Υ, and ti ∈ Ti:
∑
tj∈Tj
pii(ti, tj)
∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
ui(ti, x(s1, s2)) · σ∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ∗2(T , t2[s2) ≥∑
tj∈Tj
pii(ti, tj)
∑
s1∈S˜1,s2∈S˜2
ui(ti, x˜(s1, s2)) · σ˜∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ˜∗2(T , t2, s2), (5.4)
with strict inequality for at least one i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, T ∈ Υ, and ti ∈ Ti. A
direct mechanism that is not interim Pareto dominated will be called interim Pareto
undominated.
Definition V.8. The game form G with the consistent Bayesian equilibrium for all
type spaces (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) interim utilitarian dominates the game form G˜ with the consistent
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Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces (σ˜∗1, σ˜
∗
2) if for all T ∈ Υ and (t1, t2) ∈ T1×T2:
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
tj∈Tj
pii(ti, tj)
∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
ui(ti, x(s1, s2)) · σ∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ∗2(T , t2, s2) ≥∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
tj∈Tj
pii(ti, tj)
∑
s1∈S˜1,s2∈S˜2
ui(ti, x˜(s1, s2)) · σ˜∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ˜∗2(T , t2, s2), (5.5)
with strict inequality for at least one T ∈ Υ and (t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2. A direct
mechanism that is not interim utilitarian dominated will be called interim utilitarian
undominated.
Note that if game form G with the consistent Bayesian equilibrium for all type
spaces (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) interim utilitarian dominates game form G˜ with the consistent Bayesian
equilibrium for all type spaces (σ˜∗1, σ˜
∗
2) if the former interim Pareto dominates the lat-
ter.
5.3 Random Dictatorship is Interim Utilitarian Dominated
This paper compares the efficiency of game forms with belief independent equilibria
with those of game forms with belief dependent equilibria. (See chapter 4 for a
discussion of the motivation for this question.) Consequently we will need to define
belief independent equilibria.
Definition V.9. A game form G and a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type
space, (σ∗1, σ
∗
2), is belief independent if for all i ∈ {1, 2}, T , T˜ ∈ Υ, ti ∈ Ti and t˜i ∈ T˜i
such that ui(ti) = u˜i(t˜i) we have:
σ∗i (T , ti) = σ∗i (T˜ , t˜i), (5.6)
where Ti, ui correspond to T and T˜i, u˜i correspond to T˜ .
Chapter 4’s Proposition IV.9 shows that all game forms and belief independent
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equilibria of these game forms that satisfy a pair of unanimity requirements are ran-
dom dictatorships. To define random dictatorships we need some notation. If u is a
utility function, we denote by b(u) the element of A that maximizes u.3
We refer to random dictatorship, we shall mean the following specific game form
G and specific equilibrium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) of G for every type space.
Definition V.10. The following game form G and equilibrium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) of G for every
type space will be referred to as p-random dictatorship:
(i) S1 = S2 = A;
(ii)
x(s1, s2, a) =

1 if s1 = s2 = a;
p if s1 = a and s2 6= a;
1− p if s1 6= a and s2 = a;
0 if s1 6= a and s2 6= a;
(iii) σ∗i (T , ti, b(ui(ti))) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2}, T ∈ Υ, and ti ∈ Ti.
It is immediate that (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) is a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type space,
and that G and this equilibrium are a random dictatorship. There are other game
forms and equilibria that are random dictatorships, but it is without loss of generality
to only consider the one described in Definition V.10.
Our first result says that for every p ∈ (0, 1) such that p 6= 0 and p 6= 1 there are a
game form, and a Bayesian equilibrium of this game form for every type space, that
interim Pareto dominate random dictatorship when the probability of agent 1 being
dictator is p. We refer to the game form as p-random dictatorship with compromise.
3Recall that we have assumed that there are no indifferences. Therefore, there is a unique element
of A that maximizes u.
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Definition V.11. The following game form is called a p-random dictatorship with
compromise.
(i) for every i ∈ {1, 2}:
Si = 2
A × A,
where 2A is the set of all non-empty subsets of A;
(ii) If s1 = (A1, a1), s2 = (A2, a2), and A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ or a1 = a2, then:
x(s1, s2, a) =

1 if a1 = a2 = a;
p if a1 = a and a2 6= a;
1− p if a1 6= a and a2 = a;
0 if a1 6= a and a2 6= a;
(iii) If s1 = (A1, a1), s2 = (A2, a2), and A1 ∩ A2 6= ∅, and a1 6= a2, then there is
some a ∈ A1 ∩ A2 such that
x(s1, s2, a) = 1.
In words, this game form offers each agent i the opportunity to nominate one
preferred alternative, ai, and also a set Ai of “acceptable” alternatives. If both
agents nominate the same preferred alternative, then it is chosen with probability
one. Otherwise, if there is at least one alternative that both voters include in their
set of acceptable alternatives, then some alternative that both agents have indicated
as acceptable is chosen. If neither of those conditions is met, the mechanism reverts
to random dictatorship. We refer to this game form as random dictatorship with
compromise because it offers agents the opportunity to compromise on a mutually
acceptable alternative in place of random dictatorship.
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Proposition IV.13 of chapter 4 shows that p-random dictatorship with compro-
mise has a consistent equilibrium for all type spaces (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) that interim Pareto
dominates p-random dictatorship and that respects unanimity. This leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition V.12. For all p ∈ (0, 1), p-random dictatorship with compromise has
a consistent equilibrium for all type spaces σ∗ that interim utilitarian dominates p-
random dictatorship and that satisfies positive and negative unanimity.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of proposition IIV.13 in chapter 4 and the
observation that interim ex post dominance implies interim utilitarian dominance.
5.4 No Game Form Ex Post Utilitarian Dominates
Random Dictatorship
We now show that random dictatorship is ex post utilitarian undominated.
Proposition V.13. For all p ∈ [0, 1], there is no game form G that has a consistent
equilibrium for all type spaces (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) that ex post utilitarian dominates p-random
dictatorship.
Proof. Step 1: We show for every game form G and every equilibrium of G for all type
spaces, (σ∗1, σ
∗
2), if G and (σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2) ex post utilitarian dominate p-random dictatorship,
then: ∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
x(s1, s2, a) · σ∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ∗2(T , t2, s2) ≤ 1− p (5.7)
for all T ∈ Υ, every (t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2, and every a ∈ A such that a 6= b(u1(t1)), and
∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
x(s1, s2, a) · σ∗1(T , t1, s1) · σ∗2(T , t2, s2) ≤ p (5.8)
for all T ∈ Υ, every (t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2, and every a ∈ A such that a 6= b(u2(t2)).
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That is, any alternative that is not agent 1’s preferred alternative can be chosen with
a probability of at most 1 − p, and any alternative that is not agent 2’s preferred
alternative can be chosen with a probability of at most p. We prove this statement
only for agent 1. The proof for agent 2 is analogous.
The proof is indirect. Suppose there were some type space T ∗, some (t∗1, t∗2) ∈
T ∗1 × T ∗2 , and some alternative a∗ ∈ A such that a∗ 6= b(u1(t∗1)), and yet:
∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
x(s1, s2, a
∗) · σ∗1(T ∗, t∗1, s1) · σ∗2(T ∗, t∗2, s2) > 1− p. (5.9)
We now construct a new type space, T̂ , and show that in this type space there is a
vector of types such that the outcome prescribed by the equilibrium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) yields
lower ex post utilitarian welfare than p-random dictatorship. This contradicts the
assumption that G and (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ex post utilitarian dominate p-random dictatorship.
The type sets in T̂ are given by: T̂1 = T ∗1 , and T̂2 = T ∗2 ∪{t2(1), . . . , t2(K)} where
K ∈ N is large enough. We define later how large K needs to be. The types that are
contained in T ∗1 or T
∗
2 have the same utility function and beliefs in T̂ as in T . For
types t2 ∈ {t2(1), t2(2), . . . t2(K)} the beliefs are given by:
pi2(t2(k), t
∗
1) = 1. (5.10)
The utility function of types t2 ∈ {t2(1), t2(2), . . . t2(K)} is:
u2(t2(k), a) =

1 if a = a∗;
k
K
if a = b(u1(t
∗
1));
0 otherwise.
(5.11)
This concludes the construction of T̂ .4 By the consistency of the Bayesian equilibrium
4The construction violates our earlier assumption that there are no indifferences. The construc-
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(σ∗1, σ
∗
2), for all types in T1 and T2, σ
∗
1 and σ
∗
2 have to prescribe the same strategies
for T̂ as for T ∗. For types t2 ∈ {t2(1), t2(2), . . . t2(K)} the strategy σ∗2(T̂ , t2) must be
a best response to σ∗1(T̂ , t∗1).
We denote for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K} by v2(k) the expected utility of type
t2(k) in the game form G if equilibrium (σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2) is played. By standard incentive
compatibility arguments v2(k) is increasing in k. Observe that, for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K},
the difference v2(k)− v2(k− 1) cannot be more than 1/K because, by adopting type
t2(k)’s strategy, type t2(k − 1) can always get within 1/K of type t2(k)’s expected
utility. We also denote for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K} by r2(k) the equilibrium expected util-
ity of type t2(k) under random dictatorship. It is immediate that r2(k) is increasing
in k, and that r2(k)− r2(k − 1) = 1/(pK) for k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
Now consider the difference: v2(k) − r2(k). The observations of the previous
paragraph imply that as k increases the change in the absolute value of this difference,
|(v2(k) − r2(k)) − (v2(k − 1) − r2(k − 1))|, is at most 1/K. Note that by choosing
K large enough, we can make the step size of changes of this difference arbitrarily
small. Observe that v2(0) > r2(0) because, by the assumption of the indirect proof, in
the game form G, type t2(k) has a strategy that implies that alternative a
∗ is chosen
with a probability larger than 1 − p, so that in equilibrium type t2(0) must obtain
alternative a∗ with at least that probability. By contrast, under random dictatorship,
alternative a∗ is chosen with probability 1 − p only. On the other hand, v2(K) ≤
r2(K), because random dictatorship yields for agent t2(K) at least one of his top
alternatives with probability 1. What we have said so far implies that we can find
some k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., K} such that v2(k) − r2(k) is strictly positive but arbitrarily
close to zero, provided we choose K large enough.
tion and the argument that follows below can easily be modified to comply with this assumption by
assigning the bottom ranked alternatives almost the same, but not exactly the same utility.
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Next we note that v2(k) > r2(k) implies that
∑
s1∈S1
x(s1, s2, a
∗) · σ∗1(T̂ , t∗1, s1) > 1− p (5.12)
for every pure strategy s2 ∈ S2 in the support of σ∗2(T̂ , t2(k)). This is because
v2(k) > r2(k) implies that every strategy in the support of σ
∗
2(T̂ , t2(k)) must yield
strictly higher expected utility for type t2(k) than p-random dictatorship would give
to this type. Moreover, the only way in which type t2(k) can be better off under
G and (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) than under p-random dictatorship, where b(u1(t
∗
1)) and a
∗ are chosen
with probabilities p and 1 − p respectively, is by raising the probability of a∗ above
1− p.
Next, we denote for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K} by v1(k) the expected utility of
type t∗1 when he encounters type t2(k), and we denote by r1(k) the expected utility
under p-random dictatorship of type t∗1 when he encounters type t2(k). We first
observe that whenever v2(k) > r2(k) we must have: v1(k) < r1(k). This is because
p-random dictatorship would give b(u1(t
∗
1)) and a
∗ with probability p and 1− p. By
contrast, the game form G gives in equilibrium a∗ with a probability that is larger than
1 − p. Therefore, the outcome will be worse than random dictatorship for player 1.
Now consider all pure strategies of player 2 that, matched with type t∗1’s equilibrium
strategy, yield a probability of a∗ of more than 1−p. As observed before, v2(k) > r2(k)
implies that type t2(k) can only play such strategies with positive support. Against
each of these strategies player 1 obtains a maximum utility strictly lower than r1(k).
Therefore, there is ` > 0 such that v2(k) > r2(k) implies: v1(k) < r1(k)− `.
Now choose K large enough so that we can find a type t2(k) for whom v2(k) >
r2(k), but v2(k) < r2(k) + `. We then have: v1(k) < r1(k)− `, and therefore, adding
the last two inequalities: v1(k)+v2(k) < r1(k)+vr(k). This contradicts the hypothesis
that G and (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ex post utilitarian dominate p-random dictatorship.
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S tep 2: We now complete the proof by showing that no game form G and equi-
librium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) of G for all type spaces that has have the properties described in
Step 1 can ex post utilitarian dominate p-random dictatorship. The proof is indirect.
Suppose there were some game form G and some equilibrium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) of G for all
type spaces that have the properties described in Step 1 and that ex post utilitarian
dominate p-random dictatorship. Then there must be some type space T ∗∗ and some
(t∗∗1 , t
∗∗
2 ) ∈ T ∗∗1 × T ∗∗2 such that:
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
ui(t
∗∗
i , x(s1, s2)) · σ∗1(T ∗∗, t∗∗1 , s1) · σ∗2(T ∗∗, t∗∗2 , s2) >
pu1(b(u1(t
∗∗
1 ))) + (1− p)u2(b(u2(t∗∗2 ))) (5.13)
We now construct a new type space, T˜ , and show that in this type space there is
a vector of types such the outcome prescribed by the equilibrium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) yields lower
utilitarian welfare than p-random dictatorship. This contradicts the assumption that
G and (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ex post utilitarian dominate p-random dictatorship. The construction
and the argument below are very similar to, but not identical to, the argument in
Step 1.
Before we begin the construction we note that it must be that in equilibrium, at
t∗∗, either b(u1(t∗∗)) is chosen with probability strictly less than p, or b(u2(t∗∗)) is
chosen with probability strictly less than 1 − p, or both. Otherwise, the game form
G with the equilibrium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) could not yield strictly higher utilitarian welfare at
t∗∗ than p-random dictatorship. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case that
b(u1(t
∗∗)) is chosen with probability strictly less than p. The other case can be dealt
with by a symmetric argument. Let a∗∗ be the second most preferred alternative of
agent 1 at t∗∗1 .
We now construct T˜ . The type sets are given by: T˜1 = T ∗∗1 , and T˜2 = T ∗∗2 ∪
{t2(1), . . . , t2(K)} where K ∈ N is large enough. We define later how large K needs
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to be. The types that are contained in T ∗∗1 or T
∗∗
2 have the same utility functions and
beliefs in T˜ as in T ∗∗. For types t2 ∈ {t2(1), t2(2), . . . t2(K)} the beliefs are given by:
pi2(t2(k), t
∗∗
1 ) = 1. (5.14)
The utility function of types t2 ∈ {t2(1), t2(2), . . . t2(K)} is:
u∗2(t2(k), a) =

1 if a = a∗∗;
k
K
if a 6= b(u1(t∗∗1 )) and a 6= a∗∗;
0 if a = b(u1(t
∗∗
1 )).
(5.15)
This concludes the construction of T˜ .5 By the consistency of the Bayesian equilibrium
(σ∗1, σ
∗
2), for all types in T
∗∗
1 and T
∗∗
2 , σ
∗
1 and σ
∗
2 have to prescribe the same strategies
for T˜ as for T ∗∗. For types t2 ∈ {t2(1), t2(2), . . . t2(K)} the strategy σ∗2(T˜ , t2) must
be a best response to σ∗1(T˜ , t∗∗1 ).
We denote for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K} by v2(k) the equilibrium expected utility
of type t2(k) in the game form G with equilibrium (σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2). By standard incentive
compatibility arguments v2(k) is increasing in k. Observe that, for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K},
the difference v2(k)− v2(k− 1) cannot be more than 1/K because, by adopting type
t2(k)’s strategy, type t2(k − 1) can always get within 1/K of type t2(k)’s expected
utility. We also denote for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K} by r2(k) the equilibrium expected
utility of type t2(k) under random dictatorship. It is immediate that r2(k) = 1 − p
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
Now consider the difference: v2(k) − r2(k). The observations of the previous
paragraph imply that as k increases the difference increases, and that moreover it can
change by at most 1/K. Note that by choosing K large enough, we can make the step
5The construction violates our earlier assumption that there are no indifferences. The construc-
tion and the argument that follows below can easily be modified to comply with this assumption by
assigning to the middle ranked alternatives almost the same, but not exactly the same utility.
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size of changes of this difference arbitrarily small. Observe next that v2(0) ≤ r2(0).
This is because under G and (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) alternative a
∗∗ can be chosen with a probability
of at most 1 − p, by Step 1 of this proof applied to player 1. Therefore, v2(0) ≤
1 − p = r2(0). Finally, we show that v2(K) > r2(K). Observe that v2(K) > 1 − p,
because, by assumption, the probability of b(u1(t
∗∗
1 )) under G and (σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2) at (t
∗∗
1 , t
∗∗
2 )
is strictly less than p. Thus the probability of all other alternatives together must
be strictly more than 1 − p. Type t2(K) can choose the same strategy as type t∗∗2 ,
and therefore, if type t2(K) chooses optimally, v2(K) > 1− p = r2(1). What we have
said so far implies that we can find some k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., K} such that v2(k) − r2(k)
is strictly positive but arbitrarily close to zero, provided we choose K large enough.
Next we note that v2(k) > r2(k) implies that
∑
s1∈S1
x(s1, s2, b(u1(t
∗∗))) · σ∗1(T˜ , t∗∗1 , s1) < p (5.16)
for every pure strategy s2 ∈ S2 in the support of σ∗2(T˜ , t2(k)). This is because
every strategy in the support of player 2’s strategy σ∗2(T˜ , t2(k)) must yield the same
expected utility, and hence strictly higher expected utility than r2(k). But if such
a strategy implements b(u1(t
∗∗)) with probability of p or more, then the remaining
probability that is distributed among a∗∗ and all other alternatives, is at most 1− p.
Therefore, player 2’s expected utility from such a strategy is no more than 1 − p =
r2(k), which contradicts our assumption that player 2’s expected utility is more than
r2(k).
Next, we denote for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K} by v1(k) the expected utility of type
t∗∗1 when he encounters type t2(k), and we denote by r1(k) the expected utility under
random dictatorship of type t∗∗1 when he encounters type t2(k). We first observe that
whenever v2(k) > r2(k) we must have: v1(k) < r1(k). This is because random dicta-
torship would give b(u1(t
∗
1)) and a
∗∗ with probability p and 1 − p. By contrast, the
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game form G gives in equilibrium b(u1(t
∗∗
1 )) with a probability that is less p. There-
fore, the outcome will be worse than random dictatorship for player 1. Now consider
all pure strategies of player 2 that, matched with type t∗1’s equilibrium strategy, yield
a probability of b(u1(t
∗∗
1 )) of strictly less than p. As observed before, v2(k) > r2(k)
implies that type t2(k) can only play such strategies with positive support. Against
each of these strategies player 1 obtains a maximum utility strictly lower than r1(k).
Therefore, there is ` > 0 such that v2(k) > r2(k) implies: v1(k) < r1(k) + `.
Now choose K large enough so that we can find a type t2(k) for whom v2(k) >
r2(k), but v2(k) < r2(k) + `. We then have: v1(k) < r1(k)− `, and therefore, adding
the last two inequalities: v1(k)+v2(k) < r1(k)+vr(k). This contradicts the hypothesis
that G and (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ex post utilitarian dominate p-random dictatorship.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper extends the results of chapter 4 to the case of a mechanism designer
whose preferences obey relative utilitarianism and who faces two agents. For a mech-
anism designer who is concerned with relative utilitarianism and considers interim
expected utilities, the same mechanism that is used in that paper, random dictator-
ship with compromise, is more efficient than random dictatorship. This result is an
immediate implication of the interim Pareto result in that paper and the definition of
interim relative utilitarianism, and consequently extends to the more than two agent
case. The other main result is that no mechanism dominates random dictatorship
from an ex post relative utilitarian perspective. It is not immediately clear how to
extend the argument to more than two agents. Consequently, whether any mecha-
nism dominates random dictatorship from an ex post relative utilitarian perspective
when there are more than two agents remains an open question.
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CHAPTER VI
The Role of Solidarity and Reputation Building in
Coordinating Collective Resistance
6.1 Introduction
What motivates agents to resist when a leader attempts to gain or maintain in-
fluence via a divide-and-conquer strategy? Examples of leaders breaking up larger
groups into smaller ones that have less power are prevalent — from the times of
Machievelli (Zeitlin and Weyher, 2001), to Western countries using the strategy in
Africa (Croucher, 2004), to Wal-mart’s recent pledge to “go green” (Tasini, 2008),
to management/labor disputes (LeDuff, 2000). Often the strategy is successful, but
it also is often met by coordinated joint resistance — subordinates show solidarity,
banding together at a personal cost to thwart the divide-and-conquer strategy. Ex-
amples include strikes and unionization (Horowitz, 1997; Zeitlin and Weyher, 2001;
Gordon and Lenhardt, 2007; Oyogoa, 2009). Our research uses experimental meth-
ods to examine the extent to which this type of subordinate solidarity is driven by a
fairness norm or driven by the desire to build expectations among both leaders and
other subordinates that leader transgressions will be successfully resisted.
Weingast (1997) introduced a political model representing how exploitative leaders
can effectively maintain power in a society where there are different interest groups. It
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also has natural applications to other situations where one individual has authority
over multiple subordinates; for example, a manager and worker relationship. The
situation can be modeled by the “coordinated resistance” (CR) game.1 In the CR
game, there are three players: one leader and two subordinates, A and B. The leader
moves first and has four available actions: (i) transgress against both subordinates, (ii)
transgress against neither, (iii) transgress against A, and (iv) transgress against B.
These last two actions provide the leader an opportunity to “divide-and-conquer”.
The subordinates observe the leader’s action and then have two available actions:
challenge or acquiesce. As long as both subordinates do not challenge, a “divide-
and-conquer” strategy gains rewards for the leader at the expense of the targeted
subordinate. The beneficiary of the transgression (i.e. the subordinate not targeted)
earns a higher payoff by acquiescing than by challenging, regardless of what action the
targeted subordinate takes. For a small cost, though, the beneficiary can challenge
the leader’s transgression, and if the targeted subordinate also challenges they achieve
coordinated joint resistance. At this outcome both subordinates earn what they would
get if the leader did not transgress minus the small cost of challenging, and the leader
earns zero, which is significantly less than if he had chosen transgress against neither.
Social surplus is maximized when the leader chooses transgress against neither and
both subordinates acquiesce. However, this outcome is not part of any equilibrium.
Cason and Mui (2007) examine the CR game in a laboratory experiment, focus-
ing on when communication does or does not allow subordinates to successfully work
together to resist exploitation by a leader. They use random anonymous rematching
between repeated plays, and find that when the leader chooses to transgress against
one subordinate, a significant fraction of the subordinates coordinate on joint resis-
tance. This is despite the beneficiary paying a price in their own period payoff to
help the targeted subordinate with no direct material benefit. Over time, some leaders
1Weingast called it the“ Sovereign-Constituency Transgression Game”.
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adapt their strategy, choosing to transgress against neither. Cason and Mui interpret
beneficiaries challenging, and hence coordinated joint resistance, as evidence of fair-
ness: some subordinates are “altruistic punishers” (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Boyd et
al, 2003; DeQuervain et al, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Gintis et al, 2005). Sub-
ordinates choose to punish the leader — even at a personal cost — for having violated
social norms of fairness.2
An alternative argument — not invoking an appeal to social preferences — is that
subordinates have an individual incentive to create an expectation among leaders
that “divide-and-conquer” style transgression will be met with coordinated joint re-
sistance. After all, when individuals are randomly and anonymously rematched each
subordinate has an equal chance of being the victim of transgression in the future. If
there is a greater than 1
4
probability of joint resistance, risk-neutral leaders will not
want to transgress. With a low cost of resisting, subordinates may regard investing in
a group reputation for joint resistance as a worthwhile strategy. If the subordinates
can get the leader to choose the transgress against neither option, they can secure a
higher payoff than when they face a 50/50 chance of being the victim of the leader’s
transgression. This suggests a very different motive for joint resistance: a subordinate
has a strategic motive to build a reputation as one who challenges in order to alter
the leader’s or the other subordinate’s behavior in the future.
We use a novel experimental design to test the extent to which repeated inter-
actions drive some subordinates to resist when they are the current beneficiaries of
the leader’s divide-and-conquer strategy. We do this by systematically reducing the
strategic incentive to resist. The first treatment has leaders pre-commit to their be-
havior in all periods. The actions the leaders commit to cannot be conditioned on
any play by the subordinates. Such leader commitment removes the ability for sub-
2Evidence that individuals possess a taste for punishment has been provided across a variety
of experimental games, including public goods (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002),
investment games (DeQuervain et al, 2004, Rigdon 2009), and ultimatum games (Gu¨th et al, 1985;
Forsythe et al, 1994, Xiao and Houser, 2005).
141
 23
 
Figure 1: The Basic Collective Resistance Game (payoffs are for (Leader, 
Subordinate A, Subordinate B)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Divide-and-Conquer Collective Resistance Game (payoffs are for (Leader, 
Subordinate A, Subordinate B)) 
 
Transgress  
against both 
Transgress  
against neither 
  Subordinate B 
  Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce 8, 9, 2 8, 9, 1 
Subordinate A 
Challenge 8, 8, 2 0, 7, 7 
  Subordinate B 
  Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce 8, 2, 9 8, 2, 8 
Subordinate A 
Challenge 8, 1, 9 0, 7, 7 
Transgress  
against A 
Transgress  
against B 
Transgress 
Not 
Transgress  
  Subordinate B 
  Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce 6, 8, 8 6, 8, 7 
Subordinate A 
Challenge 6 ,7, 8 0, 7, 7 
Leader 
  Subordinate B 
  Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce 12, 2, 2 12, 2, 1 
Subordinate A 
Challenge 12, 1, 2 0, 7, 7 
Leader 
  Subordinate B 
  Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce 12, 2, 2 12, 2, 1 
Subordinate A 
Challenge 12, 1, 2 0, 7, 7 
  Subordinate B 
  Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce 6, 8, 8 6, 8, 7 
Subordinate A 
Challenge 6 ,7, 8 0, 7, 7 
Figure 6.1: CR Game (payoffs are Leader, Subordinate A, and Subordinate B)
ordinates to influence the leaders’ future behavior by their action today. The second
treatment goes one step further: leaders pre-commit to their behavior in all periods,
as in the first treatment, and one subordinate also pre-commits to their behavior in
all periods. The pre-commited subordinate’s commited actions cannot be conditional
on other agent’s actions in other rounds. Such subordinate commitment removes the
ability of subordinates to alter behavior of the leader or the behavior of the subordi-
nate with whom they interact. Each of these treatments leave fairness considerations
intact. We can then compare the rates of beneficiary challenge and coordinated joint
resistance across the treatments. By comparing these treatments with a baseline
treatment where both motivations may be at work, we aim to disentangle the ef-
fects of other-regarding motives from those of reputation-building and coordination
incentives.
The next section describes the features of the CR game and experimental find-
ings to date. Section 6.5 details the experimental design and outlines the empirical
hypotheses. Section 6.6 describes the procedures in the experiment and Section 6.7
discusses the results. The final section concludes.
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6.2 The Coordinated Resistance Game
Our experimental design uses the version of the leader-subordinate scenario drawn
from prior experimental literature (Cason and Mui, 2007,Cason and Mui, 2009); see
Figure 6.1. Of the leader’s four actions, two treat the subordinates symmetrically
(Transgress Against Both, Transgress Against Neither) and two treat the subordi-
nates asymmetrically (Transgress Against A, Transgress Against B). If the leader
chooses Transgress Against Both — rather than Transgress Against Neither — and
the subordinates do not both challenge, the leader’s payoff is increased by 6 and both
subordinates’ payoffs are lowered by 6 units. In the case of Transgress Against A,
the leader gains 2 units and the subordinate transgressed against (A) has her payoff
reduced by 6 units, exactly as in the Transgress Against Both case; A is referred to
as the targeted subordinate. The subordinate not transgressed against (B) has her
payoff raised by 1 unit relative to the Transgress Against Neither case; this represents
a bribe by the leader and so B is referred to as the beneficiary. The case of Transgress
Against B works identically, except B is targeted and A is the beneficiary. A bene-
ficiary’s dominant strategy is to choose Acquiesce. However, if the transgression by
the leader is to be resisted, both subordinates must choose challenge — coordinated
resistance corresponds to the lower-right square in each matrix (payoffs: 0, 7, 7).
There are three pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the CR game:
(i) the leader plays Transgress Against Both, and both subordinates play Acquiesce;
(ii) the leader plays Transgress Against A and both subordinates play Acquiesce; and
(iii) the leader plays Transgress Against B and both subordinates play Acquiesce.
Importantly, there is no equilibrium of the game that involves the leader playing
Transgress Against Neither, and there is no equilibrium that has the subordinates
coordinating on the action Challenge when the leader attempts to divide and conquer
the subordinates.
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6.3 Prior Experimental Results
Cason and Mui (2007) have subjects play the CR game with the same payoffs we
use, and examine the effects of communication on the level of coordinated resistance
achieved by subordinates. In the baseline, subordinates do not communicate with
the leader or each other prior to making their decisions. There is a low frequency
of both coordinated resistance and leaders choosing Transgress Against Neither. In
the ex-post communication treatment, subordinates observe the leader’s action and
then send signals to the other subordinate indicating what action they intend to
take given the leader’s action. The likelihood of coordinated resistance was higher
than with no communication, with beneficiaries challenging roughly half of the time
when both subordinates signaled an intention to challenge. Additionally, leaders
played Transgress Against Neither significantly more often in the last thirty periods,
roughly 25%. In the private ex-ante communication treatment, prior to observing
the leader’s choice, subordinates send signals to each other indicating what choice
they intend to make for each of the four leader’s actions; subordinates then learn of
the leader’s action, and the subordinates simultaneously decide on an action which
could be the same or different from their intended choice. Beneficiaries challenged
about 33.2% of the time when both indicated an intent to challenge, and leaders
played Transgress Against Neither at a significantly higher rate compared to any
other treatment, roughly 37%.
Cason and Mui (2009) extend the experimental design, examining how repeated
matching with various ending rules interacts with the form of communication allowed
between subordinates to impact rates of coordinated resistance and leader transgres-
sion. Overall, they find that communication is better than repetition in coordinating
resistance. They suggest this is because “it makes it easier for subordinates to iden-
tify others who have social preferences and are willing to incur the cost to punish a
violation of social norms (p. 1)”. Next, we describe such a hypothesis more clearly
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and put forward an alternative hypothesis that explains the current data equally well.
6.4 Why Do Beneficiaries Challenge Transgression?
One hypothesis for the high rate of beneficiaries challenging is that some subor-
dinates have a preference for fairness. They care about the outcomes of the other
players, and hence are willing to challenge when they are a beneficiary because they
prefer the outcome in that case (lower payoff for leader, higher payoff for victim,
slightly lower payoff for themselves) to the outcome when they acquiesce (higher pay-
off for leader, lower payoff for victim, slightly higher payoff for themselves). Hence,
they are willing to pay an economic cost to challenge the leader’s transgression against
the victim. Such subordinates have a social preference reflecting solidarity with other
subordinates, and are willing to punish a leader viewed as violating a social norm
when he attempts to divide-and-conquer. This form of punishment can aid in the
maintenance of norms (Ostrom, 1990; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003; Egas and Riedl, 2008).
This paper introduces another hypothesis: the high rate of beneficiaries chal-
lenging — and high rate of coordinated joint resistance — is due to strategic decision-
making by the subordinates. There are at least two strategic reasons for a beneficiary
to challenge transgression. The first reason is vertical in nature, and the hypothe-
sis is that the beneficiary choosing challenge aims to change the expectations of a
leader and hence alter his decision to one more beneficial in the future. The second
reason is horizontal in nature, and the hypothesis is that the beneficiary choosing
challenge aims to change the expectations of the other subordinate and hence alter
her behavior in the future. In both cases, there is strategic incentive to create an
expectation that transgression will be met with resistance. This relies on the argu-
ment that the observations of anonymous individuals’ play can affect beliefs about
the distribution of types in the population, and hence change future behavior through
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updating. The first reason — vertical in nature — is that if the leader’s divide-and-
conquer strategy gets met with resistance, then the leader may change his strategy in
the future to one where he chooses the Transgress Against Neither option. Under this
option, subordinates can secure a higher payoff than when they face a 50/50 chance
of being the victim of the leader’s transgression. Subordinates receive a certain pay-
off of 8 units under Transgress Against Neither compared to an expected payoff of
1
2
(9) + 1
2
(2) = 5.50 units from Transgress Against A or Transgress Against B. The
second reason — horizontal in nature — is that by challenging, a subordinate can sig-
nal to the other subordinate that resistance can be successful in an effort to alter
the other subordinates behavior in the future.3 Observing a beneficiary challenging
is a very strong signal, and can influence another subordinate’s strategy from one of
acquiescing to one of challenging. If so, then the pair can reach coordinated joint
resistance more often in the future and thereby earn higher payoffs. Both kinds of
strategic decision-making could be at work in the standard CR game. As a result,
it is unclear the extent to which coordinated resistance is motivated by expectation
building and the extent to which it is motivated by social preferences of subordinates.
Our experiment systematically removes each of the strategic reasons for a beneficiary
to challenge transgression while leaving in tact the motives for solidarity. Each treat-
ment involves some portion of the subjects pre-committing their actions. We explain
this in more detail in the next section.
6.5 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The baseline (b) treatment is a replication of the private ex-ante communication
treatment implemented by Cason and Mui (2007). One treatment — Leader Com-
3The expected future benefit to subordinates will be smaller under random rematching than
under repeated interactions since it may be many periods before interacting with the same leader
or same subordinate again, and with complete anonymity the subordinate will not know when they
do.
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mitment (lc) — has leaders pre-commit to their decisions in all periods. Such leader
commitment removes the ability for subordinates to influence the leaders’ future be-
havior by their action today. The second treatment — Subordinate Commitment
(sc) — goes one step further: leaders pre-commit to their decisions in all periods as
in lc and one subordinate also pre-commits to their intended actions and decisions
in all periods. Subordinate commitment removes the ability of the freely choosing
subordinate to alter behavior of the leader and the ability to alter the behavior of
the subordinate with whom they interact. Each of these treatments leave fairness
considerations intact.
The interaction between the leader and the two subordinates is as follows. The
leader chooses an action. Prior to learning the leader’s decision, subordinates are able
to communicate a message indicating their intended choice of challenge or acquiesce
for each of the four possible actions by the leader. Each subordinate then observes the
four intended choices signaled by the other subordinate. Then, the subordinates learn
the leader’s decision, and simultaneously choose an action to challenge or acquiesce;
the subordinate’s chosen action can be the same or different from the intended choice
specified under that action. The leader and subordinates learn all of the decisions
and the respective payoffs. This concludes the interaction. Each experimental session
consists of two phases, Phase 1 and Phase 2.4 Phase 1 is identical across all of the
treatments — subjects interact as described above for 10 periods and are randomly
re-matched at the end of each period. Phase 2 consists of the treatment portion of
the experiment.
In b, Phase 2 is identical to Phase 1 except subjects participate in 40 periods
in the phase, being randomly re-matched at the end of each period. The choice of
4The two phase structure of all of our treatments is slightly different from Cason and Mui, where
they have subjects participate in one phase consisting of 50 periods total. We implemented Phase
1 so that subjects would have experience interacting in the CR game before having to commit to
strategies in the future. It is a variation that we do not expect to make a difference. The instructions
and protocol are otherwise identical in the baseline.
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this treatment as our baseline is based on two considerations. First, it is Cason
and Mui’s treatment with the highest level of coordinated resistance by subordinates
(making it easier to distinguish whether resistance rates are lower in other treatments
compared to the baseline treatment), and also the highest fraction of leaders who
choose the Transgress Against Neither action in later periods. Since we are interested
in comparing the rates of coordinated resistance across treatments, it makes sense to
select a baseline with the highest rate. Second, there is a similarity in the decision-
making environments for private ex-ante signals and our treatment sc where one
subordinate will pre-commit to signals and conditional actions in future periods before
any others’ actions are observed. In both cases signals are chosen ex-ante, before the
leader’s action can be observed.
In lc, the baseline treatment is modified to remove the vertical nature of the
strategic incentives from repeated play. This is accomplished by having the leaders
pre-commit to a strategy for the duration of the experiment. Subjects begin with
Phase 1. In Phase 2, leaders choose all their actions for the 40 periods of the phase
before any further periods are played. In each period, both subordinates observe the
leader’s pre-committed strategy for that period (only) and respond. Since the lead-
ers are pre-committed to a course of action regardless of subordinates’ choices, this
removes the incentive subordinates may have to produce a expectation for resistance
among the leaders. Consequently, under the hypothesis that subordinates are chal-
lenging to influence the leader’s behavior in the future, we predict that beneficiary
resistance — and hence coordinated resistance — will be lower in lc than in b. Sub-
ordinates will perceive no reputation-building motivation if the leaders are already
committed to their future course of action, even though they will play further rounds
of the game. Therefore, fewer beneficiaries will choose challenge, and this is our first
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (Leader Commitment). Beneficiary resistance will be lower in lc than
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in b.
The lc treatment leaves open the possibility that subordinates’ actions will still
reflect their repeated interaction with other subordinates ; that is, it leaves open the
horizontal nature of strategic decision-making. There is still an incentive to coordinate
on resistance during any one period where only one subordinate is targeted because
the beneficiary of the transgression may find herself targeted by the leader in a future
period. In this sense, there is room for subordinates to influence the expectation of
other subordinates. To disentangle this expectation building incentive from other-
regarding preferences, we conduct an additional treatment. The sc treatment is
identical to lc with the additional constraint that half of the subordinates are also
pre-committed to a strategy in Phase 2. One subordinate chooses all of her intended
actions and actual actions for the remaining periods before observing any actions by
the others. The matching is such that each group contains one pre-committed leader,
one pre-committed subordinate, and one subordinate who is free to choose her action
period-by-period. The subordinate commits to an action in response to each possible
leader action in the period. In addition, the committed response to a specific leader
action can be contingent on the other subordinate’s intended action in response to that
action by the leader in that period (but not other periods; the committed action in the
period can only be contingent on that period’s leader action and other subordinate’s
intended action given the leader’s action). To simplify the set of choices available
to pre-committing subordinates, they are restricted to acquiesce if the leader plays
Transgress Against Both. The “free” subordinate knows that they will never interact
with a leader or a subordinate whose behavior is not pre-committed. This removes
all strategic incentives for the “free” subordinate, but still leaves open the possibility
of beneficiary challenging due to other-regarding preferences. Given that the “free”
subordinate interacts with players who have already committed to their future course
of action, she will perceive no incentive to change the leader’s or the subordinate’s
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expectations as this cannot change either’s behavior in the future, even though they
will play further rounds of the game. Therefore, we expect that beneficiary resistance
will be even lower in this treatment than the others, and this is our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (Subordinate Commitment). Beneficiary resistance by the “free” sub-
ordinates will be lower in sc than by the “free” subordinates in lc.
These are our two primary hypotheses. Define R(T ) as the rate of beneficiary
resistance under treatment T . Then H1 and H2 imply the following predicted ranking:
R (b) > R (lc) ≥ R (sc)
These rankings arise from the general hypothesis that by systematically removing
strategic incentives in repeated play, a subordinate’s willingness to engage in benefi-
ciary resistance will be reduced. Since beneficiary resistance is necessary for subor-
dinates to obtain joint resistance, we also hypothesize that rates of joint coordinated
resistance will follow the same pattern across treatments.
6.6 Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted at the Robert Zajonc’s Laboratory in
the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.5 We completed a
total of 24 independent sessions with 8 sessions for each of the three experimen-
tal conditions. The experiment was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Participants were undergraduates and were recruited using standard experimental
procedures. They participated in only one session. Each session required 1.5 to 2.5
hours to complete.
An experimental session ran as follows. Subjects received a $10 show-up payment
and were seated in the laboratory. Two sessions were conducted simultaneously with
5We ran the first session in late November 2007 and completed the last session in late April
2009. There were some coding issues that extended the length of time necessary to complete the
treatments.
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each session having 3 leaders and 6 subordinates.6 Once all subjects had completed
a consent form, the instructions were read aloud. The instructions used were the
same as those used by Cason and Mui (2007). The instructions used neutral terms
for the roles of leader and subordinates as well as their available actions: “Person
1” (the leader) chooses from “earnings squares” A, B, C or D and “Persons 2 and
3” (the subordinates) simultaneously choose X or Y . Subjects in each treatment
received the same instructions for Phase 1 of the session, being told that Phase 1
would last 10 periods (see Appendix ?? for the instructions). Subjects were informed
that there would be a second phase to the experiment as follows: “Phase 2 will be a
similar decision-making task, and you will have the same role in it that you have in
Phase 1. Further instructions will be provided before Phase 2 begins.”7 Subjects were
required to complete a quiz which included payoff calculations for all roles and ques-
tions to check their understanding about the interaction; the experimenter checked
the quizzes for accuracy. The quiz used was the same as that used by Cason and
Mui (2007).8 Subjects were then randomly assigned a role as either a leader or a
subordinate, and they kept this role throughout the session. Subjects were randomly
re-matched each period. Subjects first participated in Phase 1, consisting of 10 pe-
riods of the baseline version of the CR game. Then, prior to beginning Phase 2,
further instructions were given: in b subjects were informed they would participate
in 40 more periods, identical to those in Phase 1 (see Appendix ??); in lc the instruc-
tions provided additional information that the leader would pre-commit to a strategy
for all 40 periods before any more periods were played (see Appendix ??); and in
6Subjects were not aware that the re-groupings only happened among the 9 subjects in their
particular session. This is in keeping with Cason and Mui’s protocol.
7This deviates from Cason and Mui’s procedures, which had only one phase of 50 total periods.
Our aim is to give subjects experience in the CR game — with decisions counting for monetary
payment — prior to selecting pre-committed actions.
8Subjects were asked true/false questions about the interaction; for example, “You remain
grouped with the same two other participants in all decision-making periods” and “If you are Person
2 or Person 3, you must make the same choice on your decision screen as you indicated in the relevant
intention screen” and “If you are Person 2 or Person 3, your intentions are shown to all three people
in your group (Person 1, Person 2 and Person 3) before anyone makes actual decisions.”
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sc the instructions provided additional information that in each three-person group,
both the leader and one of the subordinates would be pre-committed while the other
subordinate would make decisions as in Phase 1 (see Appendix ??). Subjects then
participated in Phase 2, completing an additional 40 periods of one treatment, being
randomly re-matched each period. Participants earned points that were exchanged
for dollars at the exchange rate of $0.09/point. Once the session finished, subjects
were paid their accumulated earnings in private. Average earnings (excluding the
show-up payment) in b were $29.76 for the leaders and $27.51 for subordinates; in lc
earnings were $30.26 for the leaders and $27.01 for subordinates; and in sc earnings
were $25.05 for the leaders and $30.36 for subordinates.
6.7 Results
In this section, we begin by analyzing the extent to which the baseline data is
similar to the private ex-ante treatment conducted by Cason and Mui (2007). As we
demonstrate, the results are statistically indistinguishable. We then turn to analyzing
the rates of beneficiary and coordinated resistance.
Our focus is on Phase 2 behavior. Recall that Phase 1 is identical across treat-
ments — subjects participate in the baseline version of the CR for 10 periods. We are
interested in differences across treatments so the discussion will center on the results
in Phase 2. Periods of Phase 2 are labeled 11–50. We further restrict analysis to
periods 21–50 to allow time for subjects to learn — in both treatment conditions, the
decision environment has changed significantly from the baseline version of Phase 1.
To avoid issues of within-session dependence between participants’ actions, all the
tests we report use each session as an independent observation, so there are eight
observations per treatment.
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6.7.1 Replication
The baseline treatment uses instructions and procedures nearly identical to those
in Cason and Mui’s private ex-ante treatment. We compare the results along a
number of important behavioral dimensions, and find that the two are statistically
indistinguishable with respect to the following: the rate at which beneficiaries resist
when both indicate an intention to challenge, (27.1%, p = 0.6818, two-sided Mann-
Whitney test); the rate of joint resistance when both indicate an intention to challenge
(24.6%, p = 0.7718, two-sided Mann-Whitney test); the rate at which beneficiaries
resist given any signal (12.7%, p = 0.9045, two-sided Mann-Whitney test); the rate of
joint resistance given any signal (10.1%, p = 0.9522, two-sided Mann-Whitney test);
and the rate of leader non-transgression (24.0%, p = 0.5619, two-sided Mann-Whitney
test). As a result, we conclude that behavior in the baseline is indistinguishable from
that reported by Cason and Mui (2007). We now turn to discussing differences across
treatments and testing our hypotheses.
6.7.2 Beneficiary Resistance Rates Across Treatments
This section looks at the frequency of beneficiary resistance and coordinated resis-
tance when the leader attempts to divide-and-conquer, irrespective of the signals sent
by the beneficiary and victim. Table 6.2 reports the frequencies for each treatment.
We first briefly look at the correlation between signals and challenging. The data
is summarized in Table 6.1. In the baseline treatment, the beneficiary indicated
challenge 48.5% of the time. This message was not particularly truthful: when a ben-
eficiary indicated they would challenge, and conditional on the victim also indicating
challenge, the beneficiary actually challenged only 27.1% of the time. However, the
frequency of beneficiary challenging when both indicated an intention to challenge
is significantly higher than under any signal — 27.1% versus 12.7% (p = 0.00830,
one-sided pairwise t-test). In lc, beneficiaries were somewhat more truthful in their
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Baseline Leader Commit
Victim Beneficiary Joint Victim Beneficiary Joint
Message: Challenge Challenges Challenges Resistance Challenges Challenges Resistance
Only Victim
52/185
28.1
5/185
2.7
2/185
1.1
60/238
25.2
2/238
0.8
1/238
0.4
Only Beneficiary
24/57
42.1
6/57
10.5
2/57
3.5
22/52
42.3
12/52
23.1
7/52
13.5
Both
145/203
71.4
55/203
27.1
50/203
24.6
115/161
71.4
71/161
44.1
58/161
36.0
Neither
16/91
17.6
2/91
2.2
0/91
0.0
13/115
11.3
1/115
0.9
0/115
0.0
Subordinate Commit Subordinate Commit
(Free Sub Targeted) (Commited Sub Targeted)
Victim Beneficiary Joint Victim Beneficiary Joint
Message: Challenge Challenges Challenges Resistance Challenges Challenges Resistance
Only Victim
35/69
50.7
15/69
21.7
12/69
17.4
6/28
21.4
1/28
3.6
0/28
0.0
Only Beneficiary
1/3
33.3
0/3
0.0
0/3
0.0
13/39
33.33
11/39
28.2
4/39
10.3
Both
40/41
97.6
26/41
63.4
26/41
63.4
47/49
95.9
9/49
18.4
9/49
18.4
Neither
1/38
2.6
0/38
0.0
0/38
0.0
0/36
0.0
0/36
0.0
0/36
0.0
Table 6.1: Action by Subordinates Conditional on Message of Challenge (Periods 21–50)
signals: they indicated they would challenge 37.6% of the time, and when they indi-
cated challenge they actually challenged (conditional on the victim indicating chal-
lenge) 44.1% of the time. This is significantly higher than the rate across any signals,
15.2% (p = 0.01039, one-sided pairwise t-test).
In the subordinate commit treatment, when the committed subordinate was tar-
geted the free subordinate indicated they would challenge over half (57.9%) the time
but followed through, when the committed subordinate had indicated they would chal-
lenge, only 18.4% of the time. This frequency was only marginally significantly higher
than for any signals (13.8%, p = 0.09013, one-sided pairwise t-test). When the free
subordinate was targeted, the committed subordinate only indicated they would chal-
lenge 29.1% of the time, but conditional on both indicating challenge they challenged
63.4%, significantly higher than the overall rate of challenge (27.2%, p = 0.06160,
one-sided pairwise t-test).
As can be seen from Table 6.1, in all treatments victims indicated challenge more
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than half the time, and conditional on both subordinates indicating challenge they
challenged more than 70% of the time.
Now we move on to our main results. Using the measures of resistance conditional
on any signal to test our hypotheses, we find that beneficiary resistance rates in lc
are not significantly different from b— 15.2% versus 12.7% (p = 0.3974, one-sided
Mann-Whitney test).
Result 1. The rate of beneficiary resistance in lc is not significantly different from
the rate in b.
The rates are also not different in sc for actions taken by the free subordi-
nate — 13.8% versus 12.7% (p = 0.2005, one-sided Mann-Whitney test).
Result 2. The rate of beneficiary resistance in sc when the beneficiary is the free
subordinate is not significantly different from the rate in b.
Results 1 and 2 do not support our hypotheses 1 and 2. We also look at the
behavior of committed subordinates in sc when they are beneficiaries. The rate of
beneficiary challenge for actions taken by the committed subordinate when the free
subordinate is the one targeted in sc is over twice the rate of beneficiary challenge in
b— 27.2% versus 12.7% — but this difference is due to a couple of extreme sessions,
and the difference is not significant when tested by a rank-order test (p = 0.2483,
one-sided Mann-Whitney test).
Levels of joint resistance (when the leader chooses target transgression) follow the
same pattern as beneficiary resistance - the rate of joint resistance in b, 10.7%, is
not significantly different from the rate in lc, 11.7% (p = 0.4364, one-sided Mann-
Whitney test), and in sc when the beneficiary is the free subordinate - 8.6% (p =
0.2148, one-sided Mann-Whitney test). The level is higher in magnitude, 25.2%, in
sc when the beneficiary is the committed subordinate, but the difference is due to a
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Baseline Leader Commit Sub Commit Sub Commit
Free Targeted Committed Targeted
Ben Chall Joint Ben Chall Joint Ben Chall Joint Ben Chall Joint
11–20 38172
27
172
37
185
24
185
13
49
12
49
12
50
11
50
% 22.1 15.7 20 13.0 26.5 24.5 24 22.0
21–30 18179
13
179
31
189
23
185
10
44
8
44
8
53
5
53
% 10.1 7.3 16.8 12.4 22.7 18.2 15.1 9.4
31–40 26179
23
179
31
189
24
189
15
52
15
52
8
53
5
53
% 14.5 12.8 16.4 12.7 28.8 28.8 15.1 9.4
41–50 24178
18
178
24
192
19
192
16
55
15
55
5
46
3
46
% 13.5 10.1 12.5 9.9 29.1 27.3 10.9 6.5
21–50 68536
54
536
86
566
66
566
41
151
38
151
21
152
13
152
% 12.7 10.1 15.2 11.7 27.2 25.2 13.8 6.5
Table 6.2: Resistance Rates Given Any Signal
couple high rate sessions, and a rank order test on sessions shows the difference to be
not significant (p = 0.2148, one-sided Mann-Whitney test) .
Result 3. The rate of joint resistance in b are not significantly different from the
rates in lc or in sc (when the beneficiary is the free subordinate).
Overall, then, the results are not supportive of the expectation-building hypothe-
sis. We introduced the hypothesis that the high rate of beneficiaries challenging — and
high rate of coordinated joint resistance — observed in the CR game could be due to
strategic decision-making by the subordinates. Thus our results provide support for
the hypothesis that beneficiaries who challenge a leader’s transgression are exhibiting
solidarity with the victim.
6.8 Conclusions
The coordinated resistance game provides a fruitful framework in which to ex-
plore a range of motivations for the observed solidarity among subordinates. In our
experiment, subjects repeatedly play the CR game under random and anonymous
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Baseline Leader CommitSub Commit (free targeted)Sub Commit (commit targeted)CM Priv. Ex-Ante
1 - 10 16.0 13.9 23.6 23.6 22.7
11 - 20 15.7 13.0 24.5 22.0 10.8
21 - 30 7.3 12.4 18.2 9.4 4.3
31 - 40 12.8 12.7 28.8 9.4 7.9
41 - 50 10.1 9.9 27.3 6.5 9.9
0
7.5
15
22.5
30
1 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50
Jo
in
t R
es
ta
nc
e 
R
at
es
 (%
)
Period Range
Baseline
Leader Commit
Sub Commit (free targeted)
Sub Commit (commited targeted)
CM data
Figure 6.2: Joint Resistance Rates Across Treatments
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re-matching and with different types of pre-commitment. We investigate the extent
to which the observed coordinated joint resistance — which is not predicted by game
theoretic analysis of the game — can be explained by several potential motivations.
One potential explanation appeals to norms for fairness: when facing a leader at-
tempting to divide-and-conquer, the subordinate who would benefit by choosing to
acquiesce, instead chooses to challenge due to fairness considerations. Another ex-
planation appeals to reputation-building behavior: there is an individual incentive
for building a group reputation in an effort to achieve more efficient outcomes in the
future. Overall our results provide additional support for the hypothesis that benefi-
ciaries who challenge are exhibiting solidarity with the victim, rather than attempting
to strategically expectation build.
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6.9 Appendix 6.A
Instructions for Phase 1
There are two types of decision-making experiments: psychology and economics. In
psychology experiments, sometimes the researchers deceive participants involved in
the study. When this happens, they are required, before the end of the experiment,
to debrief everyone about the nature of the deception. Deception is not permitted in
an economics experiment. This is an economics experiment.
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question at any time
please raise your hand and an experimenter will come by to answer your question.
Instructions for Phase 1
This is an experiment in the economics of multi-person strategic decision-making. If
you follow the instructions and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appre-
ciable amount of money. The currency used in the experiment is points. Your points
will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of $0.09 dollars to one point. At the end
of todays session, you will be paid in private and in cash. It is important that you
remain silent and do not look at other peoples work. If you have any questions, or
need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come
to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. There will be
two phases to the experiment: Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 will consist of 10
periods. The 18 participants in todays experiment will be randomly split each period
between three equal-sized groups, designated as Person 1, Person 2 and Person
3 groups. If you are designated as a Person 1, then you remain in this same role
throughout both phases of the experiment. Participants who are not designated as
a Person 1 switch randomly between the Person 2 and Person 3 roles in different
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decision-making periods throughout both phases of the experiment. Phase 2 will be
a similar decision-making task, and you will have the same role in it that you have
in Phase 1. Further instructions will be provided before Phase 2 begins. At the
beginning of each decision-making period you will be randomly re-grouped with two
other participants to form a three-person group, with one person of each type in each
group. The groupings change every period, since you will be randomly re-grouped in
each and every period.
Your Choice During each period, you and all other participants will make one
choice. Earnings tables are provided on separate papers, which tell you the earnings
you receive given the choices that you and others in your group make. If you are
Person 1 then you choose the earnings square, either A, B, C or D. You make this
choice before the other two people in your group make their choices, on a decision
screen as shown on page 4. While Person 1 chooses the earnings square, however,
162
Persons 2 and 3 have an opportunity to communicate to each other an intended
choice for every one of the four possible earnings squares. Persons 2 and 3 indicate
their intended choices simultaneously; for example, if you are Person 3 then you do
not learn the intended choices of Person 2 until after you indicate all your intended
choices. As noted on the example Intention Screen for Person 2 below, Persons 2 and
3 are not required to make the same actual choice as corresponding to their intended
choice, and they are always free to select either choice X or Y when they make their
actual decision.
While Persons 2 and 3 are indicating their intended choices, Person 1 chooses the
earnings square using the Person 1 Decision Screen as shown below.
After both Persons 2 and 3 have finished indicating their intended choices, the
computer program displays all the intended choices to both Person 2 and Person 3
as shown on the next page (page 5). The intentions and Person 1s earning square
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choice are also shown on the Decision Screen for Persons 2 and 3, as shown on page
6. Persons 2 and 3 then make their actual choice simultaneously; for example, if you
are Person 2 then you do not learn the actual choice of Person 3 until after you make
your choice. Both Persons 2 and 3 may choose either X or Y.
Your earnings from the choices each period are found in the box determined by
you and the other two people that you are grouped with for the current decision
making period. If both Persons 2 and 3 choose X, then earnings are paid as shown
in the box in the upper left on the screen. If both Persons 2 and 3 choose Y, then
earnings are paid as shown in the box in the lower right on the screen. The other two
boxes indicate earnings when one chooses X and the other chooses Y. To illustrate
with a random example: if Person 1 chooses earnings square A, Person 2 chooses
X and Person 3 chooses Y, then Person 1 earns 12, Person 2 earns 2, and Person 3
earns 1. You can find these amounts by looking at the appropriate square and box in
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your page of earnings tables. In summary, Persons 2 and 3 indicate simultaneously
their intended choice for each of the four earning squares that Person 1 can choose,
while Person 1 chooses the earnings square. When both Persons 2 and 3 have finished
indicating their intentions, the computer program displays all the intended choices
to both Person 2 and Person 3. The computer program also displays the earnings
square chosen by Person 1. Persons 2 and 3 then simultaneously make their choices
of X and Y. Remember, Persons 2 and 3 are not required to make the same actual
choice corresponding to their intended choice, and they are always free to select either
choice X or Y when they make their actual decision.
The End of the Period After everyone has made choices for the current period you
will be automatically switched to the outcome screen, as shown below. This screen
displays your choice as well as the choices of the people you are grouped with for the
current decision making period. It also shows your earnings for this period and your
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earnings for the experiment so far.
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your choice and the choice
of the others in your group on your Personal Record Sheet. Also record your current
and cumulative earnings. Then click on the OK button on the lower right of your
screen. Remember, at the start of the next period all participants are randomly re-
grouped, and you are randomly re-grouped each and every period of the experiment.
We will now pass out a questionnaire to make sure that all participants understand
how to read the earnings tables and understand other important features of these
instructions. Please fill it out now. Raise your hand when you are finished and we
will collect it. If there are any mistakes on any questionnaire, I will summarize the
relevant part of the instructions again. Do not put your name on the questionnaire.
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6.10 Appendix 6.B
Instructions for Phase 2: Baseline
We are entering the second and final phase of the experiment.
This phase will last for 40 periods.
Each of these 40 periods is identical to those in Phase 1.
Please continue to record all decisions on the Personal Record Sheet for your role;
they are attached to Phase 2 instructions.
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6.11 Appendix 6.C
Instructions for Phase 2: Leader Commitment
We are entering the second and final phase of the experiment.
This phase will last for 40 periods.
The only difference between periods in this phase and periods in the previous phase
is that each Person 1 will choose all of their actions for the next 40 periods now,
before any more periods are played.
That means in the next 40 periods, each Person 1 will be pre-committed to actions
that they will specify for each period after they finish reading this screen.
Those in the roles of Person 2 and Person 3 will make choices identically to how they
did in Phase 1.
Persons 2 and 3 will now have a few minute wait while those in the role of Person 1
make their next 40 choices.
Please continue to record all decisions on the Personal Record Sheet for your role;
they are attached to Phase 2 instructions.
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6.12 Appendix 6.D
Instructions for Phase 2: Both Commitment
We are entering the second and final phase of the experiment.
This phase will last for 40 periods.
There are two important differences between periods in this phase and periods in
the previous phase:
1. All Persons 1 will choose all of their actions for the next 40 periods now,
before any more periods are played.
That means in the next 40 periods, each Person 1 will be pre-committed to
actions that they will specify for each period after they finish reading this.
2. Half of those in the roles of Person 2 and Person 3 will indicate their intended
choices and choose all of their actions for all periods without observing
any choices made by either Person 1 or Person 2 and 3.
That means in the next 40 periods, half of the Persons 2 and 3 will be pre-
committed to intended choices and actions that they will choose before any
more periods occur.
The other half of the Persons 2 and Person 3 will make their choices in each period
as in Phase 1.
Note: for earnings square D, all Persons 2 and 3 will be restricted to intended choice
“X” and action “X”.
The division of the Persons 2 and 3 into these two categories will remain constant
across all 40 periods of this phase.
All participants will continue to be randomly re-grouped in each and every period.
Additionally, in each and every period, each Person 1 will be grouped with one
Person 2 or 3 who is pre-committed, i.e. has already indicated an intended choice
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and chosen an action for the period without observing any choices by others, and one
Person 2 or 3 who is not pre-committed, i.e. indicates his/her intended choice and
action for each period as in Phase 1.
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